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INTRODUCTION
A cornerstone of the United States Constitution is its separation of powers among the legislative, executive, and judicial
branches of the national government. 1 The Framers of the
Constitution reasoned that separated powers would guard
against tyranny by blocking the undue concentration of authority in any single governmental department.? In crafting the
Constitution, however, the Framers could not anticipate every
3
dispute their scheme of separated powers might engender.
One modern separation-of-powers conflict not specifically anticipated by the constitutional text involves so-called "intracircuit
''4
nonacquiescence.
1. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 120 (1976) (per curiam) (recognizing "the intent of the Framers that the powers of the three great branches
of the National Government be largely separate from one another").
2. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
3. See infra note 71.
4. Although the Framers did not record a discussion of the intracircuitnonacquiescence issue, there is no dearth of commentary by modern-day analysts. A recent and provocative exchange of views appears in: Estreicher &
Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J.
679 (1989) [hereinafter Estreicher & Revesz I]; DUller & Morawetz, Intracircuit Nonacquiescence and the Breakdown of the Rule of Law: A Response to
Estreicher & Revesz, 99 YALE L.J. 801 (1990); and Estreicher & Revesz, The
Uneasy Case Against IntracircuitNonacquiescence: A Reply, 99 YALE L.J. 831
(1990) [hereinafter Estreicher & Revesz II]. Other significant articles are:
Kubitschek, Social Security Administration Nonacquiescence: The Need for
Legislative Curbs on Agency Discretion, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 399 (1989) (discussing intracircuit nonacquiescence in terms of statutory reform); Maranville,
Nonacquiescence: Outlaw Agencies, Imperial Courts, and the Perils of Pluralism, 39 VAND. L. REV. 471 (1986) (discussing issues raised by intracircuit nonacquiescence but not proposing proper legal analysis), and Schwartz,
Nonacquiescence, Crowell v. Benson, and Administrative Adjudication, 77
GEO. L.J. 1815 (1989) (critiqued infra notes 97-151 and accompanying text).
Other treatments of intracircuit nonacquiescence include: Fallon, Social Security and Legal Precedent,CAsE & COM., Mar.-Apr. 1984, at 3; Heaney, Why
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Intracircuit nonacquiescence occurs when executive-branch
the High Rate of Reversals in Social Security Disability Cases?, 7 HA iNE L.
REV. 1, 8-11 (1984); Kuhl, The Social Security Administration'sNonacquiescence Policy, 1984 DET. C.L. REV. 913; Weis, Agency Non-acquiescence - Respectful Lawlessness or Legitimate Disagreement, 48 U. PrrT. L. REv. 845
(1987); Williams, The Social Security Administration'sPolicy of Non-acquiescence, 12 N. KY. L. REv. 253 (1985); Note, Social Security Administration in

Crsis. Non-acquiescence and Social Insecurity, 52 BROOKLYN L. REv. 89, 93133 (1986) [hereinafter BROOKLYN Note]; Note, 'Respectful Disagreement"
Nonacquiescence by Federal AdministrativeAgencies in United States Courts
of Appeals Precedents, 18 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 463 (1985) [hereinafter
COLUM. J. Note]; Note, Administrative Agency IntracircuitNonacquiescence,
85 COLUM. L. REV. 582 (1985) [hereinafter COLUM. REV. Note]; Comment, Social Security Continuing DisabilityReviews and the Practiceof Nonacquiescence, 16 CuMB. L. REv. 111, 116-20 (1985) [hereinafter CUMB. Comment]; Note,
AdministrativeNonacquiescence in JudicialDecisions,53 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
147 (1985) [hereinafter GEO. WASH. Note]; Note, CollateralEstoppel and Nonacquiescence: Precluding Government Relitigation in the Pursuitof Litigant
Equality, 99 HARV. L. REV. 847, 854-61 (1986) [hereinafter HARV. Note]; Note,
The Social Security Administration's Policy of Nonacquiescence, 62 IND. L.J.
1101 (1986) [hereinafter IND. Note]; Note, Federal Agency Nonacquiescence:
Defining and Enforcing ConstitutionalLimits on Bad FaithAgency Adjudication, 38 ME. L. REV. 185 (1986) [hereinafter ME. Note]; Note, Executive Nonacquiescence: Problems of Statutory Interpretationand Separationof Powers, 60
S. CAL. L. REv. 1143 (1987) [hereinafter S. CAL. Note]; Note, Government Nonacquiescence Case in Point. Social Security Litigation, 2 TOURO L. REv. 197
(1986) [hereinafter TOURO Note]; Note, Agency Nonacquiescence: Implementation, Justification and Acceptability, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1233 (1985)
[hereinafter WASH. & LEE Note]; Note, Nonacquiescence: Health and Human
Services' Refusal To Follow Federal Court Precedent, 63 WASH. U.L.Q. 737
(1985) [hereinafter WASH. Note]; Note, Denying the PrecedentialEffect of Federal CircuitCourtDecisions: Nonacquiescence by AdministrativeAgencies, 32
WAYNE L. REV. 151 (1985) [hereinafter WAYNE Note]; see also JudicialReview
of Agency Action: HHS Policy of Nonacquiescence, Oversight HearingsBefore
the Subcomm. on AdministrativeLaw & GovernmentalRelations of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) [hereinafter Oversight
Hearings];Social Security Disability Insurance Program. HearingBefore the
Senate Finance Comm., 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 57, 105-07 (1984) [hereinafter Social Security Hearing] (statement of Martha McSteen, Acting Commissioner,
SSA); id. at 113-25 (statement of Carolyn Kuhl, Assistant Attorney General);
FEDERAL CouRTS STuDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
COMMrITEE 59-60 (1990) [hereinafter COMMrITEE REPORT]; 1 FEDERAL COURTS
STUDY COMM., WORKING PAPERS AND SUBCOMMIrrEE REPORTS 324-27 (1990)
[hereinafter COMMrrE WoRKING PAPERS]; Administrative Conference of the
United States, Transcript of Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh Plenary Session 39-94 (Sept. 16, 1988) [hereinafter Conference Transcript] (on file with author).
The special problems of nonacquiescence by the National Labor Relations
Board in administering the National Labor Relations Act, see infra text accompanying notes 24-25, are considered in Dotson & Williamson, NLRB v. The
Courts: The Need For an Acquiescence Policy at the NLRB, 22 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 739 (1987); Ferguson & Bordoni, The NLRB vs. The Courts: The
Board's Refusal to Acquiesce in the Law of the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals, 35 N.Y.U. ANN. NAT'L CONF. LAB. LAW 195 (1983); Kafker, Nonacquies-
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decision makers refuse to follow a circuit court's precedents
even when acting subject to that circuit's, and no other circuit's,
power of judicial review.5 The Social Security Administration
(SSA), for example, long has insisted that it may direct agency
adjudicators to apply SSA national standards, rather than local
circuit court interpretations of governing statutes, absent a contrary court order in a particular claimant's case.6 Judges have
chafed at this practice, decrying agency disregard of a supervisory circuit court's precedent as defiance of the judicial power
"to say what the law is."'7 Executive officials, on the other
cence by the NLRB: Combat Versus Collaboration,3 LAB. LAW. 137 (1987);
Mattson, The United States Circuit Courts and the NLRB: 'StareDecisis' Only
Applies if the Agency Wins, 53 OKLA. B.J. 2561 (1982); Modjeska, The NLRB
Litigation Processes: A Response to Chairman Dotson, 23 WAKE FOREST L.
REv. 399 (1988); Silver & McAvory, The National Labor Relations Act at the
Crossroads,56 FORDHAM L.REv. 181 (1987); White, Time for a New Approach.-

Why the Judiciary Should Disregard the "Law of the Circuit" When Confronting Nonacquiescence by the National Labor Relations Board, 69 N.C.L.
REV. 639 (1991); and Zimmerman & Dunn, Relations Between the NLRB and
the Courts of Appeals: A Tale of Acrimony and Accommodation, 8 EMP.REL
L.J. 4 (1982-1983).
This Article seeks to avoid plowing old ground covered in the existing
literature. For this reason, the Article provides only essential background information, see infra Parts I-II, critiques existing work, see intfra Part I, and
propounds a fresh approach to the intracircuit-nonacquiescence problem, see
infra Parts IV-VII.
5. A more elaborate definitional exegesis appears iqfra Part I.
6. The SSA's practices are detailed in many of the authorities cited supra
note 4. See, e.g., Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 692-99. Notably, the
SSA in recent years has moved away from the strictest forms of intracircuit
nonacquiescence. See infra notes 502-03 and accompanying text. Even in doing so, however, the agency has rejected the position that "any acquiescence
policy ... is legally compelled." Proposed Rule for Application of Circuit
Court Law, 53 Fed. Reg. 46,630 (1988); see IND. Note, supra note 4, at 1109 (noting that SSA change of policy entailed no concession that prior policy was
unlawful).
7. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). An illustrative
case - using this Marbury-basedreasoning and also collecting other decisions
invoking this rationale - is Aldrich v. Heckler, 1985 Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH)
16,369, 2499-306, 2499-317 (D. Vt. June 25, 1985) (earlier opinion at 555 F.
Supp. 1080 (D. Vt. 1982)). Other leading SSA-nonacquiescence cases include:
Lopez v. Heckler, 572 F. Supp. 26 (C.D. Cal.), stay denied, 713 F.2d 1432 (9th
Cir.), partialstay granted, 463 U.S. 1328 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice), motion
to vacate stay denied, 464 U.S. 879 (1983), and districtcourt aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 725 F.2d 1489 (9th Cir.), vacated and remanded on other
grounds,469 U.S. 1082 (mem.), on remand, 106 F.R.D. 268 (C.D.Cal. 1984), stay
denied, 793 F.2d 1464 (9th Cir. 1985); Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315,
1352, 1361-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), vacated sub nom. Stieberger v. Bowen, 801 F.2d
29 (2d Cir. 1986) (later opinion at Stieberger v. Sullivan, 738 F. Supp. 716
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (addressing merits)); Hyatt v. Heckler, 579 F. Supp. 985, 989-90
(W.D.N.C. 1984), vacated, 757 F.2d 1455 (4th Cir. 1985), vacated and remanded
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hand, have defended the practice.8 They say that the judicial
power focuses on issuing judgments in discrete cases, rather
than declaring principles that invariably bind a "co-equal
branch."9 They argue further that nationwide adherence to
agency rules, even if contrary to some circuit court precedent,
(1) creates a salutary uniformity in agency administration of
national programs; (2) produces optimum "percolation" of legal
issues by facilitating circuit court reconsideration of controversial rulings; and (3) comports with Congress's design that agencies operate as expert administrators of the statutes they are
charged to enforce. 10 This clash between executive and judicial
sub nom. Hyatt v. Bowen, 476 U.S. 1167, district court qff'd in part on remand, 807 F.2d 376 (4th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 484 U.S. 820 (1987) (other
opinions at 586 F. Supp. 1154 (W.D.N.C. 1984) (awarding attorney fees); 618 F.
Supp. 227 (W.D.N.C. 1985) (modifying fee award); Hyatt v. Bowen, 118 F.R.D.
572 (W.D.N.C. 1987) (remedial order); Hyatt v. Sullivan, 711 F. Supp. 837
(W.D.N.C. 1989) (awarding additional fees); 711 F. Supp. 837 (W.D.N.C. 1989)
(additional order regarding pain evaluations), qff'd in part and rev'd in part
sub nom. Hyatt v. Sullivan, 899 F.2d 329 (4th Cir. 1990)); Holden v. Heckler,
584 F. Supp. 463 (N.D. Ohio 1984), remanded sub nom. Brest v. Secretary of
Health & Human Servs., 754 F.2d 372 (6th Cir.), on remand, 615 F. Supp. 686
(N.D. Ohio 1985) (later opinions at 615 F. Supp 684 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (summary
judgment for plaintiffs); 615 F. Supp 686 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (awarding attorney
fees); Holden v. Bowen, 668 F. Supp. 1042 (N.D. Ohio 1986) (awarding attorney
fees)); Polaski v. Heckler, 585 F. Supp. 1004, 1013 (D. Minn.), modified, 739
F.2d 1320 (8th Cir.), and vacated in part, 751 F.2d 943 (8th Cir. 1984), vacated
and remanded,476 U.S. 1167, districtcourt reinstatedon remand,804 F.2d 456
(8th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 482 U.S. 927 (1987). For other illustrative decisions critical of the SSA's intracircuit-nonacquiescence policy, see Capitano v.
Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 732 F.2d 1066, 1070 n.9 (2d Cir. 1984),
and Buckner v. Heckler, 580 F. Supp. 1536, 1542 (W.D. Mo. 1984); see also Ruppert v. Bowen, 871 F.2d 1172, 1177 (2d Cir. 1989). For commentaries collecting
relevant intracircuit-nonacquiescence cases, see Diller & Morawetz, supra note
4, at 801 n.2; Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 681 n.7, 699-702 (discussing
in particular Lopez and Stieberger cases); ME. Note, supra note 4, at 195 n.53;
TOURO Note, supra note 4, at 199 n.13.
8. See, e.g., Kuhl, supra note 4; Letter From Rex E. Lee to Sen. Robert
Dole (May 7, 1984), reprintedin 130 CoNG. Rrc. 25,977 (1984) [hereinafter Lee
Letter] (statement of Sen. Dole).
9. See Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 723; Kuhl, supra note 4, at
916; Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1851-56. See generally Meese, The Law of the
Constitution,61 TUL. L. RaV. 979, 985-86 (1987) (asserting the co-equal nature
of the federal government's three branches).
10. See, e.g., S & H Riggers & Erectors v. Occupational Safety & Health
Review Coxnm'n, 659 F.2d 1273, 1278 (5th Cir. Unit B Oct. 1981) (Occupational
Safety and Health Agency nonacquiescence defended as implementing "'duty
of formulating uniform and orderly national policy"' (quoting Occupational
Safety and Health Review Commission opinion at 15)); see also Schwartz,
supra note 4, at 1818-19 (same); White, supra note 4, at 665-66 (acquiescence
would not be "consistent with Congress's creation of the NLRB" as an "expert
agency" to formulate labor policy). See generally infra notes 411-13 and ac-
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decisionmakers has spawned one of the most important modern
issues in constitutional and administrative law - and an issue
that the Supreme Court has yet to visit.1
companying text (discussing a "uniformity" rational for intracircuit
nonacquiescence).
11. See Maranville, supra note 4, at 488-90 (issue "has not been definitively resolved"); Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1819 ("[tlhe lawfulness of nonacquiescence by federal administrative agencies is one of the significant
unresolved problems of modern administrative law"); BROOKLYN Note, supra
note 4, at 109-10 (constitutionality of intracircuit nonacquiescence "has yet to
be authoritatively determined"); COLUM. REV. Note, supra note 4, at 582 n.5
("no dispositive body of legal doctrine has developed" to resolve the nonacquiescence issue). In dissenting from the continuance of the stay order in Lopez
v. Heckler, Justice Brennan (joined by Justice Marshall) observed: "[lit is
clear to me that it is the Secretary who has not paid due respect to a coordinate branch of Government by expressly refusing to implement the binding
decisions of the Ninth Circuit." Lopez v. Heckler, 464 U.S. 879, 887 (1983)
(Brennan, J., dissenting). The other Justices, however, did not comment on
the constitutionality of intracircuit nonacquiescence because the proceedings
before the Court in Lopez focused on the proper makeup of the plaintiff class,
rather than on the constitutional issue. See, e.g., Kubitschek, supra note 4, at
407 (noting that Court in Lopez "did not address the issue"). Notably, the visibility and importance of the intracircuit nonacquiescence issue may be on the
rise in light of: (1) the likelihood of renewed congressional interest in the subject, see, e.g., H.R. 4797, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1990) (proposed legislation requiring, in general, intracircuit acquiescence by SSA); COMMITrEE REPORT,

supra note 4, at 60 (recommending legislation barring SSA intracircuit nonacquiescence and examination of intracircuit nonacquiescence by other agencies);
(2) the unresolved struggle of the Administrative Conference of the United
States to come to grips with the issue, see Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1823,
1832-33 & n.53; Conference Transcript, supra note 4, at 77 (remarks of Harris
Weinstein) (predicting Conference's revisiting of intracircuit-nonacquiescence
issue); see also Letter from Gary J. Edles, General Counsel of the Administrative Conference of the United States, to Dan T. Coenen (Aug. 2, 1990) (on file
with author) (noting that "[iut may turn out that the Conference has not yet
seen the last of this issue," which "remains alive in the courts"); and (3) recent
proposals for decreasing the number of open-ended venue statutes, which
would greatly increase opportunities for intracircuit nonacquiescence, see
Draft Recommendation on Federal Agency Nonacquiescence, 53 Fed. Reg.
24,331, 24,332-33 (1988) (Administrative Conference of the United States Judicial Review Committee draft); Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 764-70;
COLUm. REV. Note, supra note 4, at 608; see also COLUm. J. Note, supra note 4,
at 497-99 (discussing judicial and statutory alternatives for restricting venue
options). At the least, the intracircuit-nonacquiescence problem has not gone,
and will not go, away. See, e.g., Stieberger v. Sullivan, 738 F. Supp. 716, 732,
754 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (finding continuing "de facto non-acquiescence" and that
"SSA's practice of not issuing [Acquiescence Rulings] ... has resulted in nonacquiescence" even under SSA's most recent policies); Wilkerson v. Sullivan,
727 F. Supp. 925, 935 (E.D. Pa 1989) (finding continuing SSA intracircuit nonacquiescence), qff'd in part,rev'd in par, and vacated in partsub nom. In re
Petition of Sullivan, 904 F.2d 826 (3d Cir. 1990); Nash v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 675,
677 (2d Cir.) (citing "secretary's de facto policy of nonacquiescence in the law
of the circuit"), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 59 (1989); COMivfTTEE REPORT, supra
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A lively exchange of views in the legal literature has in12
creased the visibility of the intracircuit-nonacquiescence issue.
In 1989, Samuel Estreicher and Richard Revesz set forth a substantial defense of intracircuit nonacquiescence. 13 In the wake
of that article, two other scholarly pieces - one by Matthew
Diller and Nancy Morawetz 14 and the other by Joshua
Schwartz' 5 - sought to make the case against the practice.
This Article draws on insights made by all these analysts, but
also ventures well beyond their work. In particular it finds
fault, especially on the ground of incompleteness, in the constitutional challenges to intracircuit nonacquiescence mounted
in
16 It
both the Schwartz and the Diller and Morawetz pieces.
I

note 4, at 60 (noting that "Commissioner of Internal Revenue still asserts a
'right of non-acquiescence"'); Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 713 (explaining how "the IRS ...like SSA operates under a scheme that is essentially
venue-certain" and noting that the "IRS has ... engaged in intracircuit nonacquiescence"); id- at 717-18 (noting that "several agencies reported that they engage in intracircuit nonacquiescence" and discussing in particular the Federal
Labor Relations Authority, Federal Trade Commission, and the Merit Systems
Protection Board); Kubitschek, supra note 4, at 446-48 (noting examples of
nonacquiescence and concluding that SSA is continuing to engage in intracircuit nonacquiescence notwithstanding new policies designed to ameliorate
legal difficulties); Maranville, supra note 4, at 481, 485-86 (noting that "informal nonacquiescence appears to be widespread" and "some agencies seem disinclined to acknowledge the extent of their nonacquiescence activity"); S. CAL.
Note, supra note 4, at 1146 n.13 (detailing nonacquiescence by agencies other
than SSA); WAYNE Note, supra note 4, at 162 (same). See generally Estreicher
& Revesz I, supra note 4, at 681 (stating that history of nonacquiescence goes
back 60 years); Maranville, supra note 4, at 486 (noting that nonacquiescence
decisions "span a period of thirty years").
12. See generally supra note 4 (listing numerous scholarly treatments of
intracircuit nonacquiescence).
13. Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4. I use the term "substantial defense" deliberately, knowing that others - including Professors Estreicher
and Revesz themselves - might describe their treatment of intracircuit nonacquiescence quite differently. See, e.g., id. at 719 (characterizing approach as
putting "fairly significant checks" on nonacquiescence). I do so because
Professors Estreicher and Revesz emphasize the same considerations that the
Justice Department relies on in its advocacy of the legitimacy of intracircuit
nonacquiescence. See generally infra notes 416-17, 456-57, 490-91 and accompanying text (discussing executive branch's major rationales for nonacquescence). They also argue explicitly that there should be "a qualified
acceptance" of the practice. Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 753. For
these reasons and others, the Estreicher and Revesz treatment of intracircuit
nonacquiescence seems to me to be fairly characterized as setting forth a "substantial defense." See generally infra notes 525-39 and accompanying text
(describing and critiquing Estreicher and Revesz position in detail).
14. Diller & Morawetz, supra note 4.
15. Schwartz, supra note 4.
16. The Schwartz article, which offers an elaborate treatment of the intracircuit-nonacquiescence issue, is critiqued in detail infra notes 95-137 and
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also subjects the justifications for intracircuit nonacquiescence
advanced by Estreicher and Revesz to an evaluation not otherwise available in the literature.' 7 More generally, this Article
seeks to respond to the failure of all earlier commentaries to
propose any structure, apart from wide-open balancing, for
evaluating the nonacquiescence issue.' 8 It does so by advocating use of, and subjecting intracircuit nonacquiescence to, the
sort of "heightened scrutiny" analysis courts commonly employ
in evaluating governmental practices that raise evident threats
to important constitutional values.
This Article comprises seven parts. Part I defines intracircuit nonacquiescence, while Part II comments on secondary
challenges to the practice based on the fifth amendment's due
process clause. Part III then turns to the primary line of attack, rooted in the separation of powers, and criticizes existing
analyses that apply this constitutional principle. On the heels
of this critique, Part IV proposes a fresh approach by urging
courts to evaluate intracircuit nonacquiescence pursuant to the
"means/ends" methodology widely used in other constitutional
settings. Building on this discussion, Part V advocates so-called
"heightened scrutiny" of intracircuit nonacquiescence in light
of the demonstrably grave intrusion that practice makes on important separation-of-powers values. Part VI then considers
the many justifications offered for intracircuit nonacquiescence
and finds each of them wanting under even the less-exacting
"intermediate" brand of heightened scrutiny. Finally, Part VII
explores whether particular forms of intracircuit nonacquiescence - such as nonacquiescence limited to preliminary agency
decision makers or during the pendency of Supreme Court review - merit protection even if the practice is otherwise
unconstitutional.
accompanying text. The Diller and Morawetz article does not seek in similar
fashion to set forth a full-dressed, freestanding theory of intracircuit nonacquiescence; rather it is a "Comment" that seeks to respond to the extensive defense of intracircuit nonacquiescence constructed by Professors Estreicher and
Revesz. See Diller & Morawetz, supra note 4, at 803 ('This Comment critiques
Estreicher and Revesz' underlying assumptions about our legal system and
their proposed standard for permissible nonacquiescence."). Given this limited
mission, finding "fault" with the piece based on "incompleteness" may be unfair. The key point is that the Diller and Morawetz article - unlike this one
simply does not undertake to construct a full-scale theory concerning the
constitutionality of intracircuit nonacquiescence.
17. See infra notes 414-95 and accompanying text; cf. Schwartz, supra
note 4, at 1823 (noting that arguments for intracircuit nonacquiescence "have
not been fully answered by critics").
18. See infra note 216.
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In the end, this Article concludes that intracircuit nonacquiescence in all its forms is constitutionally unacceptable. The
development of that theme requires much refinement. At bottom, however, the reason for the unconstitutionality of the
practice is straightforward. No sufficiently powerful interest
justifies the serious affront to the judicial power posed by executive flouting of the considered pronouncements of a supervisory circuit court.' 9

I. DEFINING INTRACIRCUIT NONACQUIESCENCE
Because the term "intracircuit nonacquiescence" is not
self-explanatory, any discussion of the subject must begin with
definitions. Intracircuit nonacquiescence differs from two related agency practices, often referred to as "intercircuit nonacquiescence"' 2 and "nonacquiescence in the face of venue
choice." 2 ' Intercircuit nonacquiescence occurs when an agency
declines to follow one circuit court's pronouncements in
processing claims subject to review by a different court of appeals. 22 The Internal Revenue Service, for example, sometimes
engages in intercircuit nonacquiescence by directing agency decision makers not to follow a particular court of appeals ruling
when evaluating disputes arising in other circuits.P Nonacqui19. Notably, intracircuit nonacquiescence has been most actively practiced
and most widely debated and litigated in the context of the Social Security
program. See sources cited supra note 4. For that reason, this Article at times
focuses on the SSA experience and the arguments for or against intracircuit
nonacquiescence developed in connection with the SSA program. At the same
time, this Article undertakes a treatment of intracircuit nonacquiescence
designed to cover all agencies, including those agencies that resolve private disputes rather than dole out government benefits. To this end, this Article
seeks to deal directly with any special considerations raised by intracircuit
nonacquiescence by private-dispute-resolving agencies. See, e.g., infra notes
443, 471 and accompanying text; cf. Estreicher & Revesz II, supra note 4, at 843
(challenging Diller and Morawetz analysis of intracircuit nonacquiescence because it is "based simply upon an analysis of SSA"). Agencies are not fungible,
however, and some agencies possibly may construct agency-specific defenses
for intracircuit nonacquiescence that this Article does not anticipate in precise
form. I believe, however, that the central analysis developed in this Article like the quite different, but similarly generalized, analysis of Professors Estreicher and Revesz - is sufficiently comprehensive to cover all agencies. At
the least, the analysis set forth in this Article suggests that courts should place
the heaviest burden on any agency advancing the view that it is entitled to engage in intracircuit nonacquiescence even though other agencies may not.
20. See, e.g., Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 687.
21. See, ag., id- at 741.
22. See, eg., i& at 687.
23. See, e.g., Maranville, supra note 4, at 477 n.14; Williams, supra note 4,
at 263; see also Carter, The Commissioner'sNonacquiescence: A Casefor a Na-
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escence in the face of venue choice occurs when an agency fails
to follow a circuit court decision in a setting where judicial review lies both to the decision-issuing circuit court and to other,
different courts of appeals.2 The National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB), for example, nonacquiesces in this manner because a broad venue statute often forces the agency to act without knowing which circuit court ultimately will review the
NLRB's action in the case. 25 True intracircuit nonacquiescence
- in contrast to these other forms of nonacquiescence - occurs
when agency decision makers do know the sole circuit court in
which their action is reviewable and nonetheless refuse to fol26
low that court's precedents.
tional Court of Tax Appeals, 59 TEMP. L.Q. 879, 881-901 (1986) (discussing the
history, rationale, and process of Internal Revenue Service nonacquiescence);
Rodgers, The Commissioner "Does Not Acquiesce," 59 NEB. L. REV. 1001, 100412 (1980) (same). The legality of intercircuit nonacquiescence is widely accepted. See, e.g., Lopez v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1489, 1497 n.5 (9th Cir.), vacated
and remanded on other grounds, 469 U.S. 1082 (1984) (mem.); Estreicher &
Revesz I, supra note 4, at 735-41; Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1856; COLUM. REV.
Note, supra note 4, at 583.
24. See Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 687, 705-12, 716-17;
Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1833-34, 1856-57.
25. See, eg., Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 709-10. For an extensive discussion of the NLRB practice, see White, supra note 4; see also Maranville, supra note 4, at 494 & n.73 (citing "broad venue provisions" governing
NLRB); COLUM. REV. Note, supra note 4, at 587-88 (discussing NLRB nonacquiescence and collecting cases). Although most commentators conclude that
nonacquiescence in the face of venue choice is permissible, see, e-g., Estreicher
& Revesz I, supra note 4, at 742, others have urged the NLRB to abandon the
practice, see Dotson & Williamson, supra note 4, at 744-47; Ferguson &
Bordoni, supra note 4, at 220-24; Silver & McAvory, supra note 4, at 204-05;
Weis, supra note 4, at 846-48. Circuit court decisions critical of particular applications of the NLRB's policy are collected in Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1821
n.14. See also Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 710-11 nn.164-65 (collecting materials on NLRB nonacquiescence).
26. See, e.g., Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 687, 719 (defining intracircuit nonacquiescence as arising when "the agency, at the time of its administrative proceedings, knows, by virtue of the venue rules, which court of
appeals will review its action, and yet proceeds contrary to a ruling of that
court"). A modest gloss on this definition is necessary; intracircuit nonacquiescence is present also "[w]hen all of the circuits in which an action for judicial
review might be brought have rejected the agency's position." Schwartz, supra
note 4, at 1857 n.159; accord, e.g., Estreicher & Revesz I1, supra note 4, at 832
n.4, 843 n.64 (noting that "[i]ntracircuit nonacquiescence can also occur in the
face of venue choice, where an agency's position has been rejected in all circuits that can review a particular decision," and noting further that "several
agencies engage in such conduct"). In these situations, supervisory circuit
court law is, after all, no less determinate than when the agency's action is reviewable by only a single circuit that has set forth a rule of law contrary to the
agency's view.
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This form of nonacquiescence is well illustrated by the administration of the Social Security program.2 7 Social Security
disability claimants initiate the claim-seeking process by filing a
request for benefits in a local Social Security office. 2 If benefits are denied both by frontline claims evaluators and by
higher-level SSA officials responsible for reviewing denials, an
appeal lies solely to the local district court and, from that court,
to the regional court of appeals. Thus, Social Security decision makers can determine readily which circuit court has review authority over any particular claimant's case. 30
Notwithstanding this fact, the SSA began in the 1960s to issue
rulings that ordered agency decision makers not to follow specified circuit court interpretations of the Social Security Act even
when adjudicating claims within the decision-issuing circuit.3 '
In addition, SSA policy makers generally informed agency decision makers that they should apply SSA rules even if incompatible with local circuit court law.32 These directives created a

profound practical problem for SSA claimants: they lost the
benefit of favorable circuit court precedent unless they endured
a prolonged agency review process and then secured a judicial
order requiring the agency to follow local circuit court law.a3
Questions of definitional nicety lurk in any discussion of in27. See sources cited supra note 4.
28. E.g., Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 692.
29. E.g., i& at 692-93.
30. E.g., i&i at 693-94. The SSA venue statute is 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1988).
For an extensive discussion of SSA procedures and practices during the 1980s,
see COMMITrEE WORKING PAPERS, supra note 4, at 286-327.
31. See, e.g., Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 694 & n.64; Maranville, supra note 4, at 477 n.15 (collecting SSA nonacquiescence rulings). In
1982, for example, SSA directed its decision makers - including its decision
makers in the western states - not to follow the Ninth Circuit's decisions in
Patti v. Schweiker, 669 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1982), and Finnegan v. Matthews, 641

F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1981). See SSR 82-49c, 20 C.F.R. § 416.994 (1982); SSR 8210c, 20 C.F.R. § 416.994(e) (1982). Those Ninth Circuit decisions required a
showing of some medical improvement before the Secretary could terminate
payments to an SSA recipient previously found to be disabled. See Patti,669
F.2d at 587; Finnegan,641 F.2d at 1347. As a result of SSA's nonacquiescence

in these decisions, the SSA terminated payments to numerous recipients in the

Ninth Circuit without any showing of medical improvement as required by
Ninth Circuit case law. This particular manifestation of intracircuit nonacqui-

escence culminated in the Lopez litigation, see supra note 7, which is summarized in Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 699-701. See also Schwartz,
supra note 4, at 1817 n.3 (detailing history of medical-improvement
nonacquiescence).
32. See, e.g., Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 699; Kuhl, supra note
4, at 913.
33.

See infra note 66.
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tracircuit nonacquiescence. 34 The SSA's practices, however, il34. For example, one definitional question concerns how certain a particular court's review authority must be before an agency may be said to be engaging in intracircuit nonacquiescence. Even with respect to a Social Security
disability claim, the SSA may not be absolutely certain as to the reviewing
court because an applicant may relocate his or her home during the claims
process. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1988) (specifying that venue in SSA judicialreview action lies in the district where "the plaintiff resides"). Nonetheless,
the probability that the local circuit will review the local decision maker's action is so high that all agree that a failure to follow that circuit court's precedents constitutes intracircuit nonacquiescence. See cases cited supra note 4
(cases critical of SSA practice). The probability of review by an identified circuit court may be similarly high in particular cases handled by agencies that
normally act with venue uncertainty, as when the NLRB takes action after a
remand from a particular circuit court. See, e.g., Ithaca College v. NLRB, 623
F.2d 224, 227 (2nd Cir.), cert denied, 449 U.S. 975 (1980); see also Estreicher &
Revesz I, supra note 4, at 712 n.172 (noting that where cases are on remand
from a particular court of appeals, it is "virtually certain they [will] return to
that court"). But see White, supra note 4, at 647 n.37 (noting that, even in
these cases, venue uncertainty exists). Professor Estreicher has already suggested a test as good as any for deciding whether the agency is subject to the
limits on intracircuit nonacquiescence in such cases: whether there is a "fair
certainty" that a particular circuit court will hear the case. Estreicher, The
Second Circuit and the NLRB 1980-1981: A Case Study in JudicialReview of
Agency Action, 48 BROOKLYN L. REV.1063, 1078 (1982). Accordingly, if such a
"fair certainty" exists, a failure to follow that circuit's precedent is properly
defined as intracircuit nonacquiescence.
A second- definitional question concerns whether the term "nonacquiescence" properly describes an agency's denigration of circuit court precedent
when it appears as a litigant in court. See White, supranote 4, at 661 (arguing
lawfulness of "nonacquiescence" by NLRB "as litigant" even though "venue
uncertainty vanishes once a [Board] order is before a particular circuit court").
Professor Maranville asserts, for example, that "[n]onacquiescence involves internal agency activity," but not "the agency's external behavior in litigation."
Maranville, supra note 4, at 475. Following her lead, this Article focuses on
internal action by an agency, including but not limited to agency adjudication.
See infra note 128. The separate but related question of whether an agency
may without exception "respectfully disagree" with a circuit court's precedents, even when filing papers in the courts of that circuit, is discussed infra
note 499.
Finally, an agency may "nonacquiesce" in different types of legal rulings.
For example, an agency may nonacquiesce in constitutional rulings or in interpretations of federal statutes that have no special connection to the particular
agency (as when the Immigration and Naturalization Service takes action on a
Freedom of Information Act request). In the most common case, however, an
agency declines to honor a court's interpretation of the statute subject to the
agency's own specialized administration - as when the National Labor Relations Board nonacquiesces in a judicial interpretation of the National Labor
Relation Act. This Article focuses on the latter brand of nonacquiescence,
which is the most defensible because it draws support from agency claims of
specialized expertise. See, eg., Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 720 &
n.214. Because this Article concludes in the end that intracircuit nonacquiescence, even in such "enabling statute" rulings is unconstitutional, see infra
Part VI. C., it follows a fortiori that an agency may not engage in intracircuit
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lustrate well the central constitutional problem: May agency
decisionmakers determining a citizen's rights constitutionally
disregard a circuit court's interpretations of governing statutes
even though those decisionmakers know their actions are reviewable by that, and no other, circuit court? The remainder of
this Article addresses that question.
II.

THE EQUAL PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS

ARGUMENTS
Courts and commentators generally have concluded that
the most potent constitutional challenge to intracircuit nonacquiescence rests on the separation of powers.as This Article follows that lead by focusing on the separation-of-powers line of
attack. Others have argued, however, that intracircuit nonacquiescence violates the precepts of equal protection6 and due
process-" embodied in the fifth amendment.ss These additional
nonacquiescence in supervisory-circuit precedents interpreting the Constitution or statutes other than the one subject to the agency's specialized
administration.
35. See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
36. See Kubitschek, supra note 4, at 432 n.187, 433-34 (citing equal protection cases and suggesting that SSA nonacquiescence violates equal protection
requirement); COLUM. REV. Note, supra note 4, at 603; HARV. Note, supra note
4, at 857-58; S. CAL. Note, supra note 4, at 1170-71, 1173. For judicial discussions lending the equal protection argument a sympathetic ear, see Stieberger
v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315, 1367, 1374 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), vacated sub nom,
Stieberger v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986); Lopez v. Heckler, 572 F. Supp.
26, 30 (C.D. Cal. 1983), stay denied, 713 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir.), partial stay
granted, 463 U.S. 1328 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice), motion to vacate stay denied, 464 U.S. 879 (1983), and districtcourt aff'd in partand rev'd in part, 725
F.2d 1489 (9th Cir.), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 469 U.S. 1082
(1984) (mem.).
37. See BROOKLYN Note, supra note 4, at 122-23; IND. Note, supra note 4,
at 1116-19; ME. Note, supra note 4, at 252; S. CAL. Note, supra note 4, at 1171;
see also Diller & Morawetz, supra note 4, at 826 (noting that nonacquiescence
raises "serious due process questions"). At least one district court has endorsed the due process argument in assessing SSA nonacquiescence. See Hyatt
v. Heckler, 579 F. Supp. 985, 1002 (W.D.N.C. 1984), vacated, 757 F.2d 1455 (4th
Cir. 1985), vacated and remanded sub nom. Hyatt v. Bowen, 476 U.S. 1167, district court aff'd in part on remand, 807 F.2d 376 (4th Cir. 1986), cert denied,
484 U.S. 820 (1987); see also Polaski v. Heckler, 585 F. Supp. 1004, 1011 (D.
Minn. 1984) (preliminarily deciding that intracircuit nonacquiescence violates
due process and separation of powers), modified, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir.), and
vacated in part, 751 F.2d 943 (8th Cir. 1984), vacated and remanded, 476 U.S.
1167, districtcourt reinstatedon remand, 804 F.2d 456 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 927 (1987); Stieberger v. Sullivan, 738 F. Supp. 716, 730 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (strongly indicating that intracircuit nonacquiescence violates equal protection and due process).
38. Commentators have argued also that intracircuit nonacquiescence vio-
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constitutional theories deserve at least an introduction.
A.

EQUAL PROTECTION

The equality-based challenge to intracircuit nonacquiescence arises because the practice produces unequal treatment of
the rich and the poor.39 Nonacquiescing agencies do not themselves discriminate; they subject rich and poor alike to the
agency's legal rules. Unequal treatment results, however, because only those claimants with sufficient resources can secure
judicial review and the application of favorable circuit court
law it necessarily brings.4° This discrimination against the
lates the sub-constitutional principle of stare decisis. See Schwartz, supra note
4, at 1827 n.31 (collecting authorities). The stare decisis argument has much to
commend it, especially when the agency acts in a "judge-like" adjudicative capacity. The rationales supporting that argument, however, are the same structural reasons set forth below in propounding the separation-of-powers
argument. See infra Part I; cf Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1828 (suggesting
that stare decisis argument rests on "unexamined assumptions about the relationship between administrative agencies and article I courts"). Accordingly,
that argument is not independently addressed in this Article. Professors Estreicher and Revesz take a different subconstitutional tack, arguing that the
"arbitrary and capricious" standard of the Adminstrative Procedure Act
(APA) gives rise to a complex, multi-pronged set of factors defining when intracircuit nonacquiescence is permissible. See Estreicher & Revesz I, supra
note 4, at 759-64. This Article does not explore whether the APA supports the
sort of elaborate test proposed by Professors Estreicher and Revesz. If Professors Estreicher and Revesz are correct, however, in asserting that "review of
agency action under the APA is far more substantively demanding than [constitutional] rationality review," Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 721
n.216, they provide good reason for concluding that the limitations on intracircult nonacquiescence espoused in this Article are proper as a matter of statutory, as well as constitutional, law. Professors Estreicher and Revesz, after all,
argue that the APA invites balancing in assessing the legality of agency action
and that, for example, the government's justifications for nonacquiescence
must give way when "nonacquiescence is carried too far and becomes a tool for
defiance of judicial review." See Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 759-61.
Given these premises, the critique of the Estreicher and Revesz position developed below, see infra notes 526-39 and accompanying text, and the powerful
reasons for foreclosing intracircuit nonacquiescence altogether, see infra Part
V, the balance struck in this Article would seem no less legitimate than the
balance struck by Professors Estreicher and Revesz if one is called on to engage in balancing under the APA.
39. See, e.g., Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 690 n.39 (describing
discrimination favoring "parties with greater litigation resources" as the "central cost of nonacquiescence"); Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1818 (noting that
nonacquiescence imposes substantial burdens on claimant).
40. Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 683-84 (expressing concern
about "undesirable distributional consequences that arise when only parties
with sufficient resources to pursue an appeal to the courts can benefit from a
favorable rule of law"). Of course, the risk of discrimination against the poor
may be reduced outside the SSA context. See, e.g., Kafker, supra note 4, at
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weakest members of society fairly merits description as "prejudicial and unfair."4: There exist, however, two basic difficulties
in transmuting that fact into a viable equal protection claim.
First, the impoverished do not make up a constitutionally suspect class. 42 Second, even if they did, the practice of intracircuit nonacquiescence "was not established for the purpose of
discriminating"4 against the poor." These realities leave little
doubt that a straightforward equal protection challenge to intracircuit nonacquiescence will produce only minimal scrutiny5
and a resulting refusal to invalidate the practice.4 6 Critics thus
142-43 (noting that parties before the NLRB "tend to be relatively affluent
and sophisticated and thus more likely to appeal"); Maranville, supra note 4,
at 534 (noting that, unlike in SSA context, "[m]any, though certainly not all, of
the affected unions and employees [in NLRB cases] will have substantial resources for obtaining judicial relief"). That fact, however, will provide cold
comfort to those persons who do lack the wherewithal to finance a judicial appeal. See, ag., Commissioner, INS v. Jean, 110 S. Ct. 2316, 2322 n.14 (1990)
(noting that "'small businesses... do not have the resources to fully litigate'"
(quoting H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1980))). Notably, intracircuit nonacquiescence also adversely and discriminatorily affects those who,
even if not impecunious, "have a stake in the controversy that is too small to
justify the expense of resorting to the courts." Estreicher & Revesz I, supra
note 4, at 749 n.325.
41. Lopez, 572 F. Supp. at 30 (condemning "dual system of law," especially
"with respect to the types of individuals here concerned, whose resources,
health and prospective longevity are, by definition, relatively limited"); accord,
e.g., Neuborne, The Role of The Legislative and Executive Branches in Interpreting the Constitution,73 CORNELL L. REv. 375, 378 (1988) (maintaining that
"a theory of law that the law depends on how much money you have and not
on a uniform self-executing duty to comply, is fundamentally inconsistent with

our values").
42. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980); San Antonio Indep.
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1973); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S.
656, 660 (1973) (per curiam); accord IND. Note, supra note 4, at 1117.
43. Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979) (emphasis added).
44. Rather, as already noted, the nonacquiescence doctrine was established for such purposes as ensuring uniformity and facilitating circuit court
reconsideration of controversial rulings. See supra text accompanying note 10.
It also might be suggested that SSA intracircuit nonacquiescence unconstitutionally discriminates against the disabled. The disabled, however, also are not
a suspect class, see City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S.
432, 442-46 (1985), and the SSA's policy is aimed at all claimants rather than
only those claimants who actually are disabled. A claim of discrimination
against the disabled thus adds no power to the equal protection challenge.
45. See generally infra notes 223-24 and accompanying text (explaining
that courts usually give substantial deference to the government in "minimal
scrutiny" equal protection cases).
46. See IND. Note, supra note 4, at 1117 (noting that intracircuit nonacquiescence is rationally related to legitimate end of achieving uniformity). See
generally infra note 413 and accompanying text (identifying government interests advanced by intracircuit nonacquiescence).
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must seek some other equality-based argument for attacking intracircuit nonacquiescence.
The most promising approach may lie in arguing that intracircuit nonacquiescence violates the principle of cases like
Boddie v. Connecticut4 7 because it impinges on a "protected
right" of meaningful access on the part of indigents to the application of controlling legal principles. 48 Recent Supreme
Court decisions, however, have restricted the room to argue for
recognition of such a right.49 Moreover, one logical way of
equalizing the treatment between rich and poor victims of intracircuit nonacquiescence would be to give the poor free access
to the same corrective judicial review proceedings that more
prosperous claimants can afford.50 In Ortwein v. Schwab,5 '
however, the Court rejected a claimed right of government-paid
access to judicial review of agency-conducted benefits proceedings.5 2 The Court's reasoning - which seems equally applicawas that access to the agency's
ble in this context proceedings was "not conditioned on payment of any fee" and
that a claim for governmental benefits involves "no fundamental interest.15 3 Ortwein suggests that lawyers who mount a
47. 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971) (recognizing indigent right of free access to
legal system to obtain divorce); see also Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 16 (1981)
(holding that state's refusal to pay for indigent defendant's blood grouping in
paternity suit violated due process).
48. See Boddie, 401 U.S. at 379-80.
49. See, e.g., Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 83-84
(1988); Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 16 n.12 (1981); United States v. Kras, 409
U.S. 434, 446 (1973); see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986) (expressing reluctance "to discover new fundamental rights"). See generally Estreicher & Revesz I,supra note 4, at 734-35 (concluding that United States
Supreme Court cases indicate that de facto discrimination against the indigent
does not render nonacquiescence per se invalid).
50. Notably, this fact helps explain why an equal protection analysis is
properly viewed as less central to evaluating the constitutionality of intracircuit nonacquiescence than the separation-of-powers analysis. Although government funding of appeals would eliminate the disparate effects of
intracircuit nonacquiescence on the rich and the poor, such funding would not
answer the objections that courts are the primary expositors of law, and that
their pronouncements bind the executive branch.
51. 410 U.S. 656 (1973) (per curiam).
52. Id at 660.
53. Id at 659-60 (citations omitted). DUller and Morawetz seek to distinguish Ortwein on the ground that in that case "the Court noted that there was
no reason to doubt that the administrative proceedings had been conducted
fairly." DUller & Morawetz, supra note 4, at 825-26 (citing Ortwein, 410 U.S. at
659 n.4). The passage from Ortwein they rely on, however, indicates only that
the record contained no support for the conclusion that the agency hearings
violated "the minimal requirements of due process" established in Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266-71 (1970). The question whether intracircuit nonacqui-
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Boddie-based attack on intracircuit nonacquiescence will be
fighting an uphill battle.
B.

DUE PROCESS

An alternative fifth-amendment challenge to intracircuit
nonacquiescence is available not only to the poor, but to all
agency claimants. That challenge posits that, regardless of the
separation of powers, an agency's refusal to follow a supervisory circuit court's precedent offends procedural due process
because it raises an unacceptable "risk of an erroneous deprivation."' 4 This risk arises, the argument goes, because intracircuit nonacquiescence necessarily deprives agency claimants of
the benefit of controlling law.ss Critics of this argument urge
that it "entails circular reasoning,"' s because circuit court pronouncements cannot constitute "controlling law" unless separation-of-powers considerations require agency adherence to
circuit court precedent.5 7 This response, however, overstates
the case against the procedural-due-process challenge.
The separation-of-powers principle mandates maintenance
of checked and balanced governmental structures.5s Due process, in contrast, mandates "fundamental fairness" in the government's treatment of individuals.5 9 Two such differing
concepts might well warrant differing conclusions with respect
to whether an agency must honor a supervisory circuit court's
pronouncement. For example, one might defend intracircuit
nonacquiescence against separation-of-powers attack by reasoning that an agency's ability to disregard circuit court rulings folescence violates the procedural due process rights (of rich and poor alike)
under precedents like Goldberg is considered infra notes 54-66 and accompanying text.
54. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
55. Id Moreover, at least in SSA cases, the claim of a due process violation gathers strength from "the private interest that will be affected by the official action." 1I. This is so because the unavailability of disability benefits

threatens to deprive claimants "of basic necessities such as food, shelter, and
necessary medical care." Diller & Morawetz, supra note 4, at 816 (collecting
numerous citations to case law).
56. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1828 n.37.
57. I&; accord Maranville, supra note 4, at 518-19; see Estreicher &
Revesz I, supra note 4, at 732-33 & n.266.
58. See, e.g., Bator, The Constitutionas Architecture: Legislative and Administrative Courts Under Article III, 65 IND. L.J. 233, 259 (1989) (describing
separation of powers as reflecting "structural and political ideals" rather than
"a system of private rights").
59. E.g., Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 16 (1981) (citing "the requirement of
'fundamental fairness' expressed by the Due Process Clause").
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lows from the lack of any structural mandate that agency
action be subjected to circuit court review at all.O° Such reasoning, however, does not answer the argument that it is fundamentally unfair for an agency to deny claimants the benefit of a
reviewing circuit's precedents when Congress in fact has pro61
vided for circuit court review.
Whether disregard of a supervisory circuit court's pronouncements violates the due process norm of fundamental
fairness calls for the exercise of value-laden judgment in a setting where few Supreme Court precedents provide guidance.
The courts have indicated, however, that due process requires
adjudicators to heed at least some external legal standards, 62 including in the agency setting.6 3 Moreover, on its face, an
agency decisionmaker's adherence to self-serving agency rules
already invalidated by the reviewing circuit court raises a tension with the norms of "meaningful"' ' and "impartial" 6s deci66
sionmaking that lie at the core of the due process guarantee.
60. See infra notes 173, 177 and accompanying text.

61. Cf.Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355-57 (1963) (due process requires provision of counsel on criminal appeal even though state has no duty

to afford appeals).
62. See Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 347 (1980) (state court's failure to
honor state law requiring discretionary jury sentencing violated due process);
Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 93-95 (1965) (when state court interprets state criminal statute narrowly to avoid overbreadth, due process requires state to ensure that defendant be convicted under statute as construed,
rather than as written); Roy v. City of Augusta, 712 F.2d 1517, 1523-24 (1st Cir.
1983) (federal due process arguably violated when local agency "flouted the
mandate of the state court"); see also Chilicky v. Schweiker, 796 F.2d 1131,
1138 (9th Cir. 1986) (suggesting, inter alia, that a "[k]nowing use of unpublished criteria and rules contrary to the Social Security Act" and "[i]ntentional
disregard of dispositive favorable evidence" might violate due process), rev'd
on other grounds, 487 U.S. 412 (1988).
63. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1971) ("The hearing required
by the Due Process Clause must be 'meaningful' . .. and 'appropriate to the
nature of the case.' ... It is a proposition which hardly seems to need explication that a hearing which excludes consideration of an element essential to the
decision ... does not meet this standard." (citations omitted)); Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970) (benefits decision "must rest solely on the legal
rules and evidence adduced at the hearing").
64. E.g., Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
65. E.g., Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980).
66. See Diller & Morawetz, supra note 4, at 826 (questioning compatibility
with due process of an "administrative process [that] becomes a series of obstacles yielding decisions that are predictably subject to reversal"). Moreover, intracircuit nonacquiescence - especially in SSA cases - runs hard up against
the basic due process proposition that "justice delayed [is] justice denied." Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 221 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see, eg.,
Armstrong, 380 U.S. at 552; Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532,
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The key point is that extrapolations from such due process values - which this Article leaves for elaboration by others may justify invalidation of intracircuit nonacquiescence
even if
67
that practice survives separation-of-powers attack.
At the same time, it cannot be denied that the due process
and separation-of-powers critiques of intracircuit nonacquiescence share much common ground. For example, those governmental interests said to shelter nonacquiescence from a
separation-of-powers challenge will inform likewise the issue
whether adherence to supervisory circuit court precedent is
part of the process that is due under the fifth amendment. 6s
More fundamentally, any elaboration of the requirements of
"fundamental fairness" must draw on the same rule-of-law
norms that underpin the separation-of-powers attack.69 This
Article now turns to that central line of constitutional analysis.
III.

THE SEPARATION-OF-POWERS PROBLEM AND A
REJECTION OF OTHER APPROACHES

Courts and scholars widely agree that the key constitutional question concerning intracircuit nonacquiescence is
whether the practice transgresses the so-called "separation of
543 (1985); Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 66 (1979); Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S.
379, 38 (1975). This is so because a "potentially devastating consequence of
nonacquiescence is that those parties before the agency that can and do appeal
to court must wait until they have exhausted administrative and judicial proceedings before they can receive the benefit of the circuit's law." Diller &
Morawetz, supra note 4, at 815; see also Maranville, supra note 4, at 495 (nonacquiescence can delay favorable decision for years); Williams, supra note 4, at
261 (noting "lengthy period of time" involved in administrative proceedings);
BROoKLYN Note, supra note 4, at 122 n.180 (noting that exhaustion of SSA disability claimant's administrative remedies "takes close to two years on the
average").
67. Moreover, the availability of a freestanding due process theory could
have significant practical consequences. Most important, although congressional authorization of intracircuit nonacquiescence might neutralize any separation-of-powers attack, see generally infra notes 208-11 and accompanying
text, Congress has no similar ability to alter judicial definition of the procedural safeguards that the due process clause imposes, see, ag., Cleveland Bd. of
Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 540-41 (1985). The finding of a due process
violation might also support a private damages remedy not otherwise available
based on a violation of the separation of powers. See Davis v. Passmann, 442
U.S. 228, 243-44 (1979) (authorizing suit under due process clause of fifth
amendment).
68. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (laying weight in determining what process is due on "the Government's interest, including ...the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail").
69. See infm Part V.
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powers principle." 70 That principle, however, is notoriously
cryptic. 71 No Supreme Court decision instructs courts to employ a history-based analysis, 72 a presumptive rule of invalidity,73 or a multi-factor test 74 when they turn to unresolved
separation-of-powers issues. In particular, the Court has considered only a handful of cases pitting the executive branch
against the judiciary, 75 and those cases do not purport to declare any overarching analytical framework. 76 A basic problem
in assessing the constitutionality of intracircuit nonacquiescence thus lies in deciding how even to structure the legal

analysis.
Both proponents and opponents of intracircuit nonacquiescence have responded to this difficulty by seeking to distill dispositive principles from supposedly controlling Supreme Court
decisions. At least two courts have intimated that the Supreme
70. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988); see, e.g., Estreicher &
Revesz I, supra note 4, at 722 (separation-of-powers claim is "by far the most
central"); Schwartz, supra note 4 (briefly discussing due process and equal
protection claims, while analyzing extensively whether intracircuit nonacquiescence comports with Constitution's allocation of powers); Weis, supra note 4,
at 849 (noting that the dispute between the courts and administrative agencies
is "an institutional one" that "has its roots... in the separation of powers doctrine"). The leading decisions holding intracircuit nonacquiescence unconstitutional also opt for a separation-of-powers rationale. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra
note 4, at 1824 n.23 (collecting numerous separation-of-powers-based decisions); cf. supra note 36-37 (setting forth equal protection and due process
cases).

71. See, e.g., Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government Separationof
Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLrM. L. REV. 573, 603-04 (1984); WAYNE
Note, supra note 4, at 184 (emphasizing indeterminacy of separation of powers
principle); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (noting the "poverty of really useful and unambiguous authority applicable to concrete problems of executive power," and
arguing that "what our forefathers did envision, or would have envisioned had
they foreseen modern conditions, must be defined from materials almost as
enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was called upon to interpret for Pharaoh").
72. See, e.g., Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2909
(1989).
73. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)
(applying "virtually per se rule of invalidity"); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S.
429, 440-41 (1980) (setting forth "general rule" but exploring whether exception is justified on facts presented).
74. See, e.g., Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 44445 (1979); Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279-89 (1977).
75. Such decisions include United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707-13
(1974), and Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 175-80 (1803).
76. But cf infra notes 239-49 and accompanying text (explaining that the
Supreme Court has used a heightened scrutiny analysis in many separation-ofpowers decisions).
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Court's decision in Cooper v. Aaron7 7 deals a death blow to in-

tracircuit nonacquiescence. 78 Professor Schwartz's recent critique of intracircuit nonacquiescence relies in similar fashion
on Crowell v. Benson.79 Proponents of nonacquiescence, on the
other hand, argue that the practice has been validated by the
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Mendoza.8 0 Likewise, Professors Estreicher and Revesz argue that the constitutionality of much, if not all, intracircuit nonacquiescence is
established by Congress's authorization of the practice and decisions, like Sheldon v. Sill,8 ' that broadly validate congressional
control over the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts.82 The
matter, however, is not so easy. Each of these four case-based
approaches - two attacking intracircuit nonacquiescence and
two defending it - fails to solve the constitutional difficulty.
77. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
78. See Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315, 1356-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1985),
vacated sub nom. Stieberger v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986); Lopez v.
Heckler, 725 F.2d 1489, 1497 n.5 (9th Cir.), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 469 U.S. 1082 (1984) (mem.). Making in effect the same argument,
other courts and commentators have cited Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803). See cases and sources cited supra note 7. Clearly, Cooper
is the more apposite of these two authorities because it speaks directly to the
extra-judgment effect of judicial pronouncements of law. See infra text accompanying notes 271-83. For a collection of the authorities relying on Cooper
or Marbury or both, see Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 722 n.221, and
Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1824 n.26 & 1830 n.46.
79. 285 U.S. 22 (1932); see Schwartz, supra note 4.
80. 464 U.S. 154 (1984); see sources cited infra note 148. For a discussion

of Mendoza, see supra Part III. C.
81. 49 U.S. (8 How.) 440 (1850).

82. Id. at 448-49. Sheldon, together with many other Supreme Court decisions, recognizes broad congressional authority to withhold jurisdiction over
any class of the cases and controversies set forth in article III from lower federal courts. Id.; accord, e.g., Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 103 (1980); Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943) ('The Congressional power to ordain
and establish inferior courts includes the power 'of investing them with jurisdiction either limited, concurrent, or exclusive, and of withholding jurisdiction
from them in the exact degrees and character which to Congress may seem
proper for the public good."' (quoting Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 245
(1845))). See generally L. TRIBE, AMEjCAN CONsTITImoNAL LAW § 3-5 (2d ed.
1988) (discussing Congress's constitutional power to create and control the federal judiciary). Although Professors Estreicher and Revesz do not explicitly
cite these cases, they rest their "implied authorization" defense of intracircuit
nonacquiescence on "the wide-ranging power that Congress enjoys over the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts." Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at
730.
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COOPER V. AARON

Some suggest that Cooper v. Aaron83 establishes by itself
that intracircuit nonacquiescence is unconstitutional. 8 4 In
Cooper, the Court declared it the duty of southern political
leaders to honor the ruling in Brown v. Board of Educationa5
even if not subject to a specific judicial desegregation decree. 86
Critics of intracircuit nonacquiescence argue that agency officers have no less of a duty to "acquiesce" in the rulings of the
federal judiciary than did the state officials upbraided in
87

Cooper.
Others have offered reasons why Cooper does not control
challenges to intracircuit nonacquiescence88 The main reason,
however, is that the government's defense of intracircuit nonacquiescence rests on considerations unique to the operation of
federal agencies: the value of uniformity in administration of
national agency programs, the special need for percolation of issues concerning agency programs through the lower federal
courts, and the claimed rightness of vindicating judgments
made by congressionally anointed agency experts.8 9 None of
these considerations was present in Cooper, which involved
nonadherence to a judicial pronouncement by state officials,
rather than federal agency specialists.90
To say this much is not to say that Cooper teaches little
about the intracircuit-nonacquiescence issue; in fact, it teaches
much.9 ' It is to say, however, that Cooper standing alone cannot condemn a national agency policy defended on grounds unrelated to the local practices considered and excoriated in
Cooper.92 The distinctive features of federal agencies - which
83.

358 U.S. 1 (1958)

84. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
85. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
86. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18-20.
87. See, e.g., Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 722 & n.221 (articulating argument and collecting argument's advocates).
88. See, e.g., i&i at 723-28; WAsH. Note, supra note 4, at 748.
89. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.

90. Cf Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 728 ("The relevant question
is how an agency with national jurisdiction over a particular problem must
react to the ruling of a court of limited geographical jurisdiction, which can
render neither final nor nationally uniform rules of decision.").
91. The effect of Cooper on the intracircuit-nonacquiescence debate is considered infra notes 277-89 and accompanying text.
92. But cf infra note 284 (suggesting presence of some parallels between
defense of local officials' autonomy asserted in Cooper and agency officials'
grounds for claiming power to engage in intracircuit nonacquiescence).
...
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are considered in detail below 93 - may or may not justify intracircuit nonacquiescence. 94 Courts, however, should not use
crude citations to Cooper simply to sweep those considerations
under the constitutional rug.
B.

CROWELL V. BENSON

Professor Schwartz has orchestrated a challenge to intracircuit nonacquiescence that is grand in scale compared to
the minimnlist incantation of Cooper v. Aaron.95 His imaginative article devotes eighty-nine pages to urging that intracircuit
nonacquiescence in agency adjudication offends the constitu96
tional postulates underlying Crowell v. Benson.
Crowell arose out of a workers compensation award made
by a federal agency, pursuant to a federal statute, based on
facts found by an agency officer.9 7 The employer challenged
this award, claiming that Congress's empowerment of agency
officials to make such compensation decisions offended article
III's assignment of the judicial power to judges tenured for life
and protected against salary reductions.9 8 The Court in Crowell
rejected this attack.99 It first noted that the case did not involve a "public rights" dispute, such as a contested claim for
governmental "pensions and payments;" thus, the already settled public rights doctrine did not work to insulate Congress's
assignment of this adjudicatory work to agencies from article
Ill attack.l ° ° Even so, the Court concluded that the statutory
scheme was constitutional. It reasoned that the delegation of
fact-finding duties to the workers compensation agency was
constitutional in light of the courts' age-old use of masters and
other non-life-tenured assistants as fact finders in ordinary liti93. See infra notes 412-95 and accompanying text.
94. For a further treatment of the specialist-agency distinction and other
possible differences between Cooper and cases of nonacquiescence, see infra
notes 284-98 and accompanying text.

95. Schwartz, supra note 4.
96. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
97. Id at 36-37. Crowell is described in detail in Schwartz, supra note 4, at
1837-42.
98. Crowell, 285 U.S. at 37.
99. Id. at 54.
100. See id. at 50-51 (discussing Den ex demy Murray v. Hoboken Land &
Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855)). The Court concluded that the
case involved instead a "private right," because it pitted one private litigant
(the worker asserting the claim for monetary compensation) against another
private litigant (the employer resisting the claim). Id at 51.
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gation.10 ' The Court also detected no problem in letting the
agency make legal rulings concerning entitlement to benefits
because Congress had provided for judicial review of those rulings by article III courts. 10 2 Under these circumstances, the
Court concluded, Congress's assignment of adjudicatory authority to the agency did not undermine "the essential attributes of
03
the judicial power.'
Building on Crowell, Professor Schwartz argues that intracircuit nonacquiescence in the context of agency adjudication
violates the separation of powers. In his view, the critical question in evaluating intracircuit nonacquiescence is whether the
practice offends the constitutional theory justifying congressional delegations of adjudicatory powers to non-article III
tribunals. 0 4 He claims that the "seminal case" on this subject
is Crowell,105 which established a "judicial review theory" of
agency adjudication,1. 6 and that under this theory agency adjudication is constitutionally permissible only so long as an article
III court retains "'complete authority to insure the proper application of the law.' "107 Professor Schwartz concedes that the
availability of direct review of agency action by an article III
court "ordinarily" satisfies this constitutional requirement, 0 8
but claims that the availability of such review alone does not
suffice when an agency engages in intracircuit nonacquiescence.'0 9 This is so, he says, because nonadherence to a reviewing circuit court's precedents poses "both a practical and
symbolic challenge to the authority of the article III courts"" 0
inconsistent with the "subordinate position" of adjudicatory
agencies envisioned by Crowell."' x Professor Schwartz adds
that intracircuit nonacquiescence violates Crowell's judicial review theory even in "public rights" cases, notwithstanding the
validation of unreviewed agency handling of public-rights disputes in Crowell itself." 2 He reaches this conclusion by claiming that later decisions have rejected the public-rights/private101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 51-54.
I& at 54.
I& at 51.
See Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1819-20, 1834.
Id at 1836.
Id at 1820, 1842.
I& at 1844 (quoting Crowell, 285 U.S. at 54).
Id. at 1842, 1850.
Id. at 1849-51, 1855-56.
Id. at 1851.
Id. at 1848.
See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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rights dichotomy." 3

Professor Schwartz's article abounds with valuable insights, many of which are echoed in this Article. His singleminded reliance on Crowell, however, exposes his analysis to a
host of serious challenges not applicable to a more wide-ranging
separation-of-powers analysis.
First, Crowell indicated that article III lets Congress permit
agency adjudication so long as Congress vests courts with certain powers of review. This simply is a far cry from saying that
an agency must force its own decision makers to apply certain
rules of decision. Professor Schwartz's leap between these distant points is particularly problematic because he makes it
without considering at all the distinctive governmental interests said to justify intracircuit nonacquiescence11 4 This omission offends both standard practice in constitutional analysis
and relevant separation-of-powers precedents." 5 Nor is this
omission true to Crowell itself, because the Court's constitutional analysis in that case relied to no small extent on the
practical justifications that supported agency handling of work6
ers-compensation claims?-'
Second, even if cases like Crowell - concerning congressional authority to create non-article III tribunals - control the
intracircuit-nonacquiescence issue, Crowell itself is no longer
the most relevant authority in this field. Professor Schwartz's
fixation on Crowell leads him all but to ignore the recent trilogy of Supreme Court cases that have addressed the same problem: Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co.,1 7 Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products
Co., 18s and Commodity Futures Trading Commission v.
Schor." 9 The approach of these cases is, moreover, irreconcila113. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1881-1903.
114. See id at 1855-56.
115. Infra notes 123, 221-49 and accompanying text.
116. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 46 (1932) (relying on fact that program
procedures were intended to provide "a prompt, continuous, expert, and inexpensive method" for dealing with large numbers of disputes); id at 54 (lauding
"method shown by experience to be essential in order to apply [congressional]
standards to the thousands of cases involved").
117. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
118. 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
119. 478 U.S. 833 (1986). Professor Schwartz does assert in a footnote that
the shifting majorities in these cases "based their analysis on Crowell."
Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1843 n.105. Although this statement is true in the
loose sense that the Court in each case cites to Crowell, one struggles in vain
to find explicit or implicit reliance on any meaningful "judicial review theory."
Indeed Professor Bator, the primary exponent of the judicial review theory, is,
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ble with the strict "judicial review theory" Professor Schwartz

extracts from Crowell. 2 0° In Northern Pipeline, for example,
the Court rejected adjudication by non-article III bankruptcy
judges even though their legal rulings were fully reviewable by
article III courts.12 ' In Thomas, on the other hand, the Court
upheld a congressionally imposed program of nonconsensual
adjudication by non-article III decisionmakers, which barred altogether judicial review of many rulings on legal issues. n' Indeed, Professor Schwartz himself acknowledges that these
recent cases opt not for the model of Crowell, but instead for an
"elaborate balancing test."' s The balancing approach underly"uneasy" with the Court's "reformulation" of its approach in these recent
cases precisely because "it leaves the Court with a large ad hoc discretion...
akin to a substantive due process test." Bator, supra note 58, at 257.
120. The point here is not that these recent decisions are "better" than
Crowell or that Professor Schwartz may not argue that the recent cases provide a less satisfactory explanation for the constitutionality of administrative
adjudication than Crowell. Rather, the point is that vindication of Professor
Schwartz's position would require an overruling - or at least a major revisionist rereading - of three United States Supreme Court decisions that represent
that Court's most recent treatment of this area of law. See supra note 119; infra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
121. See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 55, 84-87 (plurality opinion); id. at
100 (White, J., dissenting).
122. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 593-94
(1985). Thomas concerned a statute that mandated binding arbitration of disputes over proper compensation between filers and users of valuable pesticiderelated information required to be recorded under federal law. The statute,
however, permitted judicial review of the arbitrator's determination "only for
'fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct,"' i& at 573-74, thus placing
most legal determinations within the unreviewable authority of the non-article
I tribunal, see id. at 571 (noting "only limited judicial review" available
under the statute). In upholding this scheme, the Court reasoned that: 'Mfany
matters that involve the application of legal standards to facts and affect private interests are routinely decided by agency action with limited or no review
by Article III courts." Id. at 583; cf Maranville, supra note 4, at 524 ("Congress apparently has the authority to make administrative agencies the exclusive decisionmakers, even on issues of law, by precluding judicial review of
agency decisions."); Meltzer, Legislative Courts, Legislative Power, and the
Constitution,65 IND. L.J. 291, 304 n.68 (1990) (reading Bator as concluding that
"some determinations by the executive or other non-article I tribunals need
not be judicially reviewed"). But cf.WAYNE Note, supra note 4, at 185 n.198
(discussing need for judicial review).
123. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1888-89. This conclusion is particularly
well-supported by the Court's discussion of the matter in Schor:
In determining the extent to which a given congressional decision to
authorize the adjudication of Article Ill business in a non-Article I
tribunal impermissibly threatens the institutional integrity of the Judicial Branch, the Court has declined to adopt formalistic and unbending rules. Thomas, 473 U.S. at 587. Although such rules might lend a
greater degree of coherence to this area of the law, they might also
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ing the Court's modem cases simply is not the same as - and
indeed seems a significant departure from - the "judicial review theory" Professor Schwartz finds dispositive of the intracircuit-nonacquiescence issue.'2
unduly constrict Congress' ability to take needed and innovative action pursuant to its Article I powers. Thus, in reviewing Article III
challenges, we have weighed a number of factors, none of which has
been deemed determinative, with an eye to the practical effect that
the congressional action will have on the constitutionally assigned
role of the federal judiciary. Id., at 590. Among the factors upon
which we have focused are the extent to which the 'essential attributes of judicial power' are reserved to Article I courts, and, conversely, the extent to which the non-Article I forum exercises the
range of jurisdiction and powers normally vested only in Article III
courts, the origins and importance of the right to be adjudicated, and
the concerns that drove Congress to depart from the requirements of
Article III.
Schor, 478 U.S. at 851.
124. See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Strauss, Formal and FunctionalApproaches to Separation-of-PowersQuestions - A Fool-

ish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV.488, 509 (1987) ("Schor repudiates...
the analytic structure underpinning Crowell v. Benson."). Moreover, these
new cases - and other important considerations as well - undermine an alternative argument, hinted at by Professor Schwartz, for finding intracircuit
nonacquiescence incompatible with Crowell. Professor Schwartz notes that
"[o]ne route" to the rejection of intracircuit nonacquiescence is to argue that it
violates Crowell's portrayal of agency adjudicators' function as providing
"assistance" to article III courts. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1845-48 (citing
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932)). The invocation of this "'judicial assistant' model," i& at 1846, to attack intracircuit nonacquiescence, however, is
plainly unavailing. See Estreicher & Revesz: H,supra note 4, at 842 n.62 (criticizing Professor Schwartz's position); see also Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1847
n.124 (collecting authorities critical of model). Crowell itself spoke of "assistance" only briefly in justifying agency factfinding by analogy to juries and
masters, and not in upholding those agency forays into law-finding that give
rise to the nonacquiescence problem. Crowell, 285 U.S. at 51. Professor Bator,
even while lauding Crowell as "the greatest and deepest of the cases discussing
our problem," Bator, supra note 58, at 261, has dismissed the "judicial assistant" extrapolation as "ludicrously inapt," "misconceived," and "neither a
promising analytical tool nor a powerful way to describe the existing terrain,"
icE at 252-53. The Court's new cases make it even more apparent that "judicial
assistantship" is not the touchstone of legitimate agency involvement in the
adjudicatory process, see Strauss,supra note 123, at 509; indeed, they countenance agency participation in adjudication that is not conceivably describable
as assistance to article III courts, see Thomas, 473 U.S. at 568 (discussed supra
note 122 and accompanying text); see also Schor, 478 U.S. at 856 (upholding
empowerment of agency to adjudicate even state-law counterclaims not because agency decisionmakers served as judicial assistants, but because "the
magnitude of any intrusion on the Judicial Branch can only be termed de
minimis"). Beset by these problems, Professor Schwartz ultimately rejects
this argument himself, conceding that his challenge to intracircuit nonacquiescence cannot and does not "depend[] on the passive image of agency action
suggested by" the "judicial assistant" model. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1849;
see also id at 1871 n.210 (rejecting argument that agency nonacquiescence

1366

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:1339

Third, Crowell's "judicial review theory," even as conceived by Professor Schwartz, focuses on the availability of review by, and acquiescence in the rulings of, an article M
court. 125 It thus would seem that subjecting administrative ad-

judication to possible Supreme Court review - together with
forced acquiescence in Supreme Court rulings - should satisfy
Crowell. 26 If that is so, however, the even greater protection
afforded by forced acquiescence in Supreme Court precedent,
together with the availability of review by both the Supreme
Court and at least one other lower article IH court, should
meet Crowell's requirements without any additional mandate
of intracircuit acquiescence. Professor Schwartz claims that
agency acquiescence in Supreme Court rulings alone is not sufficient to satisfy article III,12 7 but (in my view at least) he never
adequately explains why.ms
should result in an automatic award of attorney fees under Equal Access to
Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. § 504 (a)(1) (1988); 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (d)(1)(A) (1988),
although such a "per se rule might be plausible if restrictions or nonacquiescence were predicated on Crowell's characterization of administrative agencies
as judicial assistants").
125. Supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
126. See also Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 730 (reasoning that
under recent Supreme Court cases, "Congress can pursue uniformity at the administrative level to the extent of abolishing circuit court review of agency action altogether").
127. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1854-55.
128. Accord Estreicher & Revesz II, supra note 4, at 842 n.62 ("Professor
Schwartz has difficulty explaining why this residual Article DI check is not
satisfied by the availability of Supreme Court review."). Professor Schwartz's
invocation of the judicial review theory raises a number of related analytical
problems. The theory, for example, would seem logically to require invalidation of intracircuit nonacquiescence even if clearly authorized by Congress.
This is so because to the extent Crowell creates constitutional limits, it puts
limits on congressional power to structure the agency/court relationship. See
supra text accompanying note 104. Yet a recurring theme in the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence is that the presence or absence of congressional authorization of executive action may carry substantial weight in assessing that action's compatibility with separation-of-powers constraints. See infra notes 188,
210-11 and accompanying text.
In a similar vein, Professor Schwartz finds that intracircuit nonacquiescence violates Crowell's judicial review theory because "[firom a practical point
of view" intracircuit nonacquiescence frustrates "proper application of the
law." Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1851. But why is what a single circuit court
says about a national statute, sometimes in the face of disagreement by other
circuits, properly characterized as "the law"? See generally Estreicher &
Revesz I, supra note 4, at 725-27 (analyzing the effect of circuit court decision
on the national state of the law). And why does nonacquiescence frustrate a
national statute's "proper application" if it maximizes uniformity in a setting
where different experts - namely, local circuit court judges, other judges, and
agency experts - differ as to the statute's proper interpretation? As these
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Fourth, Professor Schwartz's report of the death of the
public rights doctrine-2 9 is greatly exaggerated.1 3 0 Under present law, as even Professor Schwartz recognizes, the "public
rights" character of the dispute remains a "factor" favoring
some greater measure of agency autonomy in the adjudicatory
process. 131 Given this doctrinal reality, however, a reasonable
conclusion is that agency adjudications of public rights cases
questions suggest, Professor Schwartz reads Crowell as requiring a special
agency responsiveness to that particular"Article HI court with reviewing authority." Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1851-52 (emphasis added); see id at 185253 (article III requires adherence to "precedents that bind the very court in
which judicial review of agency action will occur"); id. at 1853 (critical that
particular court has "reviewing jurisdiction"); i&i at 1856 ("relationship between the nonacquiescing agency and the court whose precedents are rejected
assumes critical importance"). But the need for such special responsiveness is
hardly self-evident - especially given the systemic justifications offered for
intracircuit nonacquiescence and Professor Schwartz's own acknowledgement
of "the primacy of the system of Article DI courts in adjudicating questions of
law." Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1868; see infra note 413 and accompanying
text.
Professor Schwartz's focus on a judicial review theory also seems to create
a "perverse" result. Estreicher & Revesz II, supra note 4, at 842 n.62. This is
so because, under that theory, the constitutional prohibition on nonacquiescence applies only to "agencies that utilize formal adjudication as a mode of
decisionmaking," and not at all "to agencies functioning through informal
processes, lacking trial-type safeguards." Id; see Schwartz, supra note 4, at

1858 n.163 ("[A]dministrative agencies engaged in adjudication have special obligations to abide by judicial precedents that executive branch officials do not
bear in other contexts."). Of course, an important segment of agency work in-

cludes "informal investigation, enforcement activities, and claims processing,"
Maranville, supra note 4, at 493, all of which activity Professor Schwartz's theory apparently fails to cover. But see i& at 508 (noting that "[u]nless controlling case doctrine were applied to the prosecutorial or claim-deciding staff, the
doctrine would require adherence to controlling decisions in only a fraction of
the cases coming before the agency"). In addition, Professor Schwartz's analysis necessarily fails to deal with intracircuit nonacquiescence in agency rule
making, see Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1830-31 n.49, and the ability of agencies,
when acting as litigators, to disregard controlling circuit court precedent,
White, supra note 4, at 668 & n.181; cf. infira note 499 (discussing this issue).
Professor Schwartz's failure to address nonacquiescence in any context except
formal agency adjudication highlights the need to seek some other, broader
constitutional analysis.
129. See Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1881-1903. As noted above, the "public
rights" doctrine, as outlined in Crowell, exempted certain forms of agency action - including the award or failure to award government benefits - from
any form of judicial review. See supra notes 100, 113.
130. It is also ironic, because Professor Schwartz's interment of the public
rights doctrine rests on the same recent Supreme Court decisions, see supra
notes 117-19 and accompanying text, that he all but ignores in advocating the
"judicial review theory" on which his basic case rests. See Schwartz, supra
note 4, at 1886-90.
131. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1890; see also Granfinanciera, S.A. v.
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that arefully subject to judicialreview do not violate article I
when agency adjudicators acquiesce in Supreme Court, but not
circuit court, precedent. Otherwise, it is hard to see how the
public-rights "factor" has any meaningful content at all in the
context of applying Professor Schwartz's judicial review
32
theory.
Finally, Professor Schwartz's argument rests in the end on
favorable constructions of the most shadowy of judicial phrases.
What are "the essential attributes of the judicial power"?'3
What does it mean to preserve "complete authority to insure
the proper application of the law"? 13 4 Professor Schwartz
seeks, as an analyst should, to extract meaning from these Delphic utterances. Their patent obliqueness suggests, however,
that his framework ultimately must collapse into the sort of
wide-open balancing it might be supposed to replace.1as Indeed,
there exists unique evidence of the indeterminacy of Crowell
with respect to the intracircuit-nonacquiescence debate. This is
so because Professor Schwartz's argument hinges on the "judicial review theory" of agency adjudication that he borrows from
Professor Bator. 36 Yet Professor Bator himself was unpersuaded that intracircuit nonacquiescence violates the constitutional separation of powers.' 37
The central point of this critique is not that Professor
Nordberg, 109 S. Ct. 2782, 2795-97 (1989) (emphasizing public right/private
right distinction).
132. Moreover, to the extent that the Court has blurred the privaterights/public-rights dichotomy in recent cases, it has done so to shelter seemingly private-rights adjudication from article III attack. See Thomas v. Union
Carbide Agricultural Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 585-86, 589 (1985) (upholding
agency-adjudication program in part because "the right created by FIFRA is
not a purely 'private' right, but bears many of the characteristics of a 'public'
right"). This fact suggests not that Crowell's "judicial review theory" is alive
and well for purposes of both "public rights" and "private rights" adjudication,
but instead that the Court has moved toward exempting certain forms of
agency private-rights adjudication, no less than agency public-rights adjudication, from any strict requirement of judicial review.
133. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932).
134. Id at 54.
135. Indeed Professor Schwartz's own discussion reveals as much. See
Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1851 (concluding that "proper question is .. .
whether nonacquiescence undermines the ability of the courts 'to insure the
proper application of the law' "); id,at 1851-55 (developing "practical" and
"symbolic" reasons why intracircuit nonacquiescence violates article III).
136. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1842, 1849.
137. See Bator, Address by the Deputy Solicitor General and Counsellor to
the Solicitor General of the United States, 61st A.L.I. PRoc. 493, 497 (1984) (asserting that intracircuit nonacquiescence does not raise "serious concerns...
about... judicial supremacy").

1991]

INTRACIRCUIT NONACQUIESCENCE

1369

Schwartz is wrong, indeed, if the Court moves back toward
Crowell, and then gives that case an ample interpretation, his
argument may carry the day. Rather, the point is that Professor Schwartz's line of argument is neither the best one nor the
most complete one available. A more broad-gauged constitutional approach - using modem "means/end" analysis and
drawing on a wider range of separation-of-powers jurisprudence
establishes with greater persuasive force the constitutional
infirmity of intracircuit nonacquiescence.
C.

UNIED STATES V. MENDOZA

Just as detractors of intracircuit nonacquiescence have invoked Cooper and Crowell,1' defenders of nonacquiescence
urge that the Supreme Court validated the practice in United
States v. Mendoza.139
In Mendoza, a Filipino filed an action in the United States
District Court for the Central District of California, challenging
the denial of his petition for naturalization by the Immigration
and Naturalization Service. 140 The plaintiff claimed that the
government had deprived him of due process of law by not affording Filipinos the same opportunities to become naturalized
as it afforded other noncitizen Armed Forces veterans in the
wake of World War H.141 The district court ruled in favor of
the plaintiff, and the court of appeals affirmed.14 Neither of
those courts, however, reached the merits of the plaintiff's constitutional challenge.143 Instead, they relied on the doctrine of
nonmutual collateral estoppel and the fact that the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California
had ruled against the government on the same issue in an earlier case.14 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to explore
the question whether "the United States may... be collaterally
estopped on an issue such as this, adjudicated against it in an
earlier lawsuit brought by a different party."'145 Emphasizing
"that 'the Government is not in a position identical to that of a
private litigant,'

"'146

the Court barred application of nonmutual

138. See supra notes 84-137 and accompanying text.

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
148.

464 U.S. 154 (1984); see sources cited infra note 148.

Id at 155.
Ir at 156-57.
Id at 157-58.
Id at 155.
IdI&

Id-at 159 (quoting INS v. I-ibi, 414 U.S. 5, 8 (1973) (per curiam)).
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collateral estoppel against the United States. 147 Latching onto
this ruling, the Department of Justice has urged that a rule
barring intracircuit nonacquiescence "is nothing more than a
rule of mandatory nonmutual collateral estoppel against the
government" prohibited by Mendoza.148
Leading commentators agree that Mendoza does not shelter intracircuit nonacquiescence from constitutional attack.149
Some observers, however, have stressed the wrong reasons for
distinguishing Mendoza, 5° while others have suggested that
Mendoza has more bearing on the intracircuit-nonacquiescence
issue than it rightly deserves. 15 1 In reality, for at least three
separate reasons, Mendoza is all but irrelevant to the nonacqui152
escence debate.
First, Mendoza simply was not a case involving a constitutional challenge. Thus no one argued in Mendoza - and no
one reasonably could argue - that the Constitution requires
routine application of the common law principle of nonmutual
collateral estoppel in ordinary governmental litigation.us It
follows that, whatever else the Court decided in Mendoza, it did
not decide the distinctive separation-of-powers issue presented
by intracircuit nonacquiescence.
147. Id at 162.
148. Brief for Appellants at 41, Stieberger v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 29 (2d Cir.
1986) (No. 85-6310), quoted in Estreicher & Revesz I, supra n6te 4, at 684 n.21;
see Kuhl, supra note 4, at 914 (Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Justice Department) (arguing that legislative restrictions on nonacquiescence "would
create many of the same problems identified" in Mendoza); Schwartz, supra
note 4, at 1876-77 & nn.231-32 (noting government reliance on Mendoza and
collecting additional authorities); HARV. Note, supra note 4, at 854-55 (noting
government reliance on Mendoza); TOURO Note, supra note 4, at 203-04 (noting
SSA's reliance on Mendoza); see also White, supra note 4, at 669-70 (arguing
Mendoza's "reasoning suggests that commanding acquiescence is improper");
CUmB. Comment, supra note 4, at 125 (relying on Mendoza in defending intracircuit nonacquiescence).
149. See Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 684-86; Schwartz, supra
note 4, at 1875-81; see aso id at 1877 n.233 (collecting authority rejecting government's Mendoza-based arguments).
150. See Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1877-80 & n.234 (noting, for example,
inapposite arguments that Mendoza supports a distinction between constitutional and statutory rulings or permits a "hardship" exception).
151. See Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 685-86.
152. Professor Schwartz's treatment of Mendoza (although, in my view, incomplete because it does not develop all of the points made here) ably collects
existing judicial and scholarly commentary on Mendoza. See Schwartz, supra
note 4, at 1875-81.
153. For a general discussion of collateral estoppel, and nonmutual collateral estoppel in particular, see F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CwL PROCEDURE
§§ 11.16-.31 (3d ed. 1985).
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Second, the facts of Mendoza render it readily distinguishable from cases concerning intracircuit nonacquiescence. 1'
Mendoza involved the effect of a ruling of a district court,
rather than a circuit court - a fact of significance because even
staunch critics of intracircuit nonacquiescence do not advocate
forced acquiescence in district court decisions. L5 Even more
important, Mendoza involved an earlier judicial decision's impact on tribunals (the United States District Court for the Central District of California and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Court) that were in no sense
subordinate to the deciding court (the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California).'-6 Intracircuitnonacquiescence cases, on the other hand, concern how rulings
of a circuit court affect decisionmakers who are subordinate in
the indisputable sense that their actions are subject to review
and reversal by only that very circuit court' 57 Mendoza also
addressed
only the prerogatives of the government as a
"party" 158 seeking to "litigate issues"'15 9 in "lawsuits." 16° Thus,
Mendoza did not purport to address the duties of executive officers when they act as agency adjudicators or, indeed, as anything other than litigants appearing in court.161
154. See, eg., Sun Towers, Inc. v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 315, 323 n.8 (5th Cir.

1984) (noting opportunity for distinguishing other cases from Mendoza), cent
denied, 469 U.S. 823 (1984).
155. See, eg., Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1859-60.
156. One commentator's assertion that both the earlier case and Mendoza
itself arose in the same district court, S. CAL. Note, supra note 4, at 1175 n.92,
is simply wrong, see United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 157 (1984) (indicating that earlier decision arose out of Northern District of California); Mendoza v. United States, 672 F.2d 1320, 1320 (1984) (syllabus) (indicating that
Mendoza arose in the Central District of California), rev'd, Mendoza, 464 U.S.
154.
157. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
158. Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 160.
159. Id- at 162.
160. Id. at 160, 163. The Supreme Court's discussion simply leaves no doubt
that it was focusing on issue preclusion in "government litigation." Id. at 16162; see id at 164 (referring to "application of an estoppel when the Government is litigating"); id. at 161-64 (referring to issue preclusion in "litigation,"
"action[s]," "cases" and "private civil litigation").
161. See Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 685 ("the fact that the government may not be precluded in court from relitigating issues that it lost in
prior cases does not imply that it may disregard rulings of the courts of appeals in the conduct of its internal proceedings"); Schwartz, supra note 4, at
1879-80 (arguing that "nonacquiescenceby administrative agencies exercising
adjudicatory authority presents problems significantly different from those
considered in Mendoza"); M. Note, supra note 4, at 199 (citing post-Mendoza
decisions suggesting litigator/non-litigator distinction). Mendoza also is distin-
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Finally, the Mendoza decision rested on considerations of
policy not applicable in cases concerning intracircuit nonacquiescence. 162 At the core of Mendoza lay a concern about "freezing the first final decision rendered on a particular legal
issue,"' 63 for all time,'6 in all courts, 16 in all parts of the country.16 Faced with such a prospect, the Supreme Court insisted
on "allowing litigation in multiple forums,"'167 emphasizing in
particular "the benefit it receives from permitting several
courts of appeals to explore a difficult question before this
Court grants certiorari."'36 A ban on intracircuit nonacquiescence does not frustrate this agenda. Rather, the agency even if required to comply with local circuit court precedent may pursue its own policies in other circuits, defend those policies in those circuits when challenged, seek Supreme Court review when it so desires, and thus avoid the nationwide
"freezing . . . of the law"'169 that the Court in Mendoza

eschewed. 170
Indeed Mendoza differs from an intracircuit-nonacquiescence case on the most fundamental level, because Mendoza at
bottom did not involve any tension at all between executive and
judicial authority. To be sure, Mendoza protected executive
prerogatives to relitigate issues of law. The Court afforded this
guishable because the rule it establishes does not raise the problems of inequitable treatment presented by intracircuit nonacquiescence. See supra notes 3941 and accompanying text.
162. See Lopez v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1489, 1497 n.5 (9th Cir.) (finding policies underlying Mendoza inapplicable to nonacquiescence), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 469 U.S. 1082 (1984) (mem.); Stieberger v. Heckler,
615 F. Supp. 1315, 1358-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (same), vacated sub nom. Stieberger
v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986); Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1881 (concluding that prohibition on intracircuit nonacquiescence will not produce "the result the Mendoza Court sought to avoid"); IND. Note, supra note 4, at 1120-21
(intracircuit nonacquiescence does not threaten policies underlying Mendoza).
163. Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 160.
164. See id. at 161-62.
165. See id, at 163.
166. See id. at 160.
167. Id. at 163 (emphasis added).
168. Id. at 160 (emphasis added); see Maranville, supra note 4, at 510-11
(noting that Court in Mendoza relied "primarily" on desirability of multi-circuit exploration of issues prior to Supreme Court review).
169. Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 164.
170. See BROOKLYN Note, supra note 4, at 120-21; TOURO Note, supra note
4, at 206-07; see also Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 164 (1984) ("[A]pplication of an estoppel when the Government is litigating the same issue with the same party
avoids the problem of freezing the development of the law because the Government is still free to litigate that issue in the future with some other
party.").
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protection, however, to safeguard judicial autonomy to fashion
rules of law free of otherwise sweeping issue-preclusion restraints. 171 Such a decision - designed to safeguard, rather
than to contract, federal court authority - hardly disposes of
the argument that executive disregard of the preexisting precedents of a supervisory circuit court trenches too much on the
judicial power. 72
D.

CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION

Professors Estreicher and Revesz do not argue that Mendoza establishes the constitutionality of intracircuit nonacquiescence. Instead they seek to parry the separation-of-powers
challenge by constructing the following syllogism:
If Congress passed a statute
Major Premise:
authorizing intracircuit
nonacquiescence, that practice (at
least for the most part) would be
173
constitutional.
The "current administrative
Minor Premise:
landscape" suggests an "implicit
authorization of nonacquiescence"
sufficient to say that "the hypothetical
statute permitting nonacquiescence
[has] in fact been enacted."'174
Intracircuit nonacquiescence is (at
Conclusion:
least for the most part)
constitutional. 175
As its formulators recognize, the major premise of this argument is controversial. 176 In particular, it rests substantially
on the view that Congress's greater power to eliminate lower
171. Indeed, the Mendoza Court repeatedly decried the effect that applying
collateral estoppel would have on "this Court." Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 160. The
Court also reasoned that its decision was responsive to "the crowded dockets
of the courts," id at 161, that it might advance "economy interests" of the
courts, id. at 163, and (most importantly) that it "better allow[ed] thorough development of legal doctrine" by the courts, id. (emphasis added); see also
Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1876 (noting that Mendoza rule was designed to protect "scarce federal appellate judicial resources" and to "better serve the development of carefully considered legal doctrine").
172. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
173. Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 730.
174. Id at 729-30.
175. Id. at 731.
176. Id. at 730-31.
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court jurisdiction to review agency action includes the lesser
power to provide for such review without requiring intracircuit

acquiescence. 177 But the greater jurisdiction-stripping power
assumed by this argument may not exist at all,' 78 and even if it
does exist, a "greater" constitutional power often does not include what might be characterized as a "lesser" one.179 In this
setting, moreover, there exists a strong argument for rejecting
any greater-includes-the-lesser reasoning, because active flouting of local circuit court pronouncements may well create a
greater "affront to judicial authority"' 8 0 than eliminating8 altogether lower court interaction with an executive agency.' '
177. Id.at 730 (relying on "the wide-ranging power that Congress enjoys
over the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts").
178. See Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article IM. Separating the Two
Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction,65 B.U.L. REV. 205, 229-30 (1985) (arguing that
text of article III requires vesting federal judicial power to hear federal question, admiralty, and public ambassador cases in federal courts as a whole); Eisenberg, Congressional Authority To Restrict Lower Federal Court
Jurisdiction,83 YALE L.J. 498, 513 (1974) (arguing that practical limits on access to Supreme Court may preclude congressional elimination of lower federal court jurisdiction); see also Redish & Woods, CongressionalPower to
Control the Jurisdiction of Lower Federal Courts: A Critical Review and a
New Synthesis, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 45, 93 (1975) (arguing that congressional
power over lower federal court jurisdiction is limited by the fifth amendment's
due process clause in cases where doors to the state courts are closed); Sager,
Foreword: ConstitutionalLimitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the
Jurisdictionof the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV.17, 42-89 (1981) (arguing
that congressional power to mold federal jurisdiction is limited in various
ways). See generally Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1820, 1835-43 (under Crowell,
Congress may assign adjudicatory tasks to an administrative agency "only to
the extent that judicial review can assure effective supervision, by the article
III courts, of the administrative agencies' determinations of questions of law").
179. See Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 731; see also, eg., Widmar
v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-68 (1981) ("The Constitution forbids a State to enforce certain exclusions from a forum generally open to the public, even if it
was not required to create the forum in the first place."); Yakus v. United
States, 321 U.S. 414, 468 (1944) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) ("It is one thing for
Congress to withhold jurisdiction. It is entirely another to confer it and direct
that it be exercised in a manner inconsistent with constitutional requirements
180. Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 732.
181. See Maranville, supra note 4, at 497-99; see also infra notes 357-80 and
accompanying text; Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1869) (distinguishing removal of jurisdiction and "legislative interference with courts in
the exercising of continuing jurisdiction"). Professors Estreicher and Revesz
anticipate this challenge with the undeveloped assertion that, "without regard
to" the greater-includes-the-lesser argument, Congress possesses "fairly broad
authority to define the respective roles of agency and reviewing court." Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 731. Plainly, however, some limit on that
authority exists, see, e.g., id. at 721, 725 (conceding the need for agencies to "acquiesce" in Supreme Court decisions and lower-court injunctions), and - for
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The more profound deficiency in the Estreicher/Revesz
syllogism, however, lies in its minor premise. In support of
their claim of "implicit" congressional "authorization" of intracircuit nonacquiescence, Professors Estreicher and Revesz
offer one lonely paragraph of discussion. 8 2 That discussion,
moreover, asserts that Congress's "authorization" of intracircuit
nonacquiescence is established by nothing more than "the con1 3
gressional choice in favor of administrative government"' and
the congressional goal in establishing agency programs of advancing "uniformity in the administration of federal law."'1 4
Congress's endorsement of administrative government, however, did not authorize administrators to do whatever they
pleased, and its call for uniformity did not supply a license to
achieve uniformity at any price.1 8s Finding an "implicit authorization" of so focused and controversial a practice as intracircuit
nonacquiescence in such cloudy formulations as "favor[ing] administrative government" and "promot[ing] uniformity" is sim86
ply too long a leap.

reasons developed in detail below - an authorization of defiance of local circuit court precedent seems a plausible candidate for being viewed as transgressing the constitutional boundary. See supra Parts IV-VI.
182. Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 729-30.
183. I& at 729.

184. 1i
185. For example, Professors Estreicher and Revesz concede that agencies
must adhere to judicial orders in individual cases, even when such action produces nonuniform results, id. at 723, and acknowledge more broadly that intracircuit nonacquiescence is not "rational" unless certain requirements that
they identify are satisfied, id. at 758; see supra note 525 and accompanying
text. See also supra note 9, infra note 275 and accompanying text (noting position of defenders of nonacquiescence that the executive must nonetheless obey
judgments in individual cases). Moreover, inferring a congressional intent to
authorize intracircuit nonacquiescence from a declared preference for uniformity is especially problematic because such nonacquiescence in fact produces substantial disuniformity of treatment between those who appeal and
those who do not. Diller & Morawetz, supra note 4, at 818. See generally
supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text (discussing equal protection challenge to intracircuit nonacquiescence).
186. In fact, if Professors Estreicher and Revesz are right in arguing that
an answer to the "implicit authorization" issue flows from such vaguely
framed congressional objectives, the better view is that Congress implicitly has
condemned intracircuit nonacquiescence. Congress, after all, provided that
courts would review the actions of agencies - not vice versa. See McGowan,
Congress, Court, and Control ofDelegated Power, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 1119, 1124
n.17 (1977) (" 'almost every regulatory statute enacted by Congress has contained provisions authorizing Federal courts to review the legality of administrative action"' (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1656, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted
in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6121, 6125)). See generally COLUM.
REV. Note, supra note 4, at 598-99 (discussing scope of judicial review over ad-
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The outlandishness of a claim that Congress has "implicitly
authoriz[ed]" intracircuit nonacquiescence becomes even more
evident when one consults the actual legislative record. While
framing the Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of
1984 (1984 Act), 8 7 Congress took its one and only hard look at
intracircuit nonacquiescence.1 88 Following extensive investigation, the Democrat-controlled House of Representatives passed
a bill proscribing intracircuit nonacquiescence as part of a comprehensive package aimed at broadly reforming the SSA disability program. 8 9 The Republican-controlled Senate produced
a similarly wide-ranging bill, which dealt with nonacquiescence
by imposing significant procedural limitations on SSA's ability
to engage in the practice. 19° In this legislative posture, the congressional conference committee that forged the 1984 Act took
ministrative agency action). On its face, this chosen structure reveals a legislative design to subordinate agencies to courts in a meaningful way. See Thomas
v. Heckler, 598 F. Supp. 492, 496 (M.D. Ala. 1984) (by providing for judicial review, Social Security Act "recognizes the primacy of the courts in determining
the law"); Diller & Morawetz, supra note 4, at 819 (noting that judicial review
"is the principal means" used by Congress "to hold agencies accountable to
statutory limitations on agency power"). Furthermore, if Congress intended to
subordinate agencies to courts, the better inference surely is that Congress
would not and did not tolerate agency disregard of the pronouncements of reviewing courts. See Kubitschek, supra note 4, at 423 & n.139; see also Maranville, supra note 4, at 527 (noting that "Congress's provision for judicial review
of agency decisions suggests that Congress intended the courts to have the final word on some issues in individual cases"); CoLUM. REv. Note, supra note 4,
at 600 (noting that legislation authorizing courts to review agency action and
to interpret scope of agency power indicates that Congress did not "empower[ ]
agencies to disregard judicially declared limits on their power"). Proponents
of nonacquiescence might respond to this argument by claiming that Congress
surely has made no such decision. That, however, is precisely the point. If the
claim that Congress has implicitly rejected intracircuit nonacquiescence in providing for judicial supervision of agency action is an overreach, the claim that
Congress has implicitly authorized the practice in simply providing for agencies and expressing an interest in uniform program administration is no less
an overreach.
187. Pub. L. No. 98-460, 98 Stat. 1794 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
188. Because earlier instances of intracircuit nonacquiescence were so sporadic and of such limited practical significance, neither the public nor the Congress had focused on the practice. For this reason, no reason whatsoever exists
for concluding that, prior to 1984, this executive policy had gained a constitutional immunity because "Congress .. . consistently failed to object to this
longstanding practice." Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 682 n.10
(1981).
189. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1039, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 37 reprinted in
1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3080, 3095 (discussing House bill's
provisions).
190. See id.
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up the issue of intracircuit nonacquiescence.' 9 ' Ultimately, as
part of a complex compromise on legislation treating some sixteen major subjects, the conference committee proposed that
Congress not enact any legislation concerning nonacquiescence.192 The full Congress then acceded to that approach. 9 3
In opting for inaction, however, Congress specifically refused to authorize intracircuit nonacquiescence. 194 Indeed the
full conference committee went out of its way to emphasize
that: "The conferees do not intend that the agreement to drop
both provisions be interpreted as approval of 'non-acquiescence'
by a federal agency to an interpretation of a United States Circuit Court of Appeals as a general practice."' 9 5 This refusal to
approve nonacquiescence was hardly surprising, because a
widespread and deeply felt hostility toward the SSA policy existed in the Congress.196 The conference committee report itself stated that "many of the conferees" had "strong concerns"
about intracircuit nonacquiescence' 9 and the entire committee
flatly criticized the policy's "clearly . . . undesirable consequence" of generating repetitious appeals costly to both claimants and the government. 9 8 Representative Pickle, who was
191. Id.
192. Id.; see also BROOKLYN Note, supra note 4, at 124 & n.189 (detailing
the 16 subjects).
193. See Pub. L. No. 98-460, 98 Stat. 1794 (1984) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
194. See, e.g., Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315, 1375 (S.D.N.Y. 1985),
vacated sub nom Stieberger v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986); Maranville,
supra note 4, at 526 ('"To the extent that one can infer any congressional intent as to nonacquiescenc... it appears that Congress intends to avoid passing judgment on the issue."); WAYNE Note, supra note 4, at 170 (conference
committee "made clear that deletion of both provisions did not constitute tacit
acceptance of nonacquiescence by any agency"); Conference Transcript, supra
note 4, at 90 (remarks of Mr. Sussman) (Congress "threw up their hands" and
"wouldn't bite the bullet on this").
195. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1039, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 37, reprinted in 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3080, 3095 (emphasis added).
196. For example, a number of conference committee members took the
floor to express their strong personal opposition to SSA intracircuit nonacquiescence. See, e.g., 130 CONG. REC. S11,460 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1984) (statement
of Sen. Sasser); id. at S11,469 (statement of Sen. Bingaman). See generally
Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1850 n.139 (citing "unfavorable congressional attention" to SSA intracircuit nonacquiescence).
197. HR. CONF. REP. No. 1039, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 38, reprintedin 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMN. NEws 3080, 3095.
198. Id. at 38, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 3096.
The conference report also directly questioned "the constitutional basis of nonacquiescence," id. at 37, reprintedin 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at
3095, and urged that, instead of nonacquiescing, the Secretary should "resolve
policy conflicts promptly" either by appealing to the Supreme Court or by
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principally responsible for the legislation in the House, went so
far as to tell his colleagues that the conference report "send[s] a
clear signal to the administration that the present policy of
[nonacquiescence] is not acceptable." 99
Even more to the point, the legislative materials show that
Congress declined to act at all on intracircuit nonacquiescence
precisely because it envisioned a judicial resolution of the constitutional questions raised by the practice uninfluenced by any
legislative pronouncements. Even the report accompanying the
less-restrictive Senate proposal emphasized that "nothing in the
section shall be interpreted as sanctioning any decision of the
Secretary not to acquiesce." 2 °° The conference committee expressed even more clearly its intention to hand the ball to the
judiciary when it observed that: "The conferees also feel that
in addition to the practical administrative problems which may
be raised by non-acquiescence, the legal and Constitutional issues raised by non-acquiescence can only be settled by the
Supreme Court."20 1 As these statements indicate, Congress distinguished between "the practical administrative problems"
raised by intracircuit nonacquiescence and "the legal and Constitutional issues" presented by the SSA's policy. 2 02 With respect to the practical problems, Congress decided to forego
formal legislation, but to "jawbone" the agency in the conference report.20 3 With respect to "legal and Constitutional issues," the Congress very deliberately decided not to speak at
all, but instead to permit judicial resolution of those issues on a
2 4
clean slate. 0
In claiming that Congress nonetheless impliedly has authorized intracircuit nonacquiescence, Professors Estreicher
and Revesz barely acknowledge

-

much less respond to -

this

seeking legislative action, id. See generally COLUM. Note, supra note 4, at 587
n.33 (noting that "the final conference report contained strong language criticizing the practice of nonacquiescence").
199.

130 CONG. REc. H9836 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1984) (emphasis added).

200. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1039, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 38, reprinted in 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3080, 3095. The Senate took this approach
because it perceived that "if a constitutional issue is involved, it cannot be settled in this legislation." S. Rep. No. 466, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1984).

201. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1039, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 38, reprintedin 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3080, 3096; accord 130 CONG. REc. H9834
(daily ed. Sept. 19, 1984) (statement of Rep. Archer) ("We agreed to encourage
SSA to litigate this issue before the Supreme Court.").
202. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1039, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 38, reprinted in
1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmiN. NEWS 3080, 3096.

203. See id
204. See supra notes 200-02 and accompanying text.
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history of the 1984 Act. They say only that: "The implications
of the Conference Report for the legitimacy of continued intracircuit nonacquiescence by SSA are difficult to assess because the legislators held a range of views." 20 5 The
"implications of the Conference Report" with respect to the implied-authorization issue, however, are not "difficult to assess"
at all. Precisely because the legislators did hold "a range of
views," the conference committee agreed that Congress would
not speak one way or the other on whether intracircuit nonacquiescence was authorized or legally permissible. Against this
backdrop, the contention that Congress in effect has enacted a
"statute permitting nonacquiescence" 206 is unsupportable and,
indeed, extraordinary. 2°7
205. Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 704 n.137.
206. I. at 730 (emphasis added).
207. If proponents of intracircuit nonacquiescence wished to cut their
losses, they might respond that the legislative history of the 1984 Act reveals
at most Congress's choice regarding the Social Security Program, and thus
reveals only that intracircuit nonacquiescence by the SSA has not been implicitly authorized by Congress. Such a claim, however, would be unpersuasive as
well, because Congress in considering the 1984 Act took its one and only look
squarely at the practice of intracircuit nonacquiescence in the very context in
which that practice has been most visible and controversial. It makes no sense
to say that Congress's express refusal to authorize intracircuit nonacquiescence
in this setting counts for less than supposed emanations of an "implicit authorization" of nonacquiescence by other agencies flowing from nothing more than
their creation and generalized calls for administrative uniformity. Indeed,
Congress's refusal to authorize intracircuit nonacquiescence in the SSA context may suggest a fortiori an absence of such authorization in other contexts,
because the central uniformity-based justification for intracircuit nonacquiescence, see infra notes 414-17 and accompanying text, is surely at its apex in
connection with the SSA program, see infra note 414 and accompanying text.
It also noteworthy in this regard that the conference committee did not limit
its remarks regarding intracircuit nonacquiescence to the SSA, but instead
noted its refusal to give "approval of 'non-acquiescence' by a federal agency."
IR.CONF. REP.No. 1039,98th Cong., 2d Sess. 37, reprintedin 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3080, 3095 (emphasis added).
Nor can agencies bootstrap their way into an "implicit authorization" by
demanding deference under the Chevron rule, see infra notes 487-89 and accompanying text, to their own supposedly expert judgments about whether
Congress has authorized intracircuit nonacquiescence. See Diller & Morawetz,
supra note 4, at 818-19. Even Professors Estreicher and Revesz concede this
much, apparently on the ground that any such judgment would travel well
outside the agency's range of delegated authority and expertise. See Estreicher
& Revesz II, supra note 4, at 841 ("We of course do not argue that intracircuit
nonacquiescence is legitimate simply because an agency has chosen to nonacquiesce and the federal courts are bound by Chevron to defer to that choice.").
But cf.White, supra note 4, at 666 (finding Chevron deference is properly applied to the NLRB's conclusion that multiple-venue judicial-review statute is
incompatible with any duty to acquiesce). In any event, in light of the unam-
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The conclusion that Congress has refused to authorize intracircuit nonacquiescence has significant analytical consequences. It obliterates the jurisdiction-control defense of the
practice advanced by Professors Estreicher and Revesz by negating entirely their critical minor premise. Of no less importance, this conclusion undercuts three alternative arguments
20 8
for the constitutionality of intracircuit nonacquiescence.
First, the absence of congressional authorization undermines
any argument that Congress properly has sanctioned the practice as an "incidental" limitation on the right to SSA benefits,
which Congress has created and properly may define pursuant
to its spending and commerce powers. 2° 9 Second, the absence
of congressional authorization undoes any claim that intracircuit nonacquiescence enjoys "the strongest of presumptions" of
constitutionality based on the sort of cooperative executive-legislative action envisioned by the Court in Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer.210 Finally, the lack of congressional authorization neutralizes any argument that Congress has validated executive nonacquiescence pursuant to its "necessary and
proper" authority "to effectuate not only its own enumerated
powers, but all the powers of every branch of the federal
2 11

government.)2

The key point is that Congress has not authorized -

im-

biguous legislative history of the 1984 Act, any agency conclusion that an implicit congressional authorization of intracircuit nonacquiescence exists would
transgress even the bounds of reasonableness imposed by Chevron.
208. Cy Diller & Morawetz, supra note 4, at 821-22, 824 (suggesting that
constitutional inquiry may differ depending on whether Congress has, or has
not, authorized nonacquiescence).
209. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S.
50, 83 (1982) (plurality opinion).
210. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). In Youngstown Sheet & Tube, the Court addressed
whether the executive power allowed the President to seize privately owned
steel mills to ensure their operation in the face of a nationwide strike. Writing
for the majority, Justice Black concluded that the President lacked this power,
in part because no "statutory authorization for this seizure" existed, id at 585,
and because "Congress had refused to adopt that method of settling labor disputes," id- at 586. In a famous concurrence, Justice Jackson expanded on this
theme, distinguishing among three types of cases. In one set of cases, "the
President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress,"
id. at 635, and, as a result, the authority of the president to act is "supported
by the strongest of presumptions," i. at 637. Justice Jackson's approach in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube has become an important part of modern separation-of-powers analysis. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 669 (1981)
(citing Justice Jackson's approach as "analytically useful"); W. REHNQUIsT,
THm SuPREME CouR7. How IT WAS, How IT Is 93 (1987) (Justice Jackson's
opinion has "proved valuable to subsequent courts and lawyers").
211. Bator, supra note 58, at 168 (emphasis added).
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plicitly or otherwise - intracircuit nonacquiescence by the executive branch. Thus, any constitutional analysis based on an
"implied authorization" offers no more hope for solving the
nonacquiescence puzzle than do citations to Cooper, Crowell, or
Mendoza. Courts must construct some other methodology for
assessing the constitutional question.
IV.

IDENTIFYING AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH

The Supreme Court has yet to address the constitutionality
of intracircuit nonacquiescence. 2'2 Many lower courts have
condemned the practice, but they have done so essentially by
assertion. 213 Existing case law thus sheds little light on how to
approach this constitutional question.
As with other constitutional issues, resolution of the intracircuit-nonacquiescence controversy requires, in the end, a
choice between competing values. 214 It may be enough to leave
the matter at that and to proceed without more to balancing
the pros and cons of the practice.2 15 -Other commentators have
done just that. 216 Such wide-open balancing, however, raises serious problems. It imposes institutional costs on courts by lending credence to the charge that the judiciary acts as little more
than a "super-legislature" guided only by the shifting preferences of its individual members 2 17 Unstructured balancing also
212. See supra note 11.
213. See Estreicher & Revesz I, suprm note 4, at 718 (noting that court decisions have come "without detailed elaboration").
214. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 82, at viii; see also Estreicher & Revesz I,
supra note 4, at 751 (claiming that "striking a proper balance between the
competing values [is] exceedingly difficult"); Maranville, supra note 4, at 528
(ruling on nonacquiescence requires "choice between conflicting values").
215. Cf. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 677-97 (1988) (using what one dissent characterized as "the 'totality of the circumstances' mode of analysis" in
holding constitutional provisions of Ethics in Government Act of 1978 that created special court to appoint independent counsel for investigation and restricted Attorney General's power to remove independent counsel).
216. E.g., Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 720 & n.215 (proposing a
"balancing of competing factors" and suggesting that constitutional inquiry
"presumably" would be "similar" to balancing-oriented "rationality review"
under the APA); id at 751 (suggesting applicability of "cost benefit calculus");
CUMB. Comment, supranote 4, at 125 (concluding that "necessity" for intracircuit nonacquiescence "often outweighs any negative impact it may have"); see
also Diller & Morawetz, supra note 4, at 803, 812-17 (responding to cost-benefit
analysis of Estreicher and Revesz and concluding that a "fair consideration of
the costs and supposed benefits of nonacquiescence requires rejection of [their]
proposed standard").

217. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 788
(1945) (Black, J., dissenting).
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threatens sound decisionmaking in the particular case by raising the odds that judicial analysis will be undisciplined, idiosyncratic, or skewed by self-interest or partisanship 2 1 8 These risks
are particularly significant when the issue presented is whether
an executive policy impinges too much on judicial prerogatives.
After all, when courts are called on to judge their own case,
they should be especially inclined to use a recognized and discretion-limiting analytical framework.
Such a framework is available. Indeed, for at least five decades, the Supreme Court has been hammering out as its principal constitutional methodology an approach well suited to
evaluation of the intracircuit-nonacquiescence issue. That
methodology mandates a structured "judicial scrutiny of
means/ends relationships. 2' 19 Under the modern-day version
of this methodology, a court letermines first what "level of
scrutiny" it must apply to the challenged governmental policy. 220 The court then inquires whether the particular governmental interests offered in support of that policy are
sufficiently potent and carefully enough advanced by it to meet
the applicable standard of review.2 1 This methodology surfaces most often in equal protection cases. 222 In those cases, the

courts-usually apply so-called "minimal" scrutiny2 2 - requiring only that the governmental policy be "rationally related" to
a "legitimate" governmental interest.22 In cases presenting
more palpable affronts to recognized constitutional values, however, courts apply so-called "heightened" scrutiny2m - requir218. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 711-12 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting that use of a "balancing test" on "a case-by-case basis" is "not a
government of laws at all"); Bator, supra note 58, at 257 (criticizing balancing
used in cases involving permissibility of article I agency and court adjudication
as "open-ended and necessarily subjective"). On balancing, see generally
Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943
(1987) (examining growth of balancing as method of constitutional interpretation); Coffin, JudicialBalancing: The ProteanScales of Justice, 63 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 16 (1988) (advocating judicial balancing as opposed to broad rules).
219. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 93 n.2 (11th ed. 1985). Near the
beginning of his casebook, Professor Gunther notes that use of this methodology "recurs throughout this volume, and may well be the most frequently invoked technique in the judicial review of the validity of federal and state
legislation." Id.
220. Id. at 588-89.
221. Id. at 588.
222. See id. at 588-91.
223. Id. at 588.
224. E.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432,
440 (1985).
225. Id. at 440-41.
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ing proof of (1) a "compelling, 226 or at least an "important, f' 227
governmental interest and (2) a "necessary," 228 or at least a "direct, substantial, 22 9 relationship between the challenged policy
0
and the advancement of that interest.3
At first blush, use of this means/ends methodology may
seem exotic in analyzing a separation-of-powers problem. The
reality, however, is that the Supreme Court has applied
means/ends analysis - and heightened scrutiny in particular to issues arising in almost all areas of constitutional law.2 91 For
example, the Court has employed heightened scrutiny in assessing constitutional challenges based on the free speech and
free press clauses, 2 2 and the free exercise clausem of the first
amendment; the "substantive due process" component of the
fifth and fourteenth amendments; 23 and the contracts
226. Iti at 440.
227. 1I at 441.
228. E.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964).
229. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982).

230. See generally G. GUNTHER, supra note 219, at 588-89. The Court has
developed two separate forms of heightened scrutiny- so-called "strict scrutiny," developed initially in cases involving race discrimination, and so-called
"intermediate scrutiny," developed initially in cases involving sex discrimination. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432,

440-41 (1985). For reasons developed in Part VI, the distinction between these
forms of heightened scrutiny does not matter for purposes of this Article. See
infra notes 400-02 and accompanying text.
231. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 219, at 457. For a recent illustration, see
Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3166 (1990) (face-to-face confrontation excusable under confrontation clause only when "necessary to further an important public policy").
232. E.g., Butterworth v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1376,1381 (1990); Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 110 S. Ct. 1391, 1396 (1990) ('ro
determine
whether Michigan's restrictions on corporate political expenditures may constitutionally be applied to the Chamber, we must ascertain whether they burden the exercise of political speech and, if they do, whether they are narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest." (citation omitted)).
233. E.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403, 406 (1963) (after finding a
"burden on the free exercise of appellant's religion," Court inquires "whether
some compelling state interest... justifies the substantial infringement"); see
also infra note 240 and accompanying text. See generally Employment Div.,
Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1615 n.1 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (collecting earlier free-exercise cases in which Court applied heightened scrutiny).
234. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155, 164 (1973) (where "certain 'fundamental rights' are involved, the Court has held that regulation limiting these
rights may be justified only by a 'compelling state interest'" (citations omitted)); accord Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977) (plurality
opinion) (regulations imposing burden on decision whether to bear or beget a
child "may be justified only by compelling state interests"); see Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (finding that "means... sweep unneces-
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clause,2s5 the takings clause, 23 6 and the privileges and immunities clause of article IV.2 7
Most important, the Court long has applied forms of
heightened scrutiny to answer questions involving the proper
allocation of governmental powers. It has used such analysis,
for example, in determining whether state laws impinge too
much on Congress's powers to regulate the free flow of interstate commerce. 2ss Even more significant for present purposes,
sarily broadly" to justify state's contraceptive-control statute); id at 497
(Goldberg, J., concurring) (requiring government to show an "interest which is
compelling" to justify statute).
235. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 29 (1977) (requiring
that challenged law impairing contracts be "reasonable and necessary to serve
the admittedly important purposes claimed by the state").
236. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987) (requiring that state regulation impinging on use of private property "'substantially
advance[s] legitimate state interests"' (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,

260 (1980)).

237. E.g., United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465
U.S. 208, 222 (1984) (requiring both a "'substantial reason"' for rule discriminating against non-residents and an inquiry "'whether the degree of discrimination bears a close relation"' to such a reason (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334
U.S. 385, 396 (1948)). In other constitutional contexts, the Court has triggered
heightened scrutiny by finding an infringement of a "fundamental" right or interest. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (right to marry);
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336, 338 (1972) (right to vote and travel); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969) (right of interstate travel). This
"fundamental interest" concept is surely capacious enough in its phrasing to
embrace one branch's invasion of another's constitutional authority, after all,
both the judiciary and the citizenry as a whole have a "fundamental interest"
in avoiding the usurpation or dilution of the judicial power on which all constitutional rights depend. See generally G. GUNTHER, supra note 219, at 457 n.10
(noting that "strict scrutiny" is "exercised when 'fundamental interests' are
impinged"). To be sure, past fundamental-interest cases have involved the
protection of individual liberties. That fact hardly renders them irrelevant,
however, because the underlying goal of the separation of powers is to "better
... secure liberty," United States v. Munoz-Flores, 110 S. Ct. 1964, 1970 (1990)
(quoting Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 694 (1988) (quoting Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring))), and "to protect individual rights," idi at 1971.
238. E.g., Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S.
333, 353-54 (1977) (invalidating state statute because it "does remarkably little"
to advance its "laudable goal" and because "nondiscriminatory alternatives...
are readily available"); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354
(1951) (finding discrimination against interstate commerce unconstitutional
where "reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives, adequate to conserve legitimate [program] interests, are available"); see also Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365, 378 (1971) (applying strict scrutiny in invalidating state statute discriminating against resident aliens in part because it "conflict[s] with... overriding national policies in an area constitutionally entrusted to the Federal
Government").
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the Court has used the argot of heightened scrutiny in a
number of separation-of-powers decisions. In Nixon v. Administratorof General Services,2a 9 for example, the Court required
"an overriding need to promote objectives within the constitutional authority of Congress" to justify congressional regulation
of the disposition of presidential papers.2 ° Generalizing from
this principle, the Court in Mistretta v. United States2 suggested that such an "'overriding need"' must be shown whenever there exists the "potential for disruption" of the
executive's "'accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions.' "m In United States v. Nixon,2 3 the Court insisted that
something "more than a generalized claim of the public interest
in confidentiality" was necessary to sustain the "executive privilege,"244 because assertions of the privilege threatened to
"gravely impair the role of the courts under Art[icle] IH." 24
Similarly, in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the Court found that presidential immunity from private damage actions was proper, because no "broad public interests" justified the threat to
executive authority that imposition of such liability would produce2 7 and "alternative remedies and deterrents" were available to achieve the aims of permitting money-damages suits.M
These cases signal that when one branch's action threatens the
239. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
240. Id at 443 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Cf. Bob Jones Univ. v.
United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603-04 (1983) (requiring in a strict-scrutiny freeexercise case, proof of "an overriding governmental interest"; further finding
proffered interest "compelling" because government has "a fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination"). See generally In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 722 n.9 (1973) ('The state interest required [in strict
scrutiny cases] has been characterized as 'overriding,' 'compelling,' 'important,'
or 'substantial.' We attribute no particular significance to these variations in
diction." (citations omitted)).
241. 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989).
242. Id at 660 & n.13 (quoting Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433
U.S. 425, 433 (1977)).
243. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
244. Id at 707; see id at 706 ("broad, undifferentiated claim of public interest in .. . confidentiality" is inadequate); id at 713 ("generalized interest in
confidentiality" constitutes an insufficient justification).
245. Id at 707; see i& at 712.
246. 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
247. Id at 754; see also id. at 754 n.37 (noting "that there is a lesser public
interest in actions for civil damages than, for example, in criminal
prosecutions").
248. I& at 757-58. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 547-48 (1962) (plurality opinion) (requiring judicial scrutiny of "practical necessities, and the
possible alternatives"); cf. G. GUNTHER, supra note 219, at 278 & n.7 ("When a
'rationality' standard of scrutiny prevails, courts do not speculate about alter-
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central authority of another, the justifications for that action
' 249
must at least survive "close scrutiny. 0
Such an inquiry obviously approximates the "heightened
scrutiny" analysis found applicable in other constitutional settings. A readiness to use that analysis, moreover, promises
meaningful benefits. It should, for example, channel the judicial task by bringing into play discernable guideposts already
tested and refined in a wide body of case law.25 It should also
help negate rule-of-law-based complaints about open-ended balancing,251 which carry their sharpest sting when courts - as in
intracircuit-nonacquiescence cases - undertake to vindicate
rule-of-law values.2 5 2 At the least, a means/ends analysis offers
an alternative to the much-maligned separation-of-powers
methodologies the Court has floundered with in past
2 53
decisions.
To make these observations is not to suggest that use of a
means/ends methodology is a panacea.25 4 Means/ends analysis,
natives" but "inquiry about the existence of less burdensome alternative
means has become a common part of the Court's 'strict scrutiny' ").
249. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 727 (1986); see also Meltzer, supra
note 122, at 295 & n.24 (favoring "evaluating the force of the legislative justification for aisigning [adjudicatory] matters to an article I tribunal").
250. See infra notes 403-10 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 217-18 and accompanying text.
252. See, e.g., infra note 391 and accompanying text.
253. See, e.g., Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458
U.S. 50, 105-13 (1982) (White, J., dissenting) (canvassing history of Court's
treatment of non-article I courts and finding it "unsuccessful," "mystifying,"
and marked by "confusion and controversy"). See generally Schwartz, Curiouser and Curiouser: The Supreme Court's Separation of Powers Wonderland, 65 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 587 (1990) (discussing pre-Burger, Burger, and
Rehnquist Courts' approaches to separation of powers).
254. Notably, Professors Estreicher and Revesz recognize and reject the
possibility of employing heightened constitutional scrutiny in evaluating intracircuit nonacquiescence. Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 720 n.216.
Their rejection of such an approach, however, takes up only three sentences in
a footnote. See id They say in one sentence that there is "no need" to apply
"intermediate" scrutiny because APA review is necessarily stricter than constitutional "rationality review." Id. Whether or not this assertion about APA
review is accurate, it is beside the point. Intermediate scrutiny - unlike APA
review - is a recognized form of constitutional analysis that - unlike APA
analysis - calls for particularized inquiries into the weight of the claimed government interest and the closeness of fit between that interest and the challenged policy.
Professors Estreicher and Revesz also assert that "a rejection of 'strict
scrutiny'... is fairly subsumed in our rejection of the per se argument of unconstitutionality." Id. Their "rejection of the per se argument," however, appears to refer essentially to their demonstration that Cooperv. Aaron is not on
point. Cooper v. Aaron may well not be on point, see supra notes 84-91 and
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like any other constitutional methodology, is in many respects
indeterminate and subject to manipulation. A means/ends
methodology is also surely not well suited for all separation-ofpowers issues. For example, some issues may be disposed of by
an unencumbered resort to constitutional text or history,2
while other issues simply may not fit the mold of a traditional
means/ends appraisal. 2 - 6 As the analysis below seeks to show,
however, means/ends analysis does provide a workable framework for assessing the many countervailing considerations
bearing on the particular separation-of-powers problem
presented by intracircuit nonacquiescence.
For these reasons, this Article assesses the constitutionality
of intracircuit nonacquiescence using modern means/ends analysis. It addresses first (in Part V) whether intracircuit nonacquiescence so seriously trenches on recognized constitutional
concerns as to warrant more than minimal scrutiny. 25 7 It then
addresses (in Part VI) whether intracircuit nonacquiescence operates in a careful enough manner to promote sufficiently important governmental interests to satisfy the level of scrutiny
that is applicable.2sa
It bears emphasis that neither the name nor the precise
framing of the constitutional methodology used to assess intracircuit nonacquiescence is of surpassing importance. What is
important is that the ensuing analysis supports two basic conclusions. First, intracircuit nonacquiescence intrudes greatly on
a host of important separation-of-powers values. Second, the
justifications for that intrusion are insubstantial. Given these
conclusions, the constitutional case against intracircuit nonacquiescence must succeed, regardless of how one describes the
'25 9
applicable legal "test.
accompanying text, but such a conclusion does not remove the possibility that
some form of heightened scrutiny is constitutionally appropriate for other reasons, see generally inrfra Part V (discussing and defending the propriety of
heightened scrutiny).
255. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976) (per curiam); Ex
parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 512-13 (1869).
256. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
257. See infra Part V.
258. See infra Part VI.
259. In assessing intracircuit nonacquiescence, Professor Maranville asserts
that "application of the separation of powers doctrine is undercut by the absence of a neutral vantage point." Maranville, supra note 4, at 528. She accordingly reaches no conclusion with respect to the separation-of-powers issue
presented by intracircuit nonacquiescence. For better or worse, however, constitutional issues must be resolved, and this is so regardless of whether a "neutral vantage point" can be found in some abstract sense. I submit that the
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THE PROPRIETY OF HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY

How does one decide whether a particular governmental
practice is properly subject to heightened judicial scrutiny? In
many cases the task is easy. In cases involving non-benign race
and sex discrimination, for example, settled precedent demonstrates that heightened scrutiny is proper.2 6° In other cases,
however, the lack of clear precedent forces courts to explore in
greater detail whether the challenged practice so seriously
threatens the constitutional plan as to mandate elevated judi261
cial review.
This task is complicated in separation-of-powers cases because the American system is one "not of rigidly separated but
' 2 This difficulty,
rather of divided and overlapping powers."2
however, has not led to judicial abdication in separation-of-powers cases. Rather, the Court has recognized repeatedly the judiciary's responsibility to guard against attempts by any branch
improperly "to increase its own powers" 263 or to "undermine
the authority and independence of . . . another coordinate

Branch." 264 In particular, the Court has exercised "vigilance"
to forestall any practice that "'impermissibly threatens the institutional integrity of the Judicial Branch."26
In considering whether intracircuit nonacquiescence so
threatens these principles as to warrant heightened scrutiny,
attention must focus first on such orthodox sources of constitutional argument as constitutional text, judicial precedent, and
established traditions of governance. In addition, Supreme
Court authority requires courts to ask whether the "practical
consequences" of intracircuit nonacquiescence comport with
the policies underlying the Constitution's distribution of powers.266 An assessment of these key considerations - underanalysis presented here is "neutral," at least in the critical sense that it seeks
to draw on the existing legal materials in an intellectually honest fashion and
to assess deliberately and fairly all arguments made in favor of intracircuit
nonacquiescence.
260. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S.
432, 440-41 (1985).
261. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-95 (1986).
262. Bator, supra note 58, at 265; see Strauss, Article III Courts and the
ConstitutionalStructure, 65 IND. L.J. 307, 310 (1990) (citing difficulty of defining each branch's constitutional "turf").
263. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 694 (1988).
264. Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 659-60 (1989).
265. Id- at 383 (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478
U.S. 833, 851 (1986)).
266. Id. at 393; see, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478
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taken in Subpart A below as to text, authority and tradition,
and in Subpart B below as to the practice's "practical consequences" - leads to an unmistakable conclusion: Intracircuit
nonacquiescence poses so clear a "dange[r] of ... usurpation of

[Judicial] Branch functions"26 7 that it at least warrants that
form of heightened scrutiny described as "intermediate."
A. TEXT, AUTHORrY AND TRADrnION
Any look at the constitutionality of intracircuit nonacquiescence must begin with the constitutional text. 26s Although no
constitutional provision flatly condemns the practice, the case
against intracircuit nonacquiescence finds support in constitutional language more specific and suggestive than commonly is
invoked to invalidate governmental action. That language appears in article IE, section 3. The fourth clause of that section
provides simply but definitively that "the President" - and
consequently those who work under him26 9 - "shall take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed." 270 This language, like
all language, is subject to different interpretations. Indeed, the
executive branch might urge that "faithfully" executing the
U.S. 833, 851 (1986) (key question concerns the "practical effect that the congressional action will have on the constitutionally assigned role of the federal
judiciary"); Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 544-48 (1962) (plurality opinion) (observing that "practical considerations" authorized Congress to create
certain non-article M courts without offending article M).Notably, concerns
about practical consequences date all the way back to Marbury,in which the
Court relied in part on "the practical and real omnipotence" that the legislature would enjoy in the absence of judicial review. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803).
267. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 694 (1988) (quoting Bowsher v. Synar,
478 U.S. 714, 727 (1986)).
268. Cf.Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S.
102, 108 (1980) ("the starting point for interpreting a statute is the language of
the statute itself"). This conclusion is suggested by the fountainhead of
heightened-scrutiny analysis, the Carolene Products footnote four, which
teaches that "[t]here may be narrower scope for operation of presumption of
constitutionality" when government action "appears on its face to be within a
specific prohibition of the Constitution." United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). The Court's recent separation-of-powers decisions
emphasize similarly the salience of constitutional text. See, e.g., Mistretta, 109
S. Ct. 647, 671 (1989); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722-23 (1986); INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 945-46 (1983).
269. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166 (1803) (presidential subordinates "act by his authority" so as "[t]o aid him in the performance

of [his] duties"); see also THE

CONsTrrToN OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRErATION, S. Doc. No. 39, 88th Cong., 1st

Sess. 529 & n.71 (1964).
270. U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 3, cl. 4.
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laws requires strict adherence to executive perceptions of congressional intent regardless of contrary judicial interpretations.
Such a view, however, insists on a primacy of executive interpretations of law over even the clear and considered interpretations of a supervisory, multi-judge article III court. On its face,
this position rubs hard against the heedful, unresisting role suggested by an official "tak[ing] care" to "faithfully" execute
binding legal rules.
If more is needed to make the case against intracircuit nonacquiescence, it is supplied by Marbury v. Madison.- 1 The enduring contribution of Marbury is its endorsement of the
Framers' understanding that "[t]he interpretation of the laws is
the proper and peculiar province of the courts."'2 72 In recognizing this principle, the Court added a critical layer of meaning to
the faithful execution clause and stated a principle of central
importance to the intracircuit-nonacquiescence debate. The
point is simple: Because laws assume meaning only through interpretations, and because the judiciary has the "peculiar province" of providing those interpretations, those "faithfully
execut[ing]" the laws would seem bound to heed legal interpretations provided by article III courts.2 3 This proposition is, of
course, not a prescription for bizarre results. For example, a
federal agency need not immediately internalize on a nationwide basis the first interpretation of a governing statute
271. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
272.

THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 525 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961); see

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to [s]ay what the law is."); cj
American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2323, 2343 (1990) (Scalia,
J., concurring) ("judicial role. . . is to say what the law is").
273. See Lopez v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1489, 1503 (9th Cir.) (noting "that the
Secretary, as a member of the executive, is required to apply federal law as
interpreted by the federal courts cannot seriously be doubted"), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 469 U.S. 1082 (1984) (mem.); National Treasury
Employees Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587, 604 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (stating that the
"constitutional duty" arising under the faithful-execution clause "does not permit the President to refrain from executing laws duly enacted by the Congress
as those laws are construed by the judiciary" (emphasis added)). This is not to
say, of course, that the executive has no role in the interpretation of laws. See
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 732-33 (1986); see also 2 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 34 (M. Farrand rev. ed. 1937) [hereinafter
RECORDS] (remarks of James Madison, July 17) (noting that "[t]he [executive]
expounded & applied [the laws] for certain purposes"). Most important, when
statutory directions are ambiguous, the executive branch has no choice but to
interpret that language in deciding how to structure its own affairs. Once judicial interpretation removes the ambiguity, however, the executive can no
longer claim a power of interpretation based on necessity.
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adopted by the most remote federal district court.274 If a mandate to follow the laws as interpreted by courts has any substantial meaning, however, it should require at least that an
executive official not wilfully defy a clear interpretation of a
governing statute made by the sole appellate court with
mandatory review authority over that official's conduct.
Proponents of intracircuit nonacquiescence attack this position by claiming that Marbury's principle of judicial supremacy
imposes no greater duty on the executive than to honor the actual judgments of federal courts.2 5 This claim tends to prove
too much, however, because it renders constitutionally unobjectionable even an executive agency's routine disregard of the
most unshakable Supreme Court precedents. 6e Even more important, this argument clashes with Cooper v. Aaron,277 in
which the Court held that judicial interpretations of legal texts
-

not just discrete judgments -

bind government officials. 278

Indeed, because Cooper declared that such judicial interpretations are "the supreme law of the land," 279 it supports directly
274. See, ag., Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1859-60 (no duty to acquiesce in
district-court precedent because there is no "law of the district").
275. See, eg., Harrison, The Role of the Legislative and Executive Branches
in Interpreting the Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 371, 372 (1988);
Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1829 n.41, 1857-58 & nn.161-63 (collecting authorities); see also Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 6 n.33 (1983) (questioning whether Marbury envisions judicial pronouncements that bind "other branches of government, particularly the coordinate branches of the national government"); Wechsler, The Courts and the
Constitution, 65 COLuM. L. REV. 1001, 1008 (1965) ("[u]nder Marbury, the
Court decides a case; it does not pass a statute calling for obedience by all
within the purview of the rule that is declared").
276. Indeed, this prove-too-much response seems especially potent because
"federal administrative agencies uniformly acknowledge that Supreme Court
decisions are binding." Maranville, supra note 4, at 484; accord H.R. REP.No.
432, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 428 (1983) ('"e
application of Supreme Court decisions to executive branch policies is virtually undisputed."); Schwartz, supra
note 4, at 1857 & n.160 (noting that "[a]gencies typically concede the obligation
to follow Supreme Court precedent" and collecting authorities); COLUM. J.
Note, supra note 4, at 464 (noting that "mosf federal agencies consider themselves bound by decisions of the United States Supreme Court"); see also Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 723 (acknowledging that acquiescence in
Supreme Court pronouncements is required). For other commentaries rejecting this judgment-focused view of judicial decision making, see Oversight
Hearings,supra note 4, at 130 (statement of Professor Brilmayer) (noting that
argument "not only authorizes administrative law judges to disregard contrary
law of the circuit; it authorizes them to ignore contrary Supreme Court precedents as well"); Kubitschek, supra note 4, at 434-36.
277. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
278. Id at 18.
279. Id. (emphasis added).
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the proposition that the executive, charged with faithfully executing "the laws," must follow a supervisory court's clear exposition of legal texts.280 Although some have criticized
Cooper,281 its continuing vitality cannot be doubted. The Fram-

ers themselves lent support to the teaching of Cooper by speaking of Article III courts not as issuers of discrete judgments, but
as "[e]xpositors of laws.

' 28 2

Moreover, Cooper itself stands as a

uniquely potent precedent because the Court's unanimous opinion in the case was signed individually by each Justice of the
280. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 646 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring) ("faithful execution" clause "gives a governmental
authority that reaches so far as there is law" (emphasis added)); see also Diller
& Morawetz, supra note 4, at 822 (relying on Cooperin arguing that the "judiciary . . . announces declarations of law binding on the executive branch
through precedential effect").
281. See Meese, supra note 9, at 986-87 (Cooper "was, and is, at war with
the Constitution" and "would have shocked men like John Marshall and Joseph Story").
282. See 2 REcORDs, supra note 273, at 75 (remarks of Governor Morris,
July 21); accord id, at 430 (remarks of James Madison, Aug. 27) (noting "[t]he
right of expounding the Constitution" properly belonging to the judicial
branch in "cases of a Judiciary Nature"); 1 id. at 97 (remarks of Elbridge
Gerry, June 4) (noting that "Judiciary... will have a sufficient check agst.
encroachments on their own department by their exposition of the laws"); id.
at 98 (remarks of Rufus King, June 4) ("Judges ought to be able to expound
the law as it should come before them."); 2 id. at 75 (remarks of Caleb Strong,
July 21) (noting judicial "power... of expounding ...the laws" and judges'
"function of expositors"); id. at 79 (remarks of Nathaniel Ghorum, July 21)
(describing judges' role in "exposition of the laws"); id. (remarks of John
Francis Mercer, Aug. 15) (describing judges as "expositors"). Moreover, Marbury supports the view that judicial decisions have consequences reaching beyond the immediate parties to the dispute. To be sure "[i]n Marbury the Court
derived the authority of the courts to declare what the law is ...directly from
the judicial function of deciding concrete disputes placed before the courts for
decision." Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1829 n.40 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803)); see P. BATOR, D. MELTZER, P. MISHKIN &
D. SHAPIRO, THE FEDERAL CouRTs AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 79 (3d ed. 1988)
("Marshall derives the Court's power.., to make authoritative determinations
of constitutional law[ ]solely from the power to decide cases."). That fact does
not, however, in any way prove that judicial pronouncements of law have no
external legal effect once they have been issued in the context of deciding a
justiciable dispute. Indeed, language in Marbury suggests just the opposite.
See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ('Those who
apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret
that rule."); cf.G. GUNTHER, supra note 219, at 14 ("Marbury can be read as
emphasizing a narrow, incidental role of courts in constitutional cases; but
there are also passages suggesting a broader, central role of courts."). In short,
"[ilt is a proper part of the judicial function to make law as a necessary byproduct of the process of deciding actual cases and controversies." Florida v.
Wells, 110 S.Ct. 1632, 1640 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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Court. 2 3 As already suggested, the distinctive agency-related
justifications for intracircuit nonacquiescence may serve to distinguish Cooper. Cooper's broad endorsement of judicial primacy in declaring the law, however, suggests that those
justifications at least should be subjected to more than minimal
scrutiny.
Nor are Marbury and Cooper fairly read as articulating a
principle restricted to pronouncements of law issued by the
Supreme Court. 284 Marbury assigned the duty of saying "what
283. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 4.
284. In addition to this proposed distinction between the Supreme Court
and circuit courts, commentators have suggested a number of other distinctions between the nonadherence to judicial pronouncements condemned in
Cooper and cases of intracircuit nonacquiescence. For example, one may contend that Cooper involved an earlier pronouncement of constitutional,rather
than statutory, law. See generally S. CAL. Note, supra note 4, at 1153-58 (setting forth, but rejecting, argument for distinguishing Cooper and other cases
on constitutional/statutory grounds). The seminal declaration of Marbury,
however, suggested no such distinction. See Monaghan, supra note 275, at 2
('Marshall's grand conception of judicial autonomy in law declaration was not
in terms or in logic limited to constitutional interpretation."). Indeed, in finding the power of Constitution-based judicial review, the Marbury Court reasoned from the premise that the judiciary indisputably was responsible for
declaring the meaning of subconstitutional law. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803); accord THE FEDERALST No. 78, at 525 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961); see also Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1983) ("judiciary is the final authority on
issues of statutory construction"); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 390 U.S. 261, 272 (1968) ("courts are the final authorities on issues of statutory construction").
Defenders of nonacquiescence might say also that Cooperinvolved a judicial clash with state officials, rather than a coequal branch of the national government. The Constitution, however, envisions a large role for states and state
officials in the nation's governance. Moreover, because nothing in Cooper suggests an intent to limit the Court's affirmation of judicial law-pronouncing
supremacy to rules of law aimed at state officials, that decision at least presumptively forecloses federal executive, no less than state executive, disregard
of judicial pronouncements. This is especially the case because United States
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), reemphasizes that "[n]o man" - including the
President himself - "is above the law." United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220
(1882) (emphasis added); see Nixon, 418 U.S. at 715.
Finally, as already suggested, see supra notes 89-90 and accompanying
text, some might urge that particularly powerful justifications support an authorization of intracircuit nonacquiescence by specialist federal agencies, see
also infra notes 487-91 and accompanying text (discussing Chevron and judicial
deference to agency expertise). Although full consideration of this argument
is postponed to Part VI, it merits mention that the justifications for intracircuit nonacquiescence based on official expertise and the need for broad discretion in operating governmental programs sound a familiar note. In the wake
of Brown, four southern states passed interposition resolutions on the theory
that local education officials were expert administrators in a field long com-
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the law is" not to the Supreme Court, but to "the judicial department. ' '2a8 Cooper reiterated the "settled doctrine"28 and
"basic principle" 2 7 that "the federaljudiciaryis supreme in the
exposition of the law."
These formulations leave limited
room for nice distinctions between Supreme Court and supervisory circuit court pronouncements - especially in an age when
circuit courts of necessity do much of the work envisioned by
the Framers as being handled by the Supreme Court. 8 9
mitted to exclusive state regulation. See Constitutional Law- Interposition
and Nullification, 1 RACE REL. REP. 437-47 (1956) (reprinting statutes). When
the invalidation of Louisiana's resolution was appealed, the Supreme Court responded in terms that are telling in this context: "The main basis for challenging this ruling is that the State of Louisiana 'has interposed itself in the
field of public education over which it has exclusive control.' This objection is
without substance, as we held, upon full consideration, in Cooper v.:
Aaron."
Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 364 U.S. 500, 501 (1960) (per curiam) (denial of application for stay).
285. Marbury,1 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 177.
286. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 17.
287. Id. at 18.
288. Id. (emphasis added). For a similar observation, see Diller &
Morawetz, supra note 4, at 823.
289. See, e.g., R. WHEELER & C. HARRISON, CREATING THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 24 (Federal Judicial Center pub. 1989) ('What did the [Evarts
Circuit Court of Appeals] Act do? Essentially, it shifted the appellate caseload
burden from the Supreme Court to new courts of appeals."); Estreicher &
Revesz I, supra note 4, at 730 (recognizing "Supreme Court's inability to review more than a small percentage of the cases on its certiorari docket"); see
also Diller & Morawetz, supra note 4, at 822-23 (arguing that "the system of
judicial review created by Congress and the courts ... delegates the power to
create binding precedent within each region to the courts of appeals"). See
generally COLUM. J. Note, supra note 4, at 486-87 (arguing that the Supreme
Court is unable to review so many circuit court decisions, particularly in the
area of administrative law, that the Court is no longer "'the court of last resort for most litigants nor the final arbiter of all federal law'" (quoting Note,
Securing Uniformity in National Law: A Proposalfor National Stare Decisis
in Courts of Appeals, 87 YALE L.J. 1219, 1223 (1978)). The Marbury- and
Cooper-based case for condemning intracircuit nonacquiescence by analogy to
"intra-Supreme Court" nonacquiescence draws support from three additional
considerations. First, if "the federal judiciary" - apart from the Supreme
Court - has any power to issue decisions binding in the sense envisioned by
Cooper, that power must exist when decisions come from a court of appeals
with exclusive review authority over the actions of a fixed set of nonjudicial
decision makers. Second, Congress created circuit courts to handle, on a regional basis, responsibilities previously assigned to the Supreme Court; therefore, agency officials who are subject directly and exclusively to a particular
circuit court's jurisdiction logically should be bound to honor that circuit
court's pronouncements just as those of the Supreme Court. Third, the decentralization of the judiciary caused by the creation of the courts of appeals has
in a significant way augmented executive power. This is so because that decentralization effectively has validated widespread intercircuit nonacquiescence in decisions that the executive would be bound to honor if the decisions
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An additional reason exists for rejecting the argument that
circuit court rulings are so "modifiable"' 29 and "intermediate" 291 that they should not bind executive officers. This
defense of intracircuit nonacquiescence offends American "traditions"' 92 and "long-continued practice."' 93 It is simply a postulate of our legal system that there is such a thing as "the law
of the circuit."29 Congress has assumed the existence of distinctive bodies of circuit court law in creating and shaping the
courts of appeals.295 The Supreme Court has recognized that
had been issued by the Supreme Court. To countenance intracircuit nonacquiescence as well is to gild the lily.
290. Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 727.
291. Id at 726.
292. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 709 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see
id. at 695 (majority opinion) (rejecting separation-of-powers challenge to judicial authority to review grounds for Attorney General's removal of independent counsel because that "function... is well within the traditional power of
the judiciary"); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("Deeply embedded traditional ways of
conducting government ... give meaning to the words of [the constitutional]
text."); D. FARBER & S. SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
3 (noting that in pre-colonial England, "[t]hose opposed to the exercise of royal
or parliamentary authority often based their arguments on. .. common law,
custom and tradition"); see also, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court, 110 S. Ct.
2105, 2110 (1990) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) (emphasizing "American tradition" in assessing constitutionality of personal-jurisdiction rule); id. at 2122
(Brennan, J., concurring) (acknowledging relevance of tradition); Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986) (relying on "'Nation's history and tradition!" in upholding constitutionality of state law prohibiting consensual homosexual sodomy (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)
(plurality opinion)).
293. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981).
294. E.g., Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 561 (1988); see Diller &
Morawetz, supra note 4, at 811 ("[O]ur legal system treats the law of the cir-_
cuit as authoritative until it is overturned."); see also Maranville, supra note 4,
at 490 ("participants in the American legal system have become accustomed to
differences in the law applied by different circuits"). See generally Friendly,
The "Law of the Circuit" and All That, 46 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 406, 413 (1972)
(circuit courts are "not overly impressed by the fact that another has reached
a contrary conclusion" and "have become increasingly ... self-contained");
Wallace, The Nature and Extent of Intercircuit Con~flicts: A Solution Needed
for a Mountain or a Molehill?, 71 CALiF. L. REv. 913, 931 (1983) (noting that
"[m]ost litigants easily adapt to the law within their particular circuit" because
"most litigants live and work within the confines of only one circuit").
295. See, ag., H.R. REP. No. 1390, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprintedin 1980
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4236, 4237 (division of Fifth Circuit creates
judicial structure "capable of meeting the clear mandates of our judicial system - the rendering of consistent, expeditious, fair and inexpensive justice");
H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 428 (1983) ("Under the Federal judicial
system, decisions by a circuit Court of Appeals are considered the 'law of the
circuit.'

").
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each circuit properly seeks "'to maintain its integrity as an in-

stitution'" and "'to secure uniformity and continuity in its decisions.' "-96 Thus, each circuit court has taken pains to
articulate and purify its own corpus of law.297 This system,
moreover, comports with sound policy because it "allocate[s]
the judicial power among manageable units that can preserve
the rule of law within their jurisdictions. 2 98 Because there is a
"law of the circuit," and because executive officers are bound to
execute "the laws," American tradition counsels that an executive officer must honor legal interpretations issued by that circuit court that alone has supervisory authority over the action
that officer is contemplating.
The so-called "district court analogy" bolsters this conclusion.299 The law, after all, leaves no doubt that a federal district court must follow the precedents of the circuit court with
review authority over its rulings.3° ° When agency officials simi296. United States v. American-Foreign S.S. Corp., 363 U.S. 685, 689-90
(1960) (quoting Marls, Hearing and Rehearing Cases in Banc, 14 F.R.D. 91, 96
(1954)) (emphasis added); see also, e.g., United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co.,
464 U.S. 165, 177 (1984) (White, J., concurring) (noting that circuits are not
bound to follow other circuits and that "[c]onflicts in the circuits are generally
accepted and in some ways even welcomed"); Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 268-69 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (arguing that "the function of the courts of appeals in the federal judicial system
requires that their independence, within the area of their authority, be
safeguarded").
297. See, e.g., Maranville, supra note 4, at 487 n.52 (citing numerous "law of
the circuit" cases); COLUM. J. Note, supra note 4, at 466 n.23 (collecting illustrative references to "the law of the circuit" in circuit court opinions).
298. Diller & Morawetz, supra note 4, at 805. Recognizing the value of
maintaining a "law of the circuit," the recently devised Federal Circuit and
Eleventh Circuit have embraced the precedents of their predecessor tribunals.
See South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1982) ('"To proceed without precedent, deciding each legal principle anew, would for too long
deprive the bar and the public of the stability and predictability essential to
the effort of a free society to live under a rule of law."); Bonner v. City of
Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1211 (11th Cir. 1981) ('Theoretically this court could
decide to proceed with its duties without any precedent, deciding each legal
principle anew ....
This court, the trial courts, the bar and the public are
entitled to a better result than to be cast adrift among the differing precedents
of other jurisdictions, required to examine afresh every legal principle ...
299. But see Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 722-25; Estreicher &
Revesz I, supra note 4, at 840; see also Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1827 (suggesting that existing constitutional arguments suffer from assumption "that
administrative adjudicators . . . are required to model their behavior on that
expected of inferior article H courts").
300. E.g., Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982); Jaffree v. Wallace, 705
F.2d 1526, 1532-33 (11th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); see 1B J. MOORE, J.
LUCAS & T. CumuER,
MooR's FFDERAL PRAcnIcE 0.401, at 3-4 (2d ed. 1988).
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larly must answer to a single, identifiable supervisory circuit
court, symmetry of logic counsels that they too must adhere to
that court's precedents.301 Professors Estreicher and Revesz argue that this analogy breaks down because agency decision
makers, unlike district court judges, are specialists administering national programs. 30 2 As explained below, however, the
specialist character of agencies has produced a rule of judicial
deference in the initial formulation of court-made precedents
that strengthens, rather than dilutes, the district court analogy. 30 3 In addition, district court judges possess many characsuch as life tenure, protection against salary
teristics reduction, Senate confirmation, and appointment from an exclusive pool of lawyers to a highly prestigious office - that
would seem to justify giving them even more decisional autonomy vis-A-vis circuit courts than is given to agency adjudicators.30 4 Indeed, because lawyers typically view agency officials
as resting lower on the adjudicatory totem pole than district
court judges, an agency's duty to follow a supervisory circuit
court's precedents would seem to follow a fortiori from the settled obligation of federal district courts.30 5 The bottom line is
that the considerations bolstering the "district court analogy"
seem at least as strong as the considerations said to weaken
it. 3 ° 6 Thus, that analogy - though no more flawless than most
307
analogies - retains significant persuasive force.
301. E.g., Ithaca College v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 224, 228 (2d Cir.) ("[A]s must a
district court, an agency is bound to follow the law of the Circuit."), cert denied, 449 U.S. 975 (1980); Morand Bros. Beverage Co. v. NLRB, 204 F.2d 529,
532 (7th Cir.) ('The position of any administrative tribunal whose hearings,
findings, conclusions and orders are subject to direct judicial review, is much
akin to ... a United States District Court.... That is to say, it is the 'inferior'
tribunal."), cerL denied, 346 U.S. 909 (1953).
302. See supra note 299.
303. See infra notes 493-94 and accompanying text.
304. See infra notes 359-60 and accompanying text.
305. This is all the more true because not only district court judges, but
even three-judge panels of the circuit court itself, must adhere to circuit court
precedent. E.g., Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 727-28.
306. See also Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1846 n.121 (concluding that "there
are strong practical reasons to expect that nonacquiescence by administrative
agencies will pose a greater threat to the maintenance of the authority of the

article HI courts than does nonacquiescence by inferior courts").
307. See Weis, supra note 4, at 849-50 (noting that district court analogy is
not entirely apt, but nonetheless finding separation-of-powers violation); c .

Keller v. State Bar, 110 S. Ct. 2228, 2235 (1990) (relying on "substantial analogy" between union/member relationship and bar association/member relationship). Professor Schwartz questions the district court analogy, but invokes
a rationale that is fundamentally different from that of Professors Estreicher
and Revesz. Professor Schwartz suggests that the analogy may prove too
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A prohibition on executive intracircuit nonacquiescence
also comports with the recognized duties of private citizens.30 8
If a private employer in the Sixth Circuit, for example, used a
job-applicant screening test found by that court to violate Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act, neither that employer nor a neighboring employer could successfully "nonacquiesce" by continuing to use the test. If an employer did act in this manner, the
next lawsuit would not be difficult. The reviewing court would
swiftly enjoin the employer's flagrant disregard of Title VII as
interpreted by circuit court precedent. 9 Proponents of intracircuit nonacquiescence, however, urge (as they must) that a
similar injunction compelling agency decisionmakers to comply
with local circuit court precedent would be impermissible.3 1 0
This disparity in results clashes with the settled notion that exmuch because whenever district courts violate circuit court precedent, the circuit court "will ordinarily simply remand for any further proceedings necessary to complete the adjudication. It will not enjoin the lower court from ever
committing the same error again." Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1849-50 n.137. It
follows, he suggests, that judicial injunctions of agency nonacquiescence range
beyond the "norms of judicial practice" properly suggested by the district
court analogy. I&
One answer to this argument is that the point of the district court analogy
is to show that district courts and agencies share the same duty to abide by
circuit court precedent; given this central conclusion, it does not matter that
the differing postures of the two institutions may warrant different remedial
approaches when violations of this duty occur. An even easier answer, however, is that the phenomenon of intracircuit nonacquiescence by district courts
is unknown, or at least unlitigated, so that any analogy-based argument that
agencies should be free of injunctive remedies lacks a proper basis. See
BROOKLYN Note, supra note 4, at 111 (noting that "good faith of these lower
courts can usually be taken for granted"). In any event, federal appellate
courts have not hesitated to exercise broad equitable supervisory powers when
a subordinate district court does disregard controlling rules. See, e.g., Will v.
United States, 389 U.S. 90, 97, 100, 104-05 (1967); La Buy v. Howes Leather Co.,
352 U.S. 249, 257-60 (1957).
308. See generally WAYNE Note, supra note 4, at 171 n.140 (suggesting that
disobedience "of private parties who deliberately ignore binding federal [circuit] court precedents ... would not be tolerated").
309. See, e.g., Cheatwood v. South Cent. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 303 F. Supp.
754, 759 (M.D. Ala. 1969) (Johnson, J.).
310. Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 721-22 & n.218, 728 n.253, 731
n.261; cf. Conference Transcript, supra note 4, at 81 (remarks of Professor
Revesz) (arguing against certification of classes that include future litigants in
such a manner as effectively to preclude nonacquiescence). I say "as they
must" because otherwise any rule "authorizing" intracircuit nonacquiescence
would be meaningless. This is so because nonacquiescence cannot be effective
if, although the court cannot enjoin nonacquiescence per se, the court can order an agency not to pursue conduct on the ground that the conduct is inconsistent with the supervisory circuit's reading of governing law.
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ecutive decisionmakers are not "above the law." 3 1 Indeed, if
anything, executive officials would seem to have a greater duty
than private citizens to adhere to legal rules.3 12 The Constitution, after all, was designed to check governmental excesses,
and the Constitution imposes the duty to faithfully execute the
laws specifically on the executive branch.3 13
There exists a final reason, rooted in authority and tradition, why intracircuit nonacquiescence merits heightened scrutiny: The practice already has generated a fire storm of
vilification from both the judiciary and other segments of the
311. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 715 (1974); see Lopez v. Heckler
713 F.2d 1432, 1441 (9th Cir 1983) (Pregerson, J., concurring) ("The government expects its citizens to abide by the law - no less is expected of those
charged with the duty to faithfully administer the law."), denying stay, 572 F.
Supp. 26 (C.D. Cal. 1983), partialstay granted, 463 U.S. 1328 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice), motion to vacate stay denied, 464 U.S. 879 (1983); HARV. Note,
supra note 4, at 854 ("[O]ur political system presumes that the government
must set at least the same standards for its official conduct as it sets for the
actions of private citizens."); Conference Transcript, supra note 4, at 67 (remarks of Judge Re) ('"Tis would be a privilege accorded an agency not possessed by any other American .... ."); id. at 82-83 (remarks of Judge Walker)
(questioning intracircuit nonacquiescence because case not made "that somehow agencies stand in [sic] a different footing than other litigants"). Three additional considerations bolster the refusal to exempt agencies from the
generally applicable principle that a court may enjoin conformance with that
court's interpretation of federal law. First, such a refusal draws support from
the Supreme Court's declaration in Crowell that, in overseeing the work of
agency adjudicators, courts must retain 'full authority.., to deal with matters
of law." Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 54 (1932) (emphasis added). Second,
preclusion of injunctions against violations of congressional statutes found to
exist by the courts is hard to square with the general principle that courts in
fact may enjoin unlawful agency action. See, e.g., Califano v. Yamasaki, 442
U.S. 682, 705 (1979). See generally Diller & Morawetz, supra note 4, at 824-25
(noting that "a clear statement of [congressional] intent should be required"
before concluding that Congress has curtailed the courts' traditional injunctive
powers). Finally, binding private citizens to circuit court precedent while exempting federal agencies from the same obligation creates an anomalous result. This is so because private citizens often will be "non-parties to the
proceeding that created the precedent," Diller & Morawetz, supra note 4, at
822 n.82, whereas the nonacquiescing agency (at least normally) would have
been a "party to the case determining the precedent, and [thus would have]
had an opportunity to bring relevant arguments to the panel's attention, to petition for rehearing, and to suggest en banc review," id, at 808 n.28.
312. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218, 225 (5th Cir.) (en
banc) ("sound policy... requires the state to conform to stricter standards and
appearances in dealing with its citizens than are demanded of those citizens in
their dealings with each other"), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 41 (1990).
313. See also COLUM. Note, supra note 4, at 602 (agencies, because creatures
of delegated authority, "should not be considered in the same light as a private
litigant who reacts to the law, but should especially be expected to obey the
limits of their power as judicially interpreted").
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called intracirlegal community. Infuriated federal judges 3have
15
meritless," 14 "intolerable,"3
"utterly
cuit nonacquiescence
3 16
3
17
31
"outrageous,"
"shocking,"
a "symbolic bookburning, 8
and the equivalent of "the repudiated pre-Civil War doctrine of
nullification." 31 9 Courts have issued circuit-wide and state-wide
injunctions against intracircuit nonacquescence;32 0 relaxed procedural restrictions on plaintiffs attacking the practice; 321 found
that the practice is so unjustified that it warrants attorney fees
awards against the United States;322 and threatened its perpetrators with the contempt sanctions 23 More significant than
314. Holden v. Heckler, 584 F. Supp. 463, 490 (N.D. Ohio 1984), remanded
sub nom. Brest v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 754 F.2d 372 (6th Cir.
1985).
315. Ithaca College v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 224, 228 (2d Cir. 1980), cert denied,
449 U.S. 975 (1980).
316. Hyatt v. Heckler, 586 F. Supp. 1154, 1156 (W.D.N.C. 1984).
317. Anderson v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 1011, 1013 (4th Cir. 1985).
318. NLRB v. Eastern Smelting & Ref. Corp., 598 F.2d 666, 670 n.7 (1st Cir.
1979).
319. Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432, 1441 (9th Cir. 1983) (Pregerson, J.,
concurring), denying stay, 572 F. Supp. 26 (C.D. Cal. 1983), partial stay
granted, 463 U.S. 1328 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice), motion to vacate stay denied, 464 U.S. 879 (1983); see also Merli v. Heckler, 600 F. Supp. 249, 250
(D.N.J. 1984) (citing SSA practices as the work of "a heartless and indifferent
bureaucratic monster"). See generally Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1821, 1823 &
n.23 (observing that the "practice has been condemned in harsh terms" by
lower federal courts, "that judicial decisions addressing nonacquiescence reflect palpable judicial anger," and that judicial "[o]utrage at the agencies' conduct is pervasive"); ME. Note, supra note 4, at 200 (describing courts as
"unusually vocal" on this issue).
320. E.g., Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984); Lopez v.
Heckler, 572 F. Supp. 26, 31-32 (C.D. Cal. 1983), stay denied, 713 F.2d 1432 (9th
Cir.), partialstay granted, 463 U.S. 1328 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice), motion
to vacate stay denied, 464 U.S. 879 (1983), and districtcourt aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 725 F.2d 1489 (9th Cir.), vacated and remanded on other
grounds,469 U.S. 1082 (1984) (mem.); see also Williams, supra note 4, at 263 &
nn.64-66 (citing awards of injunctive relief).
321. See, e.g., Hyatt v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 376, 380-81 (4th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 820 (1987). See generally ME. Note, supra note 4, at 203-14
(discussing judicial abrogation of exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies
requirement).
322. See, e.g., Hyatt, 807 F.2d at 382 (citing Anderson v. Heckler, 756 F.2d
1011 (4th Cir. 1935)); Enerhaul, Inc. v. NLRB, 710 F.2d 748, 751 (11th Cir.
1983); Chee v. Schweiker, 563 F. Supp. 1362, 1365 (D. Ariz. 1983). See generally
Kubitschek, supra note 4, at 405 & nn.27-28 (explaining that courts have
awarded attorney fees on grounds that "the government's position was not
substantially justified or the government litigated in bad faith" and citing
cases).
323. See Hillhouse v. Harris, 715 F.2d 428, 430 (8th Cir. 1983) (McMillian,
J., concurring); Valdez v. Schweiker, 575 F. Supp. 1203, 1205 n.3 (D. Colo.
1983); see also Kirkland v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 706 F.2d 99, 104 (2d Cir.
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these colorful utterances and remarkable results, however, is
the steady drumbeat of the cases. The decisional law reveals
that dozens of courts over many years have concluded unanimously and easily that intracircuit nonacquiescence is
324
unconstitutional.
Condemnation of intracircuit nonacquiescence, moreover,
has come from important quarters of the legal community
other than the article I judges whom the practice would disempower. The American Bar Association twice has condemned
intracircuit nonacquiescence. 3 25 So has the bulk of scholarly
commentary 3 2 6 The blue-ribbon Federal Courts Study Committee concluded that the practice "repudiates... [an] obvious
and fundamental principle. 327 The most striking condemnation has come from former Solicitor General Rex E. Lee. In
1984, Mr. Lee was the highest-ranking official in the Reagan

1983) (issuing "strong[] caution" to the Board "against ignoring rules of law
established by this Court and other Courts of Appeals"); NLRB v. Ashkenazy
Property Management Corp., 817 F.2d 74, 75 (9th Cir. 1987) ("[A]ny future act
of 'nonacquiescence' should be dealt with by this court in the specific context
in which it occurs so that we may address the agency's particular violation of
the rule of law and fashion a remedy that is appropriate in light of all the relevant circumstances.").
324. See Diller & Morawetz, supra note 4, at 801 n.2 (collecting cases); Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 711 n.165 (collecting NLRB cases);
Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1821 nn.14-15 (collecting cases); IND. Note, supra
note 4, at 1103 n.14 (collecting SSA cases); TouRo Note, supra note 4, at 222
("strongly condemned by every circuit court of appeals to address the issue").
The only judicial observation sometimes said to break step with this blitzkrieg
of authority is Judge Wright's concurring opinion in Yellow Taxi Co. v. NLRB,
721 F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir. 1983). In that opinion Judge Wright expressed the view
that the NLRB is "'free to decline to follow decisions of the courts of appeals
with which it disagrees, even in cases arising in those circuits."' I at 384
(quoting the NLRB's stated position in S & H Riggers & Erectors, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 659 F.2d 1273, 1298 (5th Cir. Unit B
Oct. 1981)). Nonacquiescence by the NLRB, however, often is not "intracircuit" at all, see supra text accompanying note 25, and therefore even the
lonely comment of Judge Wright does not bear directly on the subject of this
Article. See also Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 711 (examining judicial reaction to the NLRB's nonacquiescence policy). Indeed, Yellow Tazi provides a stark example of the venue uncertainty that confronts the NLRB,
because that case arose in Minnesota, while judicial review was conducted by
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
325. See Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association, 54 U.S.L.W.
2037, 2041 (1985) (House of Delegates adopted resolution urging SSA to cease
policy of nonacquiescence); ABA Backs Abortion Rights, Right to Die and Job
Protection, 58 U.S.L.W. 2474, 2478 (1990) (House of Delegates urged federal
legislation prohibiting SSA from continuing policy of nonacquiescence).
326. See Kubitschek, supra note 4, at 400 (noting that "most" scholarly
commentary is "negative"); Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1822 n.17.
327. CoMMrrTEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 60.
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Administration to urge congressional rejection of legislation
prohibiting SSA intracircuit nonacquiescence. To this end, he
prepared and submitted to Congress a document expressing
"serious objection" to the "unprecedented interference" with
the executive branch posed by the proposed legislation.M By
1990, however, Mr. Lee was expressing a different view. He acknowledged that "[he] can now say, now that [he is] not part of
government" that the SSA's motives in pursuing intracircuit
nonacquiescence "border on the unlawful" 3 9 and has indicated
further that intracircuit nonacquiescence undertaken because
"it is cheaper.., to disregard what [a] court has done" is "outrageous. 33 0 Mr. Lee's sentiments are not unique. 331 At least
two United States Attorneys -

even while still in office -

re-

fused to comply with their own administration's program of intracircuit nonacquiescence.33 2
The widespread sense among judges and lawyers that intracircuit nonacquiescence is wrong does not prove that it is unconstitutional. It does reveal, however, that there exists a
tension between intracircuit nonacquiescence and widely
shared assumptions in this nation about the rule of law. The
bottom line is that constitutional text, authority, and tradition
combine to make a powerful case against intracircuit nonacquiescence. That case finds reinforcement in the real-world consequences of the practice.

B. PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES AND SEPARATION-OF-POWERS
POLICY

In assessing whether governmental conduct affronts the
separation-of-powers principle, the Supreme Court has emphasized not only text, authority, and tradition, but also the "practical consequences" of the challenged action in light of the
policies underlying the separation of powers.M For at least
328. Lee Letter, supra note 8, reprinted in 130 CONG. REc. at 25,977.
329. 1 Transcript of Proceedings of the 60th Judicial Conference, United
States Judge and Magistrates of the Fourth Circuit 57 (June 29, 1990) (on file
with author).
330. Id at 57-58; see also Committee Report, supra note 4, at 60 (summarizing Mr. Lee's position as viewing SSA intracircuit nonacquiescence as
"lawless").
331. See Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1823 (noting that the "instinctive response" of lawyers and non-lawyers "is that the practice of nonacquiescence
must be unlawful").
332. See Diller & Morawetz, supra note 4, at 802; N.Y. Times, Sept. 23,
1984, § 1, at 54, col. 4.
333. See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
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eight reasons, these considerations confirm that intracircuit
nonacquiescence "impermissibly interferes with the functioning
3
of the Judiciary." 3
First, intracircuit nonacquiescence "undermine[s] the authority"' 5 of the judicial branch by diminishing systematically
the authoritativeness of judicial pronouncements.3
It does so
by signaling both to executive officers and to others that circuit
court interpretations of law are no more legitimate or deserving
of respect than interpretations made by nonjudicial actors.33
This message creates more than a "symbolic challenge" to the
judiciary; s it erodes the "public esteem for the federal
courts"'

3

9

on which, as a practical matter, all judicial authority

ultimately rests.m
Second, intracircuit nonacquiescence creates a system of
dispute resolution in which claimants seeking proper results
must exhaust agency remedies, then go to court to get an order
directing enforcement of circuit court law, and then (at least
usually) return to the agency for reprocessing of the claim in
conformance with circuit court precedent.3' This regime im334. Mistretta v. United States, 109 S.Ct. 647, 667 (1989).
335. I& at 659.
336. See Maranville, supra note 4, at 498 ("As agencies consciously and visibly engage in nonacquiescence, agency personnel have less reason to internalize the values associated with the rule of law, such as consistency, fairness to
individuals, and respect for the judiciary."); Neuborne, supra note 41, at 378
(expressing concern about "a cacophonous set of voices" if executive officials
are "equally legitimate expositors of what the law is").
337. See Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1853 (describing intracircuit nonacquiescence as "a negation of the courts' supremacy as arbiters of the law in adjudicating cases"); Weis, supra note 4, at 852 (expressing concern about the
"disrespect for the administration of justice generated by the spectacle of a
federal agency which refuses to acknowledge that a court's ruling applies to it
as well as to other litigants"); WAYNE Note, supra note 4, at 187 (intracircuit
nonacquiescence "undermine[s] the respect accorded a federal court decision");
Conference Transcript, supra note 4, at 83 (remarks of Judge Walker) (questioning intracircuit nonacquiescence because it "encourag[es] governmental behavior ...that we might wish not encourage private citizens to undertake");
ef Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
("If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself .....
338. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1851.
339. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 192 (1974) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
340. See Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 672 (1989) (expressing
concern about practice that "undermines public confidence in the disinterestedness of the Judicial Branch," whose "legitimacy ...ultimately depends on
its reputation").
341. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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poses heavy and avoidable burdens on individual claimants. 342
It also engenders stark inequities between those claimants welloff and wise enough to seek judicial review and those too poor
or ill informed to do so.343

As already noted, these results

render intracircuit nonacquiescence vulnerable to due process
and equal protection challenges.3" Of no less importance, however, these results subject intracircuit nonacquiescence to a separation-of-powers attack on the ground that the practice
"unduly interfer[es] with the role" of the judiciary.m This is
so because an accepted function of appellate courts is to set
forth rules of law precisely so that the "need to ... relitigate
questions of law" is minimizedm and "equality of treatment" is
secured.3 7 By undercutting these core functions of article III
courts, intracircuit nonacquiescence not only threatens equal
justice, but also compromises the judicial power.
Third, intracircuit nonacquiescence creates a "potential for
disruption"'
of the judicial branch by "exhausting [its] resources."' 9 Intracircuit nonacquiescence has this effect because it forces courts to divert scarce resources from other
important matters to large numbers of judicial review petitions
that never would be filed in the absence of a nonacquiescence
policy.- ° Indeed, intracircuit nonacquiescence serves to shift
342. See Kubitschek, supra note 4, at 410-12.
343. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
344. See supra Part II.
345. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693 (1988).
346. Maranville, supra note 4, at 502 (discussing functions of judicial stare
decisis).
347. Difler & Morawetz, supra note 4, at 804.
348. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977).
349. Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 672 (1989).
350. Diller & Morawetz, supra note 4, at 808 ('Then agencies apply rules
differently from the courts, agency adjudication becomes simply a hurdle to
overcome before obtaining judicial review. The potential for overwhelming
the courts with challenges to agency determinations is staggering."); Schwartz,
supra note 4, at 1818, 1853-54 (concluding that impact of intracircuit nonacquiescence on judiciary is "unusually severe" and involves "a substantial burden"
because it "may spawn a vast number of actions for judicial review"); WAYNE
Note, supra note 4, at 180 ("[r]elitigation and appeal consume an inordinate
amount of judicial resources"). The SSA's program of intracircuit nonacquiescence in fact has given rise to "an extraordinary number of actions for judicial
review." Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1817 n.3 (collecting documentation); accord Kubitschek, supra note 4, at 408-10 (providing statistics on improperly
denied claims and increased judicial workload attributed to SSA nonacquiescence). Moreover, cases coming to the courts as a result of intracircuit
nonacquiescence are not simply disposed of with a whisk of a pen; rather, like
other cases, they require "careful judicial review." Diller & Morawetz, supra
note 4, at 817 n.63.
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costs from the executive branch (for which the policy results in
an escape from or delay in awarding monetary or other benefits) to the judiciary (for which the policy results in a need to
commit substantial resources to handling otherwise unnecessary judicial review proceedings),*ca5 This dynamic supports
heightened scrutiny of the practice under the familiar principle
that counsels judicial alertness whenever "'virtual representation' [is] not being provided" to those adversely affected by actions of a political branch;5 2 after all, the burdens thrust upon
the judiciary by intracircuit nonacquiescence are "likely to be
given inadequate weight"' ' a 3 by executive decision makers who
benefit directly from imposing those burdens-,s
This costshifting argument for close scrutiny of intracircuit nonacquiescence is strengthened by the vast disparity in resources controlled by the executive and judicial branches to begin with.3

Moreover, basing careful scrutiny on executive cost-shifting to
the judiciary finds support in the Supreme Court's initial validation of agency adjudication based in part on the notion that
providing such "assistance"'' 5 to judges served the purpose of
"relieving the courts of a most serious burden."'' 7
Fourth, intracircuit nonacquiescence stands on its head the
Framers' vision of the institutional competencies of the executive and judicial departments. Proponents of intracircuit nonacquiescence urge at bottom that decisionmakers in the
executive branch, rather than decisionmakers in the judicial
branch, should determine as a practical matter the law to be ap351. See Diller & Morawetz, supra note 4, at 812 (noting "burden of repetitive litigation, borne by the judiciary").
352. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, A THEORY OF JUDICIAL RFVIEW 84-85 (1980).
353. Meltzer, supra note 122, at 296.
354. See Diller & Morawetz, supra note 4, at 819 & n.74. One possible response is that so-called representation-reinforcement analysis has no role to
play in cases not involving directly the rights of individuals, but involving instead the proper allocation of governmental powers. The first and most famous case to use this mode of analysis, however, itself concerned the
structural question whether a state government could tax entities operated by
the federal government. See M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316,
428 (1819); see also South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 512-13 (1988) (noting
that states may have stronger claims of unconstitutional congressional intrusion where state interests are not adequately represented in the national political process).
355. See Weis, supra note 4, at 852 (noting reality of "scarce judicial
resources").
356. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932).
357. I& at 54 (emphasis added). For a more elaborate articulation of this
argument see Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1853-54.
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plied in large numbers of agency proceedings.35 The Framers,
however, saw the task of interpreting laws as an "impartial"
enterprise, unsuited for those with "momentary inclination"
' 359
For precisely this
and "a disposition to consult popularity."
reason, the Framers insulated federal judges from political influences by affording them life tenure and protecting them
against salary reductions.3 6 0 Against this backdrop it appears
bizarre to subordinate existing declarations of law made by supervisory, multi-judge article III courts to the interpretations of
statutes preferred by underlings of the politically accountable
chief executive. 361 To do so, moreover, seems all the more
anomalous in a time when many agree that "[o]ften agencies
' 36 2
are the chosen instruments of private pressure groups.
358. This is so for the simple reason that "most agency decisions are not
appealed." Maranville, supra note 4, at 476; see, e.g., BROOKLYN Note, supra
note 4, at 110 ("as a practical matter, only a small fraction of disability cases
reach federal court"). See generally COLUM. Note, supra note 4, at 601 ("In effect, [intracircuit nonacquiescence] allows an agency to define its own
powers").
359. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 522, 527, 529 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed.
1961).
360. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 527-28 (A.
Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (citing the "independence of judges" as "requisite to guard... the rights of individuals"); see also HARv. Note, supra note 4,
at 847 ("view of the judge as an impartial governmental participant has endured"); S. CAL. Note, supra note 4, at 1157 ("the judiciary's function is not to
be popular or accountable to majority whim").
361. See CoMMrrTEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 55 ("[R]ecent experience suggests that the [Social Security claims adjudication] process is vulnerable to unhealthy political control" because administrative law judges' "proper
independence has been compromised."); Maranville, supra note 4, at 491-92
("agencies often are subject to intense political pressure" and "tend to define
the agency's function in such a way that power and resources accrue to the
agency"); BROOKLYN Note, supra note 4, at 114 (noting that agencies "are
headed by executive appointees with partisan interests"); S. CAL. Note, supra
note 4, at 1155 (noting agency tendency to "fall[ ] back on a politically and bureaucratically slanted viewpoint"); see also Easterbrook, Success and the Judicial Power, 65 IND. L.J. 277, 279 (1990) (agencies are viewed as "changing
course dramatically as each new President obtains working control"). Put
somewhat more bluntly, one should ask whose word on the proper meaning of
a law is better: the word of an article III multi-judge court that just said what
the law is or the word of an agency litigant that just lost in its effort to get a
different interpretation from that court, despite receiving a full and fair opportunity to be heard and substantial deference from the judicial tribunal. See infra notes 487-89 and accompanying text.
362. Easterbrook, supra note 361, at 278; see also Maranville, supra note 4,
at 491 (agencies may be led to nonacquiesce by "[i]nfluential members of the
agency's constituency"). One might attack this institutional-competence argument by saying it is inconsistent with Chevron's endorsement of broad judicial
deference to agency legal rulings. See infra notes 487-91 and accompanying
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Fifth, intracircuit nonacquiescence rests uncomfortably on
the foundation supporting the modern administrative state. As
Professor Jaffe puts it:
The availability of judicial review is the necessary condition, psychologically if not logically, of a system of administrative power which
purports to be legitimate, or legally vaid....
... IThere is in our society a profound, tradition-taught reliance
on the courts as the ultimate guardian and assurance of the limits set
upon executive power by the constitution and legislatures.36 3

In reality, however, parties do not appeal most adverse agency
actions. 364 Thus, as a practical matter, a court of appeals can
create no significant "assurance" of conformance with "the limits set.., by... legislatures" if agencies can elect without restraint whether or not to abide by circuit court precedent. 3 65
text. Having broad discretion in interpreting statutes ab initio, however, is
quite different from claiming the power to opt for and implement an interpretation already definitively rejected by a supervisory article I court. Nor is
this institutional-competence line of reasoning incompatible with the recognized authority of non-article I agency tribunals to participate in federal law
adjudication. Again, permitting non-article I decisionmakers to participate in
adjudication is quite different from permitting such adjudicators to flout the
already existing pronouncements of the very courts assigned to supervise their
adjudicatory work
363. L. JAFE, JuDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINSTRATIVE ACTON 320-21
(1965); accord, e.g., COLUM. Note, supra note 4, at 597 ("Courts are entrusted
with the essential role of confining agency action to the intended legislative
delegation, a role crucial to the legitimacy of the modern administrative
state."); see, ag., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 953 n.16 (1983) (upholding Attorney General's delegated power to make deportation decisions because "courts
...can enforce adherence to statutory standards"); National Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587, 604 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("the judicial branch
... has the constitutional duty of requiring the executive branch to remain
within the limits stated by the legislative branch"); see also Monaghan, supra
note 271, at 6 ("the court's interpretation task is ... to determine the boundaries of delegated power"); cf 2 REPORTS, supra note 273, at 46 (remarks of Nathaniel Ghorum, July 18) ("Inferior tribunals are essential to render the
authority of the Natl. Legislature effectual .....
364. See supra note 358.
365. See Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315, 1357 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
('"The judiciary's duty and authority, as first established in Marbury, 'to say
what the law is' would be rendered a virtual nullity if coordinate branches of
government could effectively and unilaterally strip its pronouncements of any
precedential force."), vacated sub nom. Stieberger v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 29 (2d
Cir. 1986); IND. Note, supra note 4, at 1115 (intracircuit nonacquiescence precludes courts from exercising "meaningful control," thus undermining "the reliance that administrative law places on judicial review as the primary method
of controlling agency action"); see Maranville, supra note 4, at 497 ("[a]s an
agency becomes less susceptible to judicial control, it may acquire greater ability to engage in comprehensive regulation"). See generally Schwartz, supra
note 4, at 1851-52 (intracircuit nonacquiescence "interferes markedly with the
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Given this practical reality, intracircuit nonacquiescence is hard
to reconcile with the judiciary's status, aptly described by Professor Jaffe, as "the senior partner" in the court/agency
366
relationship.
Sixth, the practice of intracircuit nonacquiescence may
threaten the most fundamental of policies underlying our constitutional structure. The Framers separated governmental
powers because they feared "the danger of... faction."-' 7 They
foresaw that powerful segments of society, either singly or in
combination, would - if not checked through inhibiting governmental structures - improperly use the government to "oppress" weaker minorities. s Recent history suggests how
intracircuit nonacquiescence may fit this pattern. In the early
1980s, a newly installed administration adopted a policy of intracircuit nonacquiescence "[i]n an effort to reduce the number
of recipients of Social Security benefits."3 69 This effort corresponded with the interests of powerful factions concerned
about increased taxes and the long-term availability of Social
Security benefits,370 and it worked to the disadvantage of disabled persons, a numerical minority few would characterize as
efficacy of conventional judicial review as a mechanism for ensuring the
proper application of law").
366. See L. JAFFE, supranote 363, at 546. One might challenge this logic by
pointing to the broad autonomy courts give agencies to fashion law under the
Chevron doctrine. A senior partner, however, often will afford a junior partner much discretionary latitude. For this reason, it is not inconsistent with
their "senior partner" role for courts under the Chevron doctrine to afford
broad discretion to agencies to adopt reasonable interpretations of law. See
Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 84445, 865-66 (1984). It surely does seem inconsistent with any senior partner/junior partner conception of the court/agency relationship, however, for a
"junior partner" agency to ignore a dearly and formally declared limitation on
its authority already handed down by a supervisory "senior partner" court. Cf
Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1845-47 (discussing inconsistency of intracircuit nonassistant' model of adminstrative
acquiescence with the "'judicial
adjudication").
367. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 61 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961); see i&
No. 51, at 351-52 (government must "guard one part of society against the injustice of the other part").
368. See i& No. 51, at 352 ("In a society under the forms of which the
stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy may ...
truly be said to reign .... ).
369. Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 681-82.
370. Maranville, supra note 4, at 491-92 (concluding that SSA intracircuit
nonacquiescence was the product of "attempts to reduce growth in expenditures for disability benefits" in an effort "to cut the portion of the federal
budget that finances social programs").
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politically powerful.37 1 SSA nonacquiescence also threatened
strong claims of entitlement, especially among persons already
found to be disabled and counting on the continued receipt of
benefits.372 One might respond that such minority-disadvantaging results are the inevitable and desirable consequence of majority rule.3 7 3 When intracircuit nonacquiescence is at issue,
3 74
and "oppression" 375
however, added earmarks of "injustice"

appear. This is so because the executive policy in such a case is
not written on a clean slate. Rather, it is pursued in the face of
a supervisory court's multi-judge pronouncement - presumably taken with the principled and long view characteristic of judicial action - that the policy is unlawful. 376 In such a setting,
those disadvantaged by the agency's action may have a special
377
claim that they are being victimized by a majority faction.
Seventh, any practical assessment of intracircuit nonacquiescence must take account of the comparative strengths of the
branches vying for supremacy in this field. Americans have
long recognized that the executive branch - with its unitary
head, its resulting potential for efficiency and direct action, and
its effective control over all military and law-enforcement personnel - poses a grave danger of unchecked and excessive
power. 378 History has proven this concern well founded.3 79 For
371. Cf.L. TRIBE, supra note 82, § 7-1, at 547 ("[Fjederal courts have a special mission in defending substantive personal interests from governmental action that overreaches because of its unduly limited constituency - action that
oppresses people because they are outsiders.").
372. See supra note 31 (recounting widespread intracircuit nonacquiescence
in benefit-termination cases through disregard of circuit courts' medical-improvement rule).
373. Cf.Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (refusing to agree
that "majority sentiments about the morality of homosexual sodomy" are "insufficient" to validate state's ban on homosexual sodomy).
374. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 351 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
375. Id No. 10, at 61.
376. See Meltzer, supra note 122, at 296 (citing judicial function of "protect[ing] enduring constitutional values likely to be given inadequate weight by
the political branches").
377. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 57 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961)
(noting that, absent proper checks, "measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice, and the rights of the minor party, but by the
superior force of an interested and overbearing majority"); cf.L. TRIBE, supra
note 82, at 546 ("In protecting expectations created by law, and in assuring
governmental regularity, we defend a part of what liberty must ultimately
mean.").
378. See, e.g., The Letters of Cato IV, reprintedin THE ANTIFEDERALISTS
305-07 (C. Kenyon ed. 1966) (attributed to George Clinton) (questioning
"wherein does this president, invested with his powers and prerogatives, essentially differ from the king of Great Britain"); Manifesto of a Number of Gen-
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example, Justice Jackson wrote in 1953 of the vast "gap that
exists between the President's paper powers and his real powers." -8 ° He noted that "[n]o other personality in public life can
begin to compete with [the President] in access to the public
iind through modern methods of communications;" 3 8' he cited
the power that flows from "[the President's] prestige as head of
state;"3 8 2 and he explained that the "rise of the party system
has made a significant extraconstitutional supplement to real
Justice Jackson explained that these
executive power."
forces "exerto a leverage upon those who are supposed to
check and balance [executive] power which often cancels their
effectiveness." 384 Thus, he saw no reason "to believe that this
country will suffer if the Court refuses further to aggrandize
the presidential office, already so potent and so relatively immune from judicial review."5
The events of the past thirty-eight years have done nothing
to diminish the dangers identified by Justice Jackson. Indeed,
"the potential dominance of the executive branch in the complex and interdependent technological world in which we live
has become an increasing concern."386 A central source of that
increasing concern has been Congress's ever-expanding delegation of broad fields of its own powers to executive or quasi-executive agencies.3 8 7 Moreover, this delegation has resulted in
even greater shifts of power than might first meet the eye, because congressional grants often come with no meaningful limtlemen from Albany County, reprintedin THE ANTIFEDERALS, supra, at 362
(objecting that "[t]he vast executive power in one man (not elected by the people) who, though called President, will have power equal if not superior to
many European kings"); qf THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 471 (A. Hamilton) (J.
Cooke ed. 1961) (acknowledging concerns that "a vigorous executive is inconsistent with the genius of republican government").
379. See generally A. Schlesinger,The ImperialPresidency (1973) (examining the historical shift of constitutional power to the presidency and arguing
that the contemporary presidency is out of control and needs restraint).
380. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 653 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
381. Id

382. I
383. Id.at 654.
384. 1d.at 653-54.
385. Id. at 654.
386. P. KAUPER & F. BEYTAGH, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 342 (5th ed. 1980).
387. See COLUM. J. Note, supra note 4, at 468 (noting that "administrative
agencies ... have only recently played a major role in our legal system"); cf
COmmE

REPORT, supra note 4, at 4 (noting "the burst of federal lawmak-

ing that began with President Johnson's 'Great Society' programs and has continued virtually unabated since").
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iting instructionsm and provide the executive branch with a
wide choice to implement its views through rulemaking, adjudication, or other means of action.ns 9 'The proliferation of nonarticle IH adjudication," in particular, "gives the executive
branch great power to implement policies in a most troubling
way: not by persuading Congress to enact them into law, nor
even by announcing them publicly, but by quietly influencing
the orientation of the adjudicators."
In such an environment,
the principal check on the executive branch must be an insistence on adherence to law and rule-of-law values.3 91 Those values hardly can be said to be advanced by validating executive
disregard of a supervisory circuit court's existing declarations of
law.
Finally, a ban on intracircuit nonacquiescence does not unduly aggrandize the judicial power; instead, the prohibition simply effectuates the recognized authority of the "least
dangerous"3 92 branch to hand down precedents that have meaning.3 93 Moreover, a ban on intracircuit nonacquiescence vindicates judicial power principally in the field of statutory
interpretation 394 - a sphere in which the exercise of judicial
review authority is least questionable historically, 395 and in
which substantial deference to executive pronouncements is accorded already. 396 In the area of statutory interpretation, ample checks on judicial abuses exist even if nonacquiescence in
supervisory circuit court rulings is disallowed. Precisely be388. See generally G. GUNTHER, supra note 219, at 366-67 (discussing then
Justice Rehnquist's dissent in American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donavan, 452
U.S. 490 (1981)).
389. See Cass, Models of Administrative Action, 72 VA. L. REV. 363, 380-83
(1986) (criticizing strict division of agency action into "adjudication" and
"rulemaking").
390. Strauss, supra note 262, at 312.
391. See, eg., Maranville, supra note 4, at 528-29.
392. THE FEDERALST No. 78, at 522 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
393. See supra notes 294-98, 365 and accompanying text.
394. See Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 726 n.245; see also supra
note 34 (discussing limited significance of agency nonacquiescence in constitutional rulings).
395. See supra note 284 (noting that Marbury Court deemed judiciary
clearly responsible for declaring the meaning of subconstitutional law). On
the particularly controversial character of judicial law pronouncing of the constitutional variety, see Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawle 330, 348 (Pa. 1825) ("It
is the business of the judiciary, to interpret the laws, not scan the authority of
the lawgiver.... "); G. GUNTHER, supra note 219, at 14 ("viewing a constitution
as a species of 'law' [was] hardly a prominent feature in the political theory of
the Revolutionary era"); id at 18-19 (collecting literature).
396. See i~tfra notes 487-89 and accompanying text.
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cause such rulings come from a circuit court, the executive may
move to protect its interests by appealing to the Supreme
Court.3 97 In addition, the executive, when faced with a disfavored statutory precedent, has access to the corrective route
laid out by the Constitution itself: to go to the House and Senate and "recommend to their Consideration such Measures as
he shall judge necessary and expedient." 398
These considerations may or may not demonstrate conclusively the unconstitutionality of intracircuit nonacquiescence. 399
They may or may not mandate the strongest form of "strict]
scrutiny," utilized "when particularly cherished constitutional
rights are threatened." 4° ° At the very least, however, these
many considerations - based on constitutional text, authority,
tradition, and policy - should trigger in their totality application of the "somewhat heightened review" 401 referred to as
"intermediate."4 02
VI.

SCRUTINIZING THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR
INTRACIRCUIT NONACQUIESCENCE

Heightened scrutiny of even the intermediate variety requires a "searching analysis" of the challenged governmental
practice.40 3 First, the government must show that its policy
397. See infra note 418 and accompanying text.
398. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see also, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2370-71 (1989) (noting special precedential force of judicial statutory interpretations because of ability to secure correction through
legislation); id at 2380 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part) (same). An understanding of the intentions of the Framers in structuring the executive also
should reduce concern that recognition of judicial power to insist on intracircuit acquiescence would inappropriately transfer authority from the executive
to the judiciary. This is so because, although the Framers surely intended to
create a powerful executive, they did so "to provide a check on the legislature," D. FARBER & S. SHERRY, supra note 292, at 86, rather than on the judiciary. See 2 REcORDs, supra note 273, at 35 (remarks of James Madison, July
19) (citing need for "restraining the instability & encroachments" of the legislature); id, at 52 (remarks of Gouverneur Morris, July 19) ("Executive Magistrate should be the guardian of the people... agst. Legislative tyranny....").
399. See Kramer, The Constitution as Architecture: A Charette,65 IND. L.J.
283, 289 (1990) ("Like other constitutional doctrines, separation of powers is
not absolute and may yield to a sufficiently compelling governmental
interest.").
400. G. GUNTHER, supra note 219, at 457.
401. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 441
(1985).
402. G. GuNrHER, supra note 219, at 644.
403. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 728 (1982).
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rests on an interest that ranks as "important" 404 or "exceedingly persuasive." 40 5 Not just any interest will do; in particular,
claims of "administrative ease and convenience" typically will
fail. ° Second, the government must show a "direct, substantial relationship" 40 7 between the challenged policy and the interests said to justify it. In applying this requirement, courts
focus on whether there are 'qess restrictive means" for accomplishing the government's goals without impinging so much on
the threatened constitutional values. 408 Thus the governmental
policy is unconstitutional if there is a "weak congruence" 4 9 or
"unduly tenuous 'fit' "410 between the policy and its objectives.
In applying these principles to intracircuit nonacquiescence, one must first identify those particular interests relied
on to justify the challenged practice.4 1u Although one might
write the list in different ways,41 2 advocates of intracircuit nonacquiescence have argued in substance that the practice advances three important goals: (1) the achievement of a salutary
and congressionally preferred uniformity in the administration
of agency programs; (2) the advancement of sound development
of the law through the uninhibited "percolation" of legal issues
through the lower federal courts; and (3) the vindication of congressionally created and judicially recognized agency expertise
in the administration of agency programs. 41 3 A close examina404. E.g., Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3009 (1990) (inquiring whether congressionally mandated, race-based affirmative action classifications "serve important governmental objectives within the power of
Congress and are substantially related to achievement of those objectives");
Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980) (gender-based discriminations must meet same standard); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 31617 (1977) (same); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (same).
405. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724; accord,e.g., Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728,
744-45 (1984).
406. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976). See generally L.
TRIBE, supra note 82, at 1602-03 (collecting relevant case law).
407. E.g., Hogan, 458 U.S. at 725-26.
408. See, e.g., Supreme Court v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 284 (1985); see also, e.g.,
Wengler, 446 U.S. at 151-52 (gender-based policy will fail where state does not
demonstrate valid advantage of discriminatory policy over equal treatment).
409. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199 (1976).
410. I& at 202. See L. TRIBE, supra note 82, at 1603.
411. See Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1818 n.6 (noting that "[s]erious students
of nonacquiescence generally agree that agencies practicing nonacquiescence
have substantial practical justifications for their conduct and are not simply interested in denying benefits to individuals or frustrating the courts' power of
judicial review").
412. See, e.g., Kubitschek, supra note 4, at 417-40.
413. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1818-19 (citing goals of uniform administration and assuring "a stream of 'test cases,"' as well as the significance
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tion of each of these interests, however, reveals that none of
them supplies an adequate justification for intracircuit
nonacquiescence.
A.

UNIFoRMITY

In creating the administrative state, Congress envisioned
substantially uniform administration of each agency's program
throughout the United States. The Supreme Court has cited
"Congress' oft-repeated goal of uniform administration of the
[Social Security] Act."414 The Court has emphasized also the
importance of "uniform federal interpretation" of the federal
labor laws administered by the NLRB. 415 Agency advocates argue that a policy of intracircuit nonacquiescence is needed to
achieve uniformity.416 They reason that, in the absence of such
nonacquiescence, an agency must take account of each circuit's
rulings, and as a result agency practice will vary from one circuit to another. 417 Avoiding such disuniformity, the argument
continues, constitutes an important governmental interest.
This analysis is subject to criticism on many levels. For example, complaints of nonuniformity have something of a
hollow ring because the agencies themselves can cure most
problems of nonuniformity by promptly seeking Supreme
of agency's administering "the statutory provisions for which it is responsible"); S. CAL. Note, supra note 4, at 1172 (noting uniformity and administrative-expertise justifications).
414. Heckler v. Day, 467 U.S. 104, 116 (1984); cf. 42 U.S.C. § 421(a)(2)
(1988) (calling for "effective and uniform administration of the disability insurance program").
415. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 211 (1985).
416. E.g., Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 119 N.L.R.B. 768 (1957) (requiring
administrative law judge's nonacquiescence in circuit court authority because
"[o]nly by such recognition of the legal authority of Board precedent, will a
uniform and orderly administration of a national act, such as the National Labor Relations Act, be achieved"), enforcement denied, 260 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir.
1958) (per curiam), aff'd, 361 U.S. 477 (1960); Estreicher & Revesz I, supra
note 4, at 708 (noting that NLRB justifies its nonacquiescence policy based on
"its congressionally delegated responsibility to ensure a nationally uniform administration of its organic statute"); Social Security Hearing,supra note 4, at
105-06 (statement of Martha A. McSteen, Assistant Commissioner, SSA) ("policy of nonacquiescence is essential to ensure that the agency follows its statutory mandate to administer the Social Security program nationwide in a
uniform and consistent manner"); see also Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1819 (citing result of "horizontal equity in the agency's treatment of similarly situated
persons"); GEO. WASH. Note, supra note 4, at 150 n.21 (noting IRS's uniformity
justification).
417. See, e.g., Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 748-49.

1991]

INTRACIRCUIT NONACQUIESCENCE

1415

Court review and a resulting clarification of national law.418 In
addition, the uniformity-based defense of intracircuit nonacquiescence is vulnerable because substantial nonuniformity is an
inescapable consequence of having agency actions reviewable by
a system of multiple, regional circuit courts. Thus, even if an
agency nonacquiesces in a circuit court's invalidation of a "uniform" agency rule, dissatisfied claimants in that circuit who
seek judicial review will get the circuit's "nonuniform" rule ap&4 9 Indeed, intracircuit nonacplied to their claims in the end.
quiescence in a very real sense undermines the goal of
418. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 618, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1984), reprintedin
1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3038, 3060-63 (faulting SSA for not

seeking Supreme Court review in cases in which it later nonacquiesced);
Heaney, supra note 4, at 10 (decrying Secretary's failure to seek certiorari with
more frequency to resolve divisive issues under Social Security Act); Kubitschek, supranote 4, at 403 (noting that "an integral part of the agency's nonacquiescence is its refusal, with rare exceptions, to seek Supreme Court
review"). But cf.infra note 461 and accompanying text (noting that supporters of nonacquiescence urge that the policy serves goal of percolating issues
through the circuit courts prior to Supreme Court intervention). To be sure,
significant practical restrictions exist on the Supreme Court's ability to grant
petitions for certiorari. Those restrictions should not, however, pose an insurmountable obstacle to Supreme Court review of circuit court rulings that give
rise to serious friction between a national agency and regional circuit court. In
particular, federal agencies have a special claim to Supreme Court intervention - even in the absence of an intercircuit conflict - if serious practical
problems of nonuniformity are present. See Rothensis v. Elec. Battery Co., 329
U.S. 296, 299 (1946) (granting certiorari due to "gravity of [lower court's] holding to the administration of the tax laws"). In addition, the Court is uniquely
receptive to certiorari petitions filed.by the Solicitor General. See R. STERN, E.
GRESSMAN & S. SHAPIRO, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 192 (6th ed. 1986). For

these reasons, problems of nonuniformity are often problems largely of the
agencies' own making when they or their attorney - that is, the Solicitor General - fail to seek Supreme Court review. See, ag., American Medical Int'l,
Inc. v. Secretary of HEW, 677 F.2d 118, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("federal agencies
are ina better position than most litigants to petition the Supreme Court or
Congress to modify what they believe to be erroneous interpretations of national law"). But see GEO. WASH. Note, supra note 4, at 163-64 (opposing immediate appeals to Supreme Court). Also, agencies can remove uniformity
problems through the alternative means of intercircuit acquiescence - that is,
by simply following on a national level the first circuit court ruling that invalidates an agency rule. But see inrjf note 465 and accompanying text (noting
potential undesirability of agency's simply following nationwide the ruling of
the first circuit court that decides an issue).
419. See, eg., GEO. WASH. Note, supra note 4, at 162 (uniformity argument
weakened because it is defeated whenever claimant appeals). In addition,
some disuniformity is built into almost any national administrative system
"because of the need to delegate decisionmaking to regional offices and front
line personnel." Maranville, supra note 4, at 496 n.79; see S. CAL. Note, supra
note 4, at 1173 (noting that nonuniformity in SSA Program flows from fact
that "each state is involved in the day to day administration").

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

1416

[Vol. 75:1339

uniformity because it necessarily results in nonuniform treatment of those who seek and those who do not seek judicial
review.42 0
Responding to this point, Professors Estreicher and Revesz
distinguish between so-called "horizontal" and "vertical" uniformity.42 ' They urge that intracircuit nonacquiescence creates
at least a horizontal uniformity - that is, like treatment on a
national level of all persons in the context of initial agency proceedings. 422 That observation, however, does little to advance
the constitutional ball because, as Professors Estreicher and
Revesz recognize, horizontal uniformity in administering
agency programs is not an end in itself.42s Thus, proper evaluation of this justification for intracircuit nonacquiescence must
focus on the broader aims of maximizing horizontal uniformity.
Professors Estreicher and Revesz identify four such objectives:
(1) proper handling of "externalities;" 42 4 (2) avoidance of intercircuit competition;
(3) fairness; 426 and (4) reduction of
4
costs. 27
1.

Externalities

Professors Estreicher and Revesz argue that "a bar against
intracircuit nonacquiescence, even where it contemplates limited exceptions ... undermines important goals of uniformity
that underlie the administrative law system." 428 The first such
420. See Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315, 1363 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), vacated sub nom. Stieberger v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986); DUller &
Morawetz, supra note 4, at 815 ("nonacquiescence creates its own disuniformities by making a different set of rules available to those who can litigate and
those who cannot"); id at 813 (citing "gross disuniformity between those who
can pursue their appeals and those who cannot"); COLUM. Note, supra note 4,
at 602-03 ("[ilntracircuit nonacquiescence... creates inequities" among similarly situated persons); WASH. & LEE Note, supra note 4, at 1243 (commentators and "courts have noted . . . that implementation of an intracircuit
nonacquiescence policy actually leads to less uniformity, rather than more uniformity"); see also Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 750 (noting that
some nonuniformity is created by nonacquiescence). See generally supra notes
42-45 and accompanying text (discussing disparity of treatment created by intracircuit nonacquiescence).
421. Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 750.

422.
423.
424.
425.
426.
427.
428.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 748.
Id.
Id. at 748-49.
Id. at 747.
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goal that they identify concerns the proper treatment of socalled "externalities." They explain:
[EPA] emission standards are uniform nationwide and are set by reference to categories of polluters (for example, coal-fired electric
plants). If one circuit were to strike down regulations limiting the
permissible emissions of a particular pollutant, the effects would be
felt not only in that circuit, but in downwind circuits as well. For the
ambient standards to be met in those circuits, the agency would have
to define more stringent circuit-specific emission standards for those
downwind states. Thus, the actions of the court of appeals that struck
down the administrative policy will have important effects even
outside the geographic jurisdiction of that circuit, forcing the agency
to take suboptimal measures in the downwind circuits to counteract
the impact of the court's action.42

The best response to this observation is: So what? The
"externalities" problem identified by Professors Estreicher and
Revesz exists not because of the unavailability of intracircuit
nonacquiescence, but because Congress has created a system of
geographically defined circuit courts. Thus, persons in "downwind" circuits will feel the effects of the agency-disrupting propollution ruling regardless of the agency's power to nonacquiesce. This is so because the court's ruling necessarily was
embodied in a judgment, and even the most vociferous proponents of intracircuit nonacquiescence concede that agencies
must honor judicial decrees.43 0
Nor would an ability to nonacquiesce significantly reduce
such "externalities" problems. For example, the operators of a
"coal-fired electric plant" certainly are going to be aware of important and favorable local circuit court rulings concerning
emission standards. As a result, even if the agency nonacquiesces, the electric plant will seek judicial review; the circuit
court (applying its own settled precedent) will grant relief to
the plant; and both the EPA and "downwind" neighbors will be
in the same boat they would have been in if the agency had
acquiesced.
Additional reasons support the conclusion that any "externalities" justification for intracircuit nonacquiescence is unavailing. First, even if externalities problems are real and
recurring, they surely do not justify nonacquiescence with respect to all agency programs. For example, the operation of the
Social Security program does not present "externalities"
problems remotely resembling the "downwind pollution" hypo429. I&
430. See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
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thetical invented by Professors Estreicher and Revesz. Second,
no reason exists to believe that such problems are common or
even that they exist at all. Indeed, Professors Estreicher and
Revesz note that their own illustrative case is one that will
never arise, because Congress has vested review of emission
standards in a single court of appeals.4s1 Surely a stronger
showing is necessary to establish that the remedying of "externalities" constitutes an "exceedingly persuasive"' 4 2 governmental interest that a program of intracircuit nonacquiescence will
advance in a "direct [and] substantial" 43s way.
2.

Intercircuit Competition

Professors Estreicher and Revesz suggest also that a ban on
intracircuit nonacquiescence will exacerbate problems of "undesirable regional competition. 43 4 For example, they observe
that:
If one circuit takes a more restrictive view than does the NLRB of
what constitutes a mandatory subject for collective bargaining, employers in that circuit have more entrepreneurial flexibility, and perhaps lower labor costs, than their counterparts in other circuits,
creating incentives for new industry to establish itself in that circuit
and for existing industry to move there from other circuits.4 3 5

To suggest that intracircuit nonacquiescence should be permitted to mitigate such untoward and inefficient business location
shopping, however, is to rely on fantasy. First, it is farfetched
to believe that firms select business sites based on differences
in approach to a federal statute between a local court of appeals
and a governing agency. 436 In the absence of some "concrete

431. Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 747 n.319; see also Diller &
Morawetz, supra note 4, at 813 n.46 (noting that "[w]hen uniform national
rules are especially important, Congress can create special courts or venue
rules to assure uniformity").
432. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982).
433. Id at 725-26.
434. Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 748.
435. Id
436. This is the case for a number of reasons going beyond the obvious fact
that businesses typically will respond to more traditional economic considerations than a difference in statutory interpretation between a regional circuit
court and a federal agency. For example, even if a favorable circuit court rule
otherwise might attract a company, that company would have to recognize
that the rule later might be adopted by other circuits or the agency itself; it
might be supplanted by Supreme Court or congressional action; or it might be
rendered obsolete through subsequent agency action, such as the adoption of
an entirely new set of rules. In addition, locating an operation in a particular
circuit will not assure that the circuit's law will control a case concerning that
operation. For example, Professors Estreicher and Revesz hypothesize that
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evidence" 43 7 of such conduct, this supposed interest cannot justify intracircuit nonacquiescence. Second, even if businesses
shop for favorable legal rules in this way, permitting intracircult nonacquiescence will not stop them. This is so, once again,
because persons subjected to intracircuit nonacquiescence can
always seek judicial review.4ss If a company is so enamored of
a particular circuit court's ruling that it is willing to relocate its
entire business in that circuit, the company surely will not
stand idly by if the agency chooses to nonacquiesce in the ruling. Rather, the company will go to court, receive the benefit
of the ruling, and thus render useless the agency's effort to stop
its intercircuit shopping trip with the crude tool of intracircuit
nonacquiescence. For these reasons, the avoidance of "intercircuit competition" is not an "important" governmental interest
that intracircuit nonacquiescence is "carefully tuned '43 9 to
advance.
3. Fairness
Defenders of intracircuit nonacquiescence have argued that
the practice enhances fairness by producing a uniform treatment of claimants in different circuits despite variations among
circuit court rules.44 In particular, federal officials have argued that if one circuit has displaced an SSA rule with a more
generous one, fairness dictates that the SSA should treat claimants in that circuit pursuant to the same national standard it
continues to apply in other circuits.'
This view of "fairness"
is an odd one indeed. In practice, it means that all claimants
should be treated equally poorly - that is, that "fairness" commands evaluation of all claimants' cases according to the SSA's
inhospitable standards even if a particular circuit has adopted a
companies may settle on business locations to secure the benefits of local circuit court labor law. The venue rules governing NLRB judicial review proceedings, however, typically support review in any number of circuits
regardless of the location of a particular company plant. See supra note 25 and
accompanying text. The resulting uncertainties as to where judicial review
proceedings will in fact occur would reduce any incentive companies otherwise
might perceive to shift locations to capitalize on favorable circuit court law.
437. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 689 (1973).
438. See supra text following note 430.
439. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 513 (1976).
440. See Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 748.
441. See, e.g., Social Security Hearing,supra note 4, at 105-06 (statement of
Martha A. McSteen, Assistant Commissioner, SSA) ("[I]t would not be equitable to people to subject their claims to differing standards depending on where
they reside.").
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more pro-claimant rule. Of course, determining whether conduct qualifies as "fair" is not a simple business. A useful way of
making the inquiry, however, is to determine the likely outlook
of the persons who supposedly are the victims of the treatment
described as unfair. Taking this perspective, the question becomes whether claimants in circuits that have upheld the inhospitable SSA rule would advocate that outsiders be dragged
down with them in the interest of ensuring "fairness"? Such a
callous view of fairness seems so improbable that this justification for intracircuit nonacquiescence cannot qualify as "exceedingly persuasive."" 2
This response to the government's fairness argument does
not apply to programs (such as the program administered by
the NLRB) designed not to dispense governmental benefits, but
to resolve disputes between private parties. 443 Even with respect to those programs, however, it is doubtful that an agency
seeking "fair" results should be able to insist on achieving
equality of treatment only on the agency's own terms.
In any event, and regardless of the type of agency program
involved, the government's claimed interest in avoiding inequitable treatment falters because the cure it proposes is worse
than the disease. This is so because intracircuit nonacquiescence itself produces grave inequality of treatment. As already
explained," 4 when an agency engages inintracircuit nonacquiescence, those claimants with the wherewithal and sophistication to seek judicial review will do so and thereby secure
application of favorable circuit court law. Those not so blessed,
however, will not seek judicial review, and accordingly their
claims will remain rejected on the basis of unfavorable agency
rules.445

Under this regime, even next-door neighbors with

identical job skills and medical conditions could receive different resolutions of their disability claims. Such a result travels
far from accepted conceptions of equity and justice.446
In reality, any fairness-based defense of intracircuit nonac442. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982).
443. See Maranville, supra note 4, at 495-96.
444. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
445. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 618, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1984), reprintedin
1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3038, 3061 (noting inequities caused by
SSA nonacquiescence).
446. See, e.g., Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 323 (1987) (citing "principle of treating similarly situated defendants the same"); Dworkin, Hard Cases,
88 HARV.L. REv. 1057, 1064-65 (1975) (arguing that cases should be decided on
arguments of principle, which requires "consistency from one case to the
next").
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quiescence is a makeweight. The government cannot show that
any true interest in fairness - much less an "important" one
- justifies intracircuit nonacquiescence.
4. Administrative Inconvenience
The final uniformity-based justification for intracircuit
nonacquiescence focuses on the practical burdens thrust upon
an agency precluded from nonacquiescing. As explained by
Professors Estreicher and Revesz: "If an agency cannot engage
in intracircuit nonacquiescence, it will have to administer its
statute differently in various parts of the country .... Differential administration can impose significant costs on an
agency."" 7 A basic difficulty with this cost-saving argument is
that intracircuit nonacquiescence may well increase, rather
than decrease, costs for the government as a whole. This is the
case because, for reasons already given, the practice serves to
shift costs, so that any saving by the executive branch may well
be offset by additional costs imposed on the federal courts.4 s
In addition, the administrative cost savings flowing to the executive branch from intracircuit nonacquiescence may well be
overstated. For example, Professors Estreicher and Revesz suggest that, if intracircuit nonacquiescence is barred, "whenever
the agency loses a case in a court of appeals, [its instruction
manuals] will have to be updated."" 9 The experience of the
SSA illustrates the exaggerated character of this assertion.
That agency often loses cases on "substantial evidence" grounds
in unpublished circuit court decisions that add nothing to the
corpus of Social Security law.45° Even the staunchest critic of
nonacquiescence would not suggest that instruction manuals for
local decision makers must identify or explain all decisions of
447. Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 748; see, eg., Schwartz, supra
note 4, at 1819 (nonacquiescence "simplifies the task of administering the
agency's program"); GEo. WASH.Note, supra note 4, at 150 (noting argument
that mandatory acquiescence "could wreak havoc on administrative
efficiency").
448. See supra note 351 and accompanying text. See generally WASH. Note,
supra note 4, at 749 ("[o]nce a circuit court firmly establishes its policy, relitigation of that question within the circuit wastes governmental resources").
449. Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 449.
450. See H.R. REp. No. 618, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1984), reprintedin 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3038, 3060 ("Most disability cases decided in
the Federal courts have little value as precedent."); COMMI TrEE REPORT, supra
note 4, at 56 ("[p]rinciple issues in most Social Security disability cases are factual and technical").
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this sort.45 ' Moreover, even when circuit courts issue impor-

tant decisions, it is not clear that national instruction manuals
must immediately and invariably pick them up. Instead, agency
officials might be able to advise local decision makers in general terms that they must follow local circuit court authority,
while placing the burden on claimants to identify specific circuit court precedents applicable to that claimant's case and in45 2
compatible with agency rules.

In any event, an administrative burden argument cannot
justify intracircuit nonacquiescence under settled constitutional
doctrine. This is so because the Court's decisions have "rejected administrative ease and convenience as sufficiently important objectives" to satisfy even intermediate constitutional
scrutiny.453 In a similar vein, the Court has refused to excuse
serious intrusions on separation-of-powers values on the
4
grounds of "[c]onvenience and efficiency." M It follows that
under any form of analysis even approximating heightened
scrutiny, intracircuit nonacquiescence cannot be defended as a
cost-saving measure. This conclusion negates even the government's most plausible argument for justifying intracircuit nonacquiescence on the ground of uniformity.4
451. See also Diller & Morawetz, supra note 4, at 814 n.48 (noting that "the
problem of updating instructions is one that agencies already face and have established mechanisms to accommodate").
452. In particular, this procedural mechanism provides an adequate response to concerns that a duty to acquiesce places an inordinate burden on
agency decision makers to sort out cases in which application of the agency's
national rules will result in nonacquiescence. In a similar vein, Professors Estreicher and Revesz observe that administrative "problems are exacerbated in
agencies with regional offices that do not match the geographic jurisdictions of
the courts of appeals." Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 691 n.41. Even
assuming that such nonparallelism increases costs and burdens, however, it
seems redressable through the less restrictive alternative of simply restructuring agency offices. Surely agencies cannot cry foul when forced to acquiesce if
the costs and inconveniences are the product of the agency's own choice in
drawing bureaucratic boundaries.
453. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976); see also Keller v. State
Bar, 110 S. Ct. 2228, 2237 (1990) (denigrating "administrative burden" justification for impinging on first amendment rights). See generally supra note 406
and accompanying text (discussing validity of government claims of administrative ease and convenience).
454. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983); see also, e.g., Myers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("[D]octrine of the separation of powers was adopted... not to promote efficiency but to preclude
the exercise of arbitrary power.").
455. See Kubitschek, supra note 4, at 430 (suggesting that the "primary"
reason for favoring uniformity "is that it is a cheaper and more efficient way
to operate"); COLUM. Note, supra note 4, at 602 ("soundest justification for
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B. PERCOLATION
Proponents of intracircuit nonacquiescence rely on more
than the claimed advantages of maximized uniformity; they argue also that broad protection of intracircuit nonacquiescence
best advances the goal of sound judicial lawmaking. 4- 6 They
urge in particular that intracircuit nonacquiescence is necessary
to ensure a proper "percolation" of important legal issues
through the federal judicial system.4 7 Like "horizontal uniformity," however, "percolation" is only a means to other ends.
The most prominent of those ends is well recognized: to ensure
that different circuits courts - bringing to the task differing
backgrounds and perspectives - lay down multiple analyses of
a legal issue before the Supreme Court acts (or chooses not to
act) on that issue.4 s In its direct operation, a ban on intracircuit nonacquiescence does not threaten this interest at all. This
is so because such a ban requires agency adherence to circuit
court decisions only within the decision-issuing circuit.4 59 It
does not restrict the development of federal law in other circuits in any way. 46 0
Critics argue, however, that a prohibition on intracircuit
nonacquiescence" is that intracircuit acquiescence "may be costly and
burdensome").
456. See, e.g., Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 743-47.
457. See, e.g., Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315, 1359 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(citing government's percolation defense for intracircuit nonacquiescence), vacated sub nm Stieberger v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986).
458. See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 160 (1984) (noting concern
about depriving "this Court of the benefit it receives from permitting several
courts of appeals to explore a difficult question before this Court grants certiorari"); Wallace, supranote 294, at 929 (noting value of "providing the Supreme
Court with a wide array of approaches to legal issues and thus, hopefully, with
the raw material from which to fashion better judgments"); COLUM. J. Note,
supra note 4, at 467 (intercircuit percolation serves to ensure that "issues will
become ripe for Supreme Court review"); HARV. Note, supra note 4, at 850
("The only value of percolation that the Court identified in Mendoza is the
benefit to the Supreme Court from the existence of different lower court opinions onthe same legal issue."); Conference Transcript, supra note 4, at 42 (remarks of Professor Estreicher) ("multicircuit consideration of issues and
multicircuit dialogue [serve] both as a means of identifying the cases that the
Supreme Court ought to hear and also as a basis for deciding the cases that it
ultimately grants certiorari to hear").
459. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
460. Accord, e.g., Diller & Morawetz, supra note 4, at 812 ("agency compliance with circuit law within a circuit does not inhibit the primary form of intercircuit dialogue where circuits consider issues that have been ruled on by
other circuits"); Kubitschek, supra note 4, at 420 ("[e]ven if the agency must
follow court of appeals decisions within the circuit, it remains free to litigate
the same issues in other circuits").
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nonacquiescence may indirectly inhibit the "percolation" of
legal issues in other circuit courts. For example, if intracircuit
nonacquiescence were prohibited, agencies faced with unfavorable circuit court decisions might rush to secure immediate
Supreme Court review before optimum percolation had occurred.4 1 This argument, however, faces a number of difficulties.46 2 The most obvious is that the Supreme Court can simply
deny the agency's petition for certiorari if it desires further
lower court dialogue before it acts.463 To be sure, the agency
will suffer inconvenience whenever forced to acquiesce in a circuit court decision as to which certiorari has been denied. As
already shown, however, such inconvenience does not justify intracircuit nonacquiescence.4
Agency advocates make an alternative "real-world" argument that mandated intracircuit acquiescence will unduly
threaten intercircuit dialogue. The nub of this argument is that
an agency confronted with the complexity of applying one rule
in one circuit, while sticking by its own rule in all others, may
simply capitulate to the adverse circuit court ruling and thus
Given an agency's nattruncate judicial dialogue altogether.4
this
scenario is unlikely
ural loyalty to its own rules, however,
if
it
does,
that
fact cannot valiMoreover,
even
often to unfold.
date intracircuit nonacquiescence under "heightened scrutiny"
principles. After all, the stifling of judicial dialogue that results
under this scenario does not occur because of the ban on intracircuit nonacquiescence; instead it occurs because of the
agency's own choice to acquiesce in the circuit court ruling nationwide. Stated another way, a less-restrictive alternative for
461. See Lee Letter, supra note 8, reprinted in 130 CoNG. REC. at 25,977;
Kuhl, supra note 4, at 914-15.
462. For example, the argument is speculative because agencies may not
act in this manner. In addition, even if agencies do seek certiorari when they
first lose on an important issue, there may already have been extensive circuit
court treatment of the issue in cases the agency has won. Moreover, further
dialogue may unfold while the case is pending before the Supreme Court. Finally, intercircuit dialogue, while useful, is hardly indispensable to sound
Supreme Court decision making. In fact, the Court commonly decides issues
before any intercircuit dialogue on them has occurred. See, e.g., United States
v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404, 2406-07 (1990).
463. See 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1988).
464. See supra note 453 and accompanying text.
465. Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 749 (expressing concern about
"indirectly" forcing agencies to follow nationwide "the first adverse decision
by a court of appeals"); Maranville, supra note 4, at 496 (noting possibility that
agency will "abandon its preferred approach . . . each time a court adopts a
different position").
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achieving the government's interest in ensuring intercircuit dialogue would be for the agency not to assimilate the first adverse circuit court ruling on a nationwide basis, but instead to
accept the ruling only locally, while engaging in intercircuit
nonacquiescence. 4 Again, an agency might find this course of
inaction inconvenient to implement, but the avoidance of such
4 7
convenience cannot justify intracircuit nonacquiescence. 6
466. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
467. See supra note 453 and accompanying text. Three other practical aspects of the percolation argument are said to favor broad executive authority
to engage in intracircuit nonacquiescence. First, a ban on intracircuit nonacquiescence might "overburden the Supreme Court with appeals from adverse
decisions" because of the practical requirement that "government... seek all
possible avenues of review of the first adverse decision in any circuit." Kuhl,
supra note 4, at 914. Any acquiescence-induced increase in the Supreme Court
docket (which already comprises over 5,000 cases per year), however, seems
unlikely to be functionally significant Moreover, "while acquiescence might
increase congestion in the Supreme Court, nonacquiescence increases congestion in the district courts and courts of appeals" to a far greater extent. Kubitschek, supra note 4, at 440. In any event, the Supreme Court can manage its
own workload through discretionary control of its certiorari docket.
Second, Professors Estreicher & Revesz complain that a ban on intracircuit nonacquiescence "skews the law's development in a direction that is always antagonistic to the agency's position." Estreicher & Revesz H,supra note
4, at 835. They say this is so because "an agency whose position has been rejected in a circuit may not relitigate in that circuit," while when an agency's
position is endorsed "opponents of the agency not party to the previous proceeding may continue to press their position in the face of contrary circuit
law." I& This argument does not apply to agencies that - unlike the SSA decide private disputes, because the losing private litigant can always appeal,
and the agency can then support that private appellant's position. Even as to
agencies like the SSA, however, the argument is fallacious because it ignores
both the real-world opportunities that do exist for agency relitigation, see infra notes 483-84, and the practical restraints imposed on nongovernment litigants faced with existing "contrary circuit law." See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 11.
This argument fails also to recognize that circuit courts in general do not disrupt their own precedents for any party and that the federal government,
when genuinely bent on dislodging a circuit court precedent, can bring far
more resources and influence to bear than other federal court litigants. See,
eg., Commissioner, INS v. Jean, 110 S. Ct. 2316, 2322 n.14 (1990) (noting
"'greater resources and expertise"' of government) (quoting H.R. REP. No.
1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1980)); Ruppert v. Bowen, 871 F.2d 1172, 1177 (2d
Cir. 1989) (citing "disparity between the resources at [the claimant's] command
and those available to the SSA"); HARV. Note, supra note 4, at 852-53 (citing
government's "considerable" advantages as a litigator).
Finally, the Justice Department has suggested that "mandatory acquiescence would severely damage the government's litigation practices." WAYNE
Note, supra note 4, at 171; accord Lee Letter, supra note 8, reprintedin 130
CONG. REC. at 25,977 (nonacquiescence prohibition "represents an unprecedented interference with the ability of the Justice Department to determine
the cases it will appeal"); cf.United States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S.
693, 702-03 & n.7 (1988) (Supreme Court relies on Solicitor General not to file
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Faced with these difficulties, Professors Estreicher and
Revesz contend that "percolation," if correctly conceived, involves more than facilitating the independent review of a legal
issue by multiple circuit courts. They argue that the appellate
system also should facilitate ready reconsideration of circuit
court precedent by the precedent-issuingcourt itself.4 This interest, they add, is especially great after other circuits have rejected the targeted precedent as unpersuasive.4 9 Having
certiorari petitions in most cases the government has lost in the appellate

courts). This argument comes with something of a pedigree because the
Supreme Court in Mendoza deemed inadvisable a disruption of the government's litigation practices. United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 159-61
(1984). The reasoning of Mendoza (which concerned irreversible nationwide
"law-freezing" and important decisions regarding appeals from district court,
as well as circuit court, rulings), however, does not carry over to a rule of mandated intracircuit acquiescence (which involves only circuit-wide effects of
court rulings that can be reversed by a subsequent challenge, and appeal decisions relating to only circuit court, and not district-court, judgments). In any
event, a rule of compulsory intracircuit acquiescence "simply puts the agency
in the same position as every private litigant with a nationwide constituency,
who must make a difficult decision as to whether to seek Supreme Court review, weighing such factors as the cost of appealing, the likelihood of success,
and the danger of setting a nationwide precedent against the litigant." Kubitschek, supra note 4, at 437. Indeed, the government generally is in a far better
position than any ordinary litigant in making this choice because: (1) unlike a
private party, the government is not precluded by collateral estoppel from
thereafter relitigating the issue in any court even if it declines to seek certiorari; (2) such relitigation in other circuits may well produce an intercircuit
conflict, which the government may readily take to the Supreme Court; (3)
the uniquely expansive nature of government programs often will provide
agencies with ample opportunities to relitigate even in the decision-issuing circuit; and (4) the government, in any event, has far greater resources and influence in litigation than any private party. See, e.g., S. CAL. Note, supra note 4,
at 1168 (noting "strategic luxury" given to agencies that may, unlike individuals, "pick and choose" cases best suited for appeal).
468. Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 727; see also Lee Letter, supra
note 8, reprinted in 130 CONG. REc. at 25,977 (expressing concern regarding
intracircuit percolation); Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1878 (citing circuit court

reconsideration as "a useful alternative to recourse to the Supreme Court's
certiorari jurisdiction"). Perhaps supporting this reasoning is a general unease
about insisting on conformance with a judicial decision that later might be repudiated by the issuing court. However, "reliance on court decisions that may
one day be overturned is inherent in a legal system designed to protect rights
in a timely manner." Diller & Morawetz, supra note 4, at 829. Indeed, the
United States Supreme Court - whose decisions are viewed as binding even
by proponents of intracircuit nonacquiescence, see supra note 276 and accompanying text - has overruled itself no fewer than 172 times. See CoLUM.
Note, supra note 4, at 593.
469. Estreicher & Revesz II, supra note 4, at 835 n.22 (arguing that prohibition of intracircuit nonacquiescence "prevents a circuit that has already passed
on a question from benefitting from the views of circuits that rule subsequently, including criticism by such circuits").
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identified this interest, Professors Estreicher and Revesz argue
that a flat rule mandating intracircuit acquiescence inhibits too
much the opportunities for agencies to secure circuit court reconsideration of past decisions concerning agency rules.470
Concerns about restraints that intracircuit nonacquiescence
places on intracircuit percolation, however, do not apply at all
to the conduct of those many agencies (such as the NLRB) that
decide disputes between private parties. 71 This is so because in
those cases, the private party that loses because the agency acquiesces in circuit-court precedent can appeal freely to the circuit court and ask it to reconsider its earlier decision.472 Other
agencies (such as the SSA) cannot count on private parties to
seek circuit court reconsideration of decisions that the agency
has applied but seeks to have overturned.4 73 Even for those
agencies, however, ensuring opportunities to ask for circuit
court reconsideration of past decisions is an interest of "insufficient importance 474 to justify a practice impinging so profoundly on the separation of powers.
This is especially true because courts of appeals are seldom
moved -

by intercircuit conflicts or otherwise -

to overturn

their past decisions. 4 75 This disinclination reflects more than
the natural human reluctance to admit bad mistakes (a reluctance that is heightened when the mistake is said to lie in a
written multi-judge opinion issued solemnly after much reflection, deliberation, and hard work). It results also from the settled procedural rule that circuit courts will overturn past
decisions only through the cumbersome and seldom-used vehicle of en banc review.476 In addition, facilitating circuit court
470. See Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 727.
471. See sulpra note 19.
472. Moreover, the agency can encourage such a private party to take such
an appeal and then support the appellate's position in the circuit court.
473. See BROOKLYN Note, suprm note 4, at 97 (noting that SSA itself may
not seek judicial review from adverse internal decisions by agency AIJs or the
Social Security Review Council).
474. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976).
475. Diller & Morawetz, supra note 4, at 812 n.44 ("courts are... hesitant
to abandon their precedents"); Kubitschek, suma note 4, at 424-25 & n.152
(finding interest in intracircuit reconsideration "more theoretical than real"
and "worth little" because SSA "experience shows that the courts, when faced
with issues previously decided, have generally adhered to their former
decisions").
476. Diller & Morawetz, supra note 4, at 805-7 nn.17, 21 & 26 (collecting
authorities setting forth requirement of panel adherence to past panel rulings
while "limit[ing] reconsideration of precedent to the en banc process"); i6. at
806 & n.22 (detailing that "resolution of inconsistencies across circuits is not a
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reconsiderations is an interest of limited significance because
agencies -

especially when conflicts arise

-

can readily secure

"reconsideration" of troublesome precedent through the alternative route of bringing the issue before the Supreme Court. 477
Professors Estreicher and Revesz reply to this point by
urging that it is preferable to have "conflicting positions ...
harmonized without the need for review by the Supreme
Court."47 8 To be sure, Supreme Court review has its costs. The

system of intracircuit error correction envisioned by Professors
Estreicher and Revesz, however, also would entail a substantial
commitment of resources. 4 79 For example, the circuit court en
banc proceeding they prefer could tie up the time and attention
central purpose of the en bane procedure" and that "99.5 percent of all court
of appeals decisions have been rendered without the en bane process"); White,
supra note 4, at 672-73, 675 n.232 ("In terms of describing the reality of circuit courts' treatment of precedent, Diller and Morawetz, not Estreicher and
Revesz, are correct. Intracircuit stare decisis is the traditionally followed rule,
and en banc reversal of precedent is not occurring routinely."); COLUM. Note,
supranote 4, at 593 (citing unlikelihood of en bane review). See generally 9 J.
MooRE, B. WARD & J. LucAs, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE

235.02 n.3 (2d ed.

1990) (en banc hearings "are comparatively rare"). While generally questioning the perception of circuit-court reluctance to overturn past rulings, see Estreicher & Revesz II, supra note 4, at 838, even Professors Estreicher and
Revesz acknowledge that a circuit court might well decline to reconsider its
precedent "where there has been ample multi-circuit consideration of an issue
and Supreme Court review is imminent." Estreicher & Revesz I1, supra note
4, at 837 n.34; see also Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1868 n.200 ("[a]vailability of
certiorari review in the Supreme Court as a mechanism for resolution of intercircuit conflicts may cause some courts of appeals to refuse to reconsider
their precedents when faced with a conflict"). Notably, this description will fit
many, if not most, situations in which an intercircuit conflict has arisen. On
the other hand, if no conflict exists, a circuit court is also unlikely to reconsider its precedent because the situation will provide little basis for concluding
that its original ruling was misbegotten.
477. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1869 n.205 ("It is virtually inconceivable that the Court would decline to resolve a well-entrenched intercircuit
conflict, when asked to do so by the Solicitor General, if the issue affects the
ongoing administration of a significant government program.").
478. Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 743.
479. Moreover, the costs of facilitating reconsideration through intracircuit
nonacquiescence range well beyond financial ones. See generally supra notes
335-57 and accompanying text (discussing practical consequences of intracircuit
nonacquiescence). Thus, the "conflicting positions" that supposedly would
warrant circuit court reconsideration may never arise (or even if they do, the
circuit court may still choose not to reconsider its precedent). In addition,
even if a conflict arises, the "Supreme Court may sustain the court of appeals
that ruled against the agency." Diller & Morawetz, supra note 4, at 811. In all
of these instances, intracircuit nonacquiescence will not serve its purpose of
generating intracircuit error correction; rather, its effect will be simply to produce large numbers of agency proceedings in which a supervisory circuit's settled rule was not applied.
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of more than a dozen judges.48° Moreover, if en banc reconsideration fails to dislodge the circuit court's prior statement of
law, the agency must also secure Supreme Court review, thus
generating all the additional costs that intracircuit percolation
is theoretically designed to avoid.48 In light of these practical
considerations, any interest in broadly facilitating intracircuit
reconsideration of past decisions adverse to an agency seems
"dubious"' 2 at best.
Even if facilitating intracircuit reevaluation of precedent
were a governmental interest of the highest order, however, it
would not justify intracircuit nonacquiescence. This is so because many opportunities exist for agencies to secure circuit
court reconsideration of controversial circuit court rulings without resort to intracircuit nonacquiescence. For example, agencies may file declaratory judgment actions requesting the
overturning of unfavorable circuit court rulings.48 In addition,
an agency may seek reconsideration of a disfavored circuit
court precedent whenever occasions arise for testing the scope
and limits of that precedent. 4 m Finally, even if the declaratory480. See Judges of the Federal Courts, 923 F.2d vii, vii-xxxii (noting
number of judges in various circuit courts). To be sure, courts of appeals in
some cases may overrule precedents without full-scale en banc review. See Estreicher & Revesz U, supra note 4, at 838. Even such a "streamlined" procedure, however, necessitates at least a limited participation by "all active
members of the court." AK In any event, the use of such a procedural shortcut
is very much the exception to the general rule. See Bennett & Pembroke,
"Mini"In Banc Proceedings: A Survey of Circuit Practices,34 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 531, 557 (1986).
481. See Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1868-69 ("Of course, if the conflict is not
resolved, a definitive Supreme Court resolution will likely be forthcoming.").
482. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 498 (1965) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring).
483. Oversight Hearings, supra note 4, at 131 (statement of Professor
Brilmayer) (suggesting declaratory judgment route is available and far less
"harsh" than intracircuit nonacquiescence); Kubitschek, supra note 4, at 42627 (suggesting that SSA can sue under 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (1988), as well as 28
U.S.C. § 2201 (1988), and faulting agency because it has not attempted to use
these routes). To be sure, experts have debated whether the declaratory judgment route is open. See Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 745-46. It
seems inappropriate, however, to permit agencies to rely on an intracircuitpercolation rationale until they have failed in actual efforts to prosecute such
actions. Moreover, even if the declaratory-judgment option is foreclosed, that
fact does not so much constitutionalize intracircuit nonacquiescence as suggest
the need for a limited congressional response extending the right to seek declaratory relief to this distinctive situation.
484. See Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315, 1360 & n.32 (S.D.N.Y.
1985), vacated sub nom Stieberger v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986); Oversight Hearings,supra note 4, at 131 (statement of Professor Brilmayer) ("original precedent can be criticized in the context of an attempt to distinguish or
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judgment and scope-testing-case routes prove inadequate, an interest in intracircuit percolation cannot justify the practice of
intracircuit nonacquiescence in all agency proceedings. This is
so because a "less restrictive alternative" is readily available to
facilitate timely circuit court reconsideration of precedents the
agency opposes. Under this alternative approach, an agency
would apply its own rule only to a targeted "test-case" claimant, who then could appeal and thus put in issue the disfavored
circuit court ruling.4a8 Such selective intracircuit nonacquieslimit its holding" or in "future litigation designed to extend the precedent's
scope;" predicting that agencies will be "amply creative" in finding ways to secure reconsiderations); Diller & Morawetz, supra note 4, at 812 n.42; Kubitschek, supra note 4, at 427 & n.159 (citing authorities noting availability of
circuit-court reconsideration in context of litigating scope of rule); see also
Carrington, United States Appeals in Civil Cases: A Field and Statistical
Study, 11 Hous. L. REv. 1101, 1104 (1974) (noting that "even in the same circuit, the United States may be willing to relitigate an issue if minor factual
distinctions can be made between the pending matter and the preceding decision"). Notably, in making the case for intracircuit nonacquiescence, then-Solicitor General Lee stated that "it is often difficult to ascertain the precise
scope of a particular appellate decision until subsequent cases arise on somewhat different facts and a court is asked to distinguish prior precedent." Lee
Letter, supra note 8, reprinted in 130 CONG. REc. at 25,977. Of course, it is
precisely when such "subsequent cases arise" that the government may seek
circuit court reconsideration of the earlier ruling.
485. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1820 (concluding that intracircuit
nonacquiescence is unlawful except when "selectively employed in a small
number of test cases"); see also COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 60 (recommending that Congress prohibit intracircuit nonacquiescence by the SSA
with a narrow exception for "any case that the Solicitor General has determined is appropriate to use as a test case of existing law"). But see Estreicher
& Revesz I, supra note 4, at 746. Professors Estreicher & Revesz criticize this
test-case approach, reasoning in part that the agency will have to instigate "a
relatively large number" of test cases, because "the 'test' parties against whom
the agency issues complaints may not be inclined to pursue their remedies to
the level of a court of appeals." Id, at 746-47. This view exaggerates the
agency's difficulties. The agency can greatly increase the chances that adversely affected parties will pursue judicial remedies simply by (1) choosing
test cases involving important consequences, and (2) specifically informing the
adversely affected parties of the favorable circuit court law the agency wishes
to test. At the very least, agency nonacquiescence in a "large number" of cases
should be impermissible until these avenues have been tried without success.
On a more general level, some have noted that test-case actions (as well as
declaratory actions) entail a distasteful and inequitable singling out of particular claimants for harsher treatment than is received by all other claimants. As
with getting old, however, the alternative is worse. After all, full-scale intracircuit nonacquiescence subjects everybody, including the potential test-case
claimant, to application of unfavorable agency rules that are incompatible with
supervisory circuit court law. Cf supra notes 440-46 and accompanying text
(refuting defense of intracircuit nonacquiescence on grounds of fairness).
As to appropriate procedures that might be used in connection with such
"test-case" nonacquiescence, see Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1870-72.
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cence would adequately protect any governmental interest in
intracircuit relitigation while avoiding the serious separation-ofpowers problems posed by routine flouting of local circuit court
pronouncements. 486
C.

VINDICATING AGENCY EXPERTISE

In Chevron USA Inc. v. National Resources Defense Counci, Inc.,487 the Supreme Court held that courts must accept an
agency's interpretation of a governing statute so long as it is
"reasonable" 48 8 and not "manifestly contrary to the statute."' 4 9
This principle of deference emanates from the recognition that
Congress created agencies to serve as "experts" in their field of
operation.49° It also gives rise to the argument that an impor486. This discussion is designed to show only that the test-case option undermines the intracircuit-percolation justification for intracircuit nonacquiescence. It is not designed to advocate a test-case exception to the intracircuitnonacquiescence prohibition. Indeed, for at least the following reasons, no
test-case exception should be recognized: (1) the intracircuit-percolation justification for the exception is not weighty, (2) alternative avenues exist for securing intracircuit reconsideration of questioned precedents even if intracircuit
acquiescence is required without exception, (3) a test-case exception involves a
singling out of claimants that should be avoided, (4) courts should be hesitant
to embrace any exception to the ban on intracircuit nonacquiescence, and (5)
any such exception would be difficult in practice to apply and police. On the
last point, compare Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1872 (suggesting that "test case"
nonacquiescence is permissible when circuit court "may reasonably be thought
to be receptive to reconsideration of its precedent"). At the least, any such exception to the otherwise complete ban on intracircuit nonacquiescence, see infra note 524, should be judicially tolerated only if either endorsed by Congress,
see supra notes 208-11 and accompanying text, or established by a solid evidentiary record as the only available means of securing intracircuit reconsideration of an important precedent.
487. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
488. Id at 843 n.1, 865.
489. Id. at 842-44. See generally Starr, Sunstein, Willard & Morrison, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in a Conservative Era, 39 ADVIN. L.
REv. 353 (1987) (panel discussion of Chevron). For more recent decisions applying the Chevron principle, see NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc.,
110 S. Ct. 1542, 1549 (1990); Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482
U.S. 27, 42 (1987); see also Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 454
U.S. 404, 417-19 (1982) (deferring to the NLRB, because agency's rule was
"consistent with its mandate and promotes the underlying congressional purpose" of the National Labor Relations Act); Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437
U.S. 483, 496-500 (1978) (upholding NLRB rule because "nothing in the legislative history ...indicates a congressional policy inconsistent with Board's general approach").
490. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865; accord,ag., Pension Benefits Guaranty Corp.
v. LTV Corp., 110 S.Ct. 2668, 2679 (1990) ("practical agency expertise is one of
the principal justifications behind Chevron deference"); see also, e.g., Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 708 (explaining that the NLRB justifies
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tant interest justifying intracircuit nonacquiescence is the propriety of vindicating agency expertise. 491
The flaw in this argument is that it "allow[s] the agencies
to double dip on their Chevron rights to deference. '492 This is
so because, whenever a circuit court invalidates an agency rule
on nonconstitutional grounds, it must do so only after applying
the substantial degree of deference mandated by Chevron. It
follows that when an agency invokes its expertise to nonacquiesce in an earlier decision invalidating an agency rule, it is
seeking a second bite at the Chevron apple. No Supreme Court
decision even remotely suggests that a federal agency deserves
that much deference. Indeed, the "district court analogy" decried as inapplicable by Professors Estreicher and Revesz in
light of judicially established principle of deference - assumes
an added force because of that very principle.493 After all, it
surely is least defensible for a subordinate decision maker to
persist in applying a rule when that rule has been found by a
reviewing authority not only to be wrong, but "beyond the zone
of reasonableness. 49 4 In any event, there is no overriding interest i doubly protecting "agency expertise" in this manner.495 Any legitimate interest in vindicating agency expertise
is amply protected by the broad deference courts must give
agencies in reviewing the legality of their rules ab initio.
VII.

THE SEARCH FOR LIMITS

All that precedes shows that intracircuit nonacquiescence
violates the Constitution's separation of powers. That declaration does not end discussion, however, because inventive lawits nonacquiescence policy on the ground that "it is the primary policymaker
under the statute and the Supreme Court has often sided with it").
491. See Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 723-25; Estreicher &
Revesz II, supra note 4, at 841; White, supra note 4, at 665-67; qf Schwartz,
supra note 4, at 1825 n.27 (noting that defenders of intracircuit nonacquiescence assert that any limit on the practice interferes with authority delegated
to the executive branch by Congress or assigned under the Constitution).
492. Diller & Morawetz, supra note 4, at 821.
493. For a discussion of the "district court analogy," see supra notes 299-

307 and accompanying text.
494. Strauss, One Hundred-Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the
Supreme Court's Limited Resourcesfor JudicialReview of Agency Action, 87

COLUM. L. REv.1093, 1121-22 (1987).
495. Indeed, in seeking to respond to this "double dipper" challenge to use
of an expertise-based rationale, Professors Estreicher and Revesz simply fall

back on the uniformity and percolation justifications, see Estreicher & Revesz
II, supra note 4, at 842, already considered and rejected above, see supra Part
VI. A.-B.
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yers will seek to confine the constitutional restriction by urging
that it admits of exceptions. Indeed, agency advocates have already proposed four important limitations on any general prohibition of intracircuit nonacquiescence. They maintain that
each of the following policies should pass constitutional muster:
(1) a policy of agency bifurcation, under which intracircuit nonacquiescence is pursued at the initial, but not the final, levels of
agency decision making,496 (2) a rule permitting intracircuit
nonacquiescence with respect to "questionable" circuit court
precedents; 497 (3) a policy of nonacquiescing in a circuit court
precedent so long as the agency is seeking to "correct" the circuit court's perceived error;49 8 and (4) the practice of nonacquiescing in a circuit court decision until the opportunity for
Supreme Court review of that decision has expired.4 99
496. See infra notes 502-f1 and accompanying text.
497. See infra notes 512-24 and accompanying text.
498.

See infra notes 525-39 and accompanying text.

499. See i;fra notes 540-49 and accompanying text. In addition, agencies
have asserted that they may nonacquiesce when litigating cases in court, regardless of their duty to follow circuit court law in conducting their own internal proceedings. See supra note 34. For example, the NLRB may seldom
engage in intracircuit nonacquiescence in issuing enforcement orders due to
uncertainties about which circuit court will review the order upon its issuance.
Once enforcement of an agency order is challenged, however, the agency necessarily knows the identity of the reviewing court. This fact notwithstanding,
NLRB lawyers refuse to acknowledge the controlling effect of a reviewing circuit court's precedents. Instead, they routinely file briefs in which they "respectfully disagree" with such otherwise dispositive authorities. See, eg.,
Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965, 966-67 (3d Cir. 1979); White,
supra note 4, at 642-43; cf COLUM. Note, supra note 4, at 583 (suggesting difference between "nonacquiescence" in primary agency conduct and in "litigation in a court").
The courts have for good reason found this practice impermissible. See,
e.g., NLRB v. Ashkenazy Property Management. Corp., 817 F.2d 74 (9th Cir.
1987); Yellow Taxi Co. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The rationales
supporting the unconstitutionality of intracircuit nonacquiescence in ordinary
agency decision making carry over - at least as a general matter - to agency
decision making in the litigation context as well. For example, because advocacy of legal positions is an aspect of executing the laws, see Morrison v. Olson,
487 U.S. 654, 691 (1988), the constitutional text requires that it be done "faithful[ly]" and with "care." See supra notes 230-38 and accompanying text; see
also text accompanying notes 309-13 (highlighting propriety of like treatment
of governmental and private actors); notes 335-40 (emphasizing importance of
safeguarding perception of courts as sound law-pronouncing institutions);
notes 348-57 (expressing concern about avoidable costs placed on judiciary by
intracircuit nonacquiescence); notes 358-62 (noting institutional features of
courts supporting acceptance of existing court rulings); notes 393-98 (noting
absence of risk of aggrandizement of judicial power in requiring adherence to
existing circuit court decisions). Nor does Mendoza support a wide-open power
to constantly and routinely attack circuit court precedent in the context of liti-
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To be sure, the constitutional considerations marshalled
above do not condemn these peripheral forms of intracircuit
nonacquiescence as plainly as they do full-scale flouting of all
circuit court pronouncements. At the same time, the long history of flagrant agency overreaching should not dull the alertness of courts to more selective and less visible forms of
intracircuit nonacquiescence. 5° 0 Indeed, precisely because the
reasons for banning that practice run so wide and deep, proposed exceptions to the constitutional prohibition should meet
with a strong presumption of invalidity. Separate analysis of
each of the four limiting proposals confirms that no exception
to a flat ban on intracircuit nonacquiescence is warranted.5°1
gating in that circuit. See Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1880 (noting that "policy

concerns expressed in Mendoza... have diminished force in the setting of intracircuit relitigation"); Oversight Hearings,supra note 4, at 131 (statement of
Professor Brilmayer) ("Mendoza merely rejected the extreme position that the
government should never be able to relitigate; there is no reason to read it as
espousing the opposite extreme position that the government should always be
able to relitigate" (emphasis added)). Indeed, the routine dismissal of circuit
court precedent in the advocacy of agency cases seems particularly indefensible given the special status of agency representatives in this context as "officers of the court." See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 714 (1980). Agency lawyers, like other lawyers, may be permitted to make "a
good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing
law." FED. R. CIV. P. 11; see Wyandotte Say. Bank v. NLRB, 682 F.2d 119, 120
(6th Cir. 1982) (finding that agency had "reasonable basis" for challenging
prior controlling Sixth Circuit decision); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-

SPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(2) (1980). A policy of invariably challenging circuit
court decisions in the decision-issuing circuit, however, places the agency well
outside this protected zone. See, eg., Jones v. Heckler, 583 F. Supp. 1250, 1256
& n.7 (N.D. IMI. 1984). See generally COLUM. Note, supra note 4, at 596 (citing
authorities in noting that Rule 11 applies to government lawyers).
500. See Stieberger v. Sullivan, 738 F. Supp. 716, 759 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (considering present SSA policy and concluding that it "leaves a great deal of room
for non-acquiescence").
501. A separate question is whether Congress would have the power to enact these exceptions after the judiciary had already rejected them. Because
these forms of intracircuit nonacquiescence rest on the edge, rather than at
the center, of the constitutional prohibition, the case for some such congressional power seems strong as to proposed exceptions two and four, see supra
text accompanying notes 497, 499, and perhaps exception one, see supra text
accompanying note 496. See generally Monaghan, The Supreme Court 1974
Term - Foreword Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1, 26-30
(1975) (discussing role of Congress in rejecting or modifying judicial decisions
in proposed federal common law of civil liberties). As developed below, however, the proposed "correction-of-precedent" exception - that is, exception
three, see supra text accompanying note 498 - is so likely to swallow the nononacquiescence rule, that no congressional power to establish that exception
should be recognized unless Congress is found to have the power to authorize
intracircuit nonacquiescence in general. See generally supra notes 172-211 and
accompanying text (exploring possible constitutional arguments for sustaining
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AGENCY BIFURCATION

Following its failed defense in the lower courts of its generalized policy of intracircuit nonacquiescence,m° 2 the SSA took a
new approach in 1985. In effect, the agency agreed to acquiesce
in circuit court law at the third and fourth stages of agency review of a claimant's case, but continued to nonacquiesce at the
first and second stages. 5, 3 This bifurcated approach, however,
failed to cure the basic constitutional difficulty with intracircuit
nonacquiescence. After all, defiance of controlling judicial
rules is no less defiance because it is carried out by the foot
soldiers of the agency, rather than its majors and colonels. This
conclusion becomes all the more clear, moreover, when it is recalled that all these subordinates act on the orders of agency
generals.0
In adopting a bifurcated approach, the SSA sought to pursue a "less restrictive alternative" to agency-wide intracircuit
nonacquiescence. In particular, the agency recognized that
third-level and fourth-level decisionmakers - the agency's regional administrative law judges (ALJs) and national Appeals
Council - generally are well educated, are comparatively few
in number, and have a working familiarity with judicial precedent. Thus, the agency concluded that forced acquiescence in
circuit court precedent by these decisionmakers would not subcongressional authorization of intracircuit nonacquiescence). Because the intriguing question whether such a power exists is entirely hypothetical, nothing
will be added here to the brief comments on the issue offered elsewhere in the
Article. See id
502. See supra note 7.
503. See generally Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 695-99 (describing revised SSA policy); TouRo Note, supra note 4, at 215-17 (detailing bifurcated approach); IND. Note, supra note 4, at 1107-09 (discussing bifurcated SSA
approach). Notably, the SSA later revised its nonacquiescence policy again,
leaving some question as to whether its bifurcated policy was ever implemented to a significant degree. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.984 (1990). Even so, the
SSA's policy of bifurcation illustrates how one agency sought to structure a
compromise position on intracircuit nonacquiescence in order to satisfy constitutional challenges, and how other agencies may structure program operations
in the future. For a discussion of the SSA policy put in place following withdrawal of its bifurcated approach, see Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1866-68.
504. See IND. Note, supra note 4, at 1114 ("[t]he fact that the SSA is likely
to remedy the use of an incorrect standard at a higher appellate level does not
excuse the initial abuse of power"). Notably, in the NLRB context, "[tihe
courts have been critical of nonacquiescence, whether it occurs when the General Counsel issues a complaint at odds with circuit law, or when an AUJ refuses to follow circuit law in issuing a recommended decision and order, or
when the Board itself rejects circuit law in its own decisions." White, supra
note 4, at 660 n.137 (citations omitted).
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ject the agency to undue disruption or expense. In contrast, the
agency reasoned that forced acquiescence by frontline decisionmakers would necessitate major modifications to national
agency manuals and substantial training, monitoring and updating of thousands of agency workers.-05 The SSA concluded that
such retooling was unacceptable.50 6
The problem with the agency's approach is that even a less
restrictive means of obtaining a governmental goal cannot
stand if the goal is not a permissible one. Because a cost-savings goal cannot justify nonacquiescence in general, it should
not justify a policy of "low-level" agency nonacquiescence
designed to avert inconvenience and disruption. °7 Additionally, the bifurcated approach only perpetuates problems of discrimination between claimants who do and claimants who do
not exercise appeal rights.5 0 Finally, the SSA's change of policy had only the most limited "practical consequences,"' s 9 because the large majority of claimants denied benefits by
frontline decisionmakers do not pursue agency appeals to the
ALJ level.5 10 For all these reasons, the only court to consider
505. See Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 748 (explaining why acquiescence at low agency levels is "far more cumbersome" than at high levels;
noting in pafticular that enforcement staff often is made up of "nonlawyers
. . . responsible for large caseloads"); Maranville, supra note 4, at 493 & n.68
(noting that many SSA personnel performing "formal adjudication, informal
investigation, enforcement activities, and claims processing... have no formal
legal training").
506. Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 690 (noting that added costs
result from non-bifurcated system); see Maranville, supra note 4, at 493 ("process of transmitting instructions may be complex, costly, [and] time consuming"). But cf Maranville, supra note 4, at 508 n.121 (downplaying difficulties
of instructing decision makers who "are accustomed to receiving detailed instructions"). The agency also argued that its bifurcated procedure was necessary to facilitate identification of proper "test cases" by ensuring that the
Appeals Council was able to review actual cases - those involving the denial
of benefits by frontline decisionmakers - that brought into play rules disfavored by the circuit court. See IND. Note, supra note 4, at 1110-11. This justification improperly assumes that there is a proper "test case" exception to the
duty to acquiesce. See supra note 486. In any event, the SSA should be able to
protect any interest it has in identifying test cases through closer monitoring
of cases at the state-agency level. See IND. Note, supra note 4, at 1116.
507. See supra note 453 and accompanying text.
508. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
509. See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
510. See Stieberger, 615 F. Supp. at 1371 (only approximately one-third of
claimants denied funds at first and second stages of SSA process get to third
stage, where intracircuit acquiescence is required), vacated sub no.
Stieberger v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986); Maranville, supra note 4, at
503 n.103, 5i9-20, 531 n.200 (ALJ hearings amount to only "a small percentage
of the agency's work" so that "[a]ccurate agency decisionmaking at the initial
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squarely the SSA's bifurcated approach properly found it
unconstitutional. 5 "1

B. DEREUCT PRECEDENT
Judicial rulings may lose vitality. Some are explicitly overruled, while others become so battered and bruised that they
forfeit all precedential force.5 12 It follows that agency refusals
to honor some past decisions may be appropriate and indeed
unavoidable. 51 3 The practical task is to identify those circuit
court precedents that have become so derelict that agencies
may properly refuse to follow them.
In identifying such "nonacquiescable" decisions, some considerations should count for nothing. Most important, the fact
that other circuits have parted ways with the decision at issue
should be without consequence. 514 After all, the ban on intracircuit nonacquiescence stems from the rightness of vindicating the authority of the supervisory court of appeals, and the
law of that circuit is in no way altered by developments in
stage of processing claims... is much more significant in the overall system
than accurate decisionmaking at adjudicatory hearings"; consequently bifurcated system had "extremely limited" effect).
511. See Stieberger, 615 F. Supp. at 1367-74.
512. Cf. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 517-527 (1988); Limbach v.
Hooven & Allison Co., 466 U.S. 353, 357-61 (1984) (although not explicitly overruled at the time, Court's decision "retain[ed] no vitality" when the decision
upon which it had been based was overruled).
513. See, e.g., Diller & Morawetz, supra note 4, at 806-07 & n.24; Estreicher
& Revesz I, supra note 4, at 725 n.239 (advocating legitimacy of intracircuit
nonacquiescence in "desuetude" or "substantially eroded" precedents);
Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1859-60; Colum. Note, supra note 4, at 584. Obviously, intracircuit nonacquiescence in one decision is "unavoidable" if two circuit court decisions are flatly inconsistent.
514. Accord, e.g., Diller & Morawetz, supra note 4, at 807 & n.25. But see
Stieberger v. Sullivan, 738 F. Supp. 716, 730 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (indicating that
when a conflict arises, an agency is expected to acquiesce, except in certain
limited circumstances); Kuhl, supra note 4, at 913 (urging that intracircuit
nonacquiescence is "necessary" and "certainly ... justified" when intercircuit
disagreement with a relevant decision arises); see also COLUM. Note, supra
note 4, at 605-06 (setting forth vague standards permitting a "very limited justification for acting contrary to applicable circuit law when other circuits have
failed to follow the initial precedent-creating decision"). Notably, current regulations permit the SSA to engage in intracircuit nonacquiescence with respect
to a circuit court decision so long as "[s]ubsequent circuit court precedent in
other circuits supports [the SSA's] interpretation of the Social Security Act or
regulations on the issues in question." 20 C.F.R. § 404.985(c)(1)(iii) (1990); see
also id. § 404.985(a).
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other circuits.51 5 In addition, whenever intercircuit conflicts
surface, the agency will be most able to solve problems of
nonuniformity through the medium of Supreme Court review.516 Finally, insistence on agency adherence to circuit court
precedent in this setting follows the principle of law that governs federal district court judges.5 17 Because those judges lack
authority to ignore the law of their circuit simply because another circuit opts for a different legal rule, so too should federal
agency decisionmakers. 518
In a similar vein, in only the rarest case should later developments within a circuit or in the Supreme Court warrant
agency disregard of a circuit court decision. Reasons of both
policy and authority support this conclusion. From the standpoint of policy, agency lawyers will often be able to construct
arguments that disfavored circuit court precedents have been
eroded by later developments. 519 Thus, practical protection of
the basic principle prohibiting intracircuit nonacquiescence favors a strict rule that preempts agency use of such self-serving
rationalizations. 520
From the standpoint of authority,
515. See supra notes 294-98 and accompanying text (discussing "law of the
circuit" doctrine).
516. See supra note 418 and accompanying text.
517. See generally supra notes 299-307 and accompanying text (discussing
so-called "district court analogy").
518. See Anderson v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 1011, 1013 (4th Cir. 1985) (agency is
"bound by the precedents in this circuit until they are displaced by higher authority or are overruled by this court"); Beverly Enters. v. NLRB, 727 F.2d
591, 593 (6th Cir. 1984).
519. See, e.g., Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315, 1344 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(noting SSA's argument that it may nonacquiescence in Second Circuit's treating physician rule because "the Second Circuit's standards are less than consistent"), vacated sub nora. Stieberger v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986).
520. See, e.g., GEO. WASH. Note, supra note 4, at 159 (attacking "when the
law is firmly established" test as providing "no real guidance"). Even in the
Stieberger case, for example, the district court left open the possibility of intracircuit nonacquiescence whenever "subsequent consideration of the disputed issue in other forums has created conditions which are likely to lead...
to reconsideration." Stieberger, 615 F. Supp. at 1365-66. A standard of this
type plainly leaves the Secretary with a wide opportunity to rationalize the
permissibility of intracircuit nonacquiescence in many circuit court decisions.
Beyond this, whenever later decisions of the same circuit or of the Supreme
Court cast doubt on an earlier ruling, the agency has alternative means to cure
its problems. After all, the agency will be in the best position to secure circuit
court reconsideration if a genuine tension exists among that circuit's precedents, and the agency will find a sympathetic audience for any certiorari petition if a true conflict exists between a circuit court decision and a later
Supreme Court ruling. See SuP. CT. R. 17.1. Finally, any proposed exception
to the no-nonacquiescence rule based on subsequent Supreme Court, in-circuit,
or out-of-circuit decisions entails a request that agencies be able to discontinue
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subordinate courts must generally honor a superior court's rulings until they are overturned. 52 1 It follows that reference to
the "district court analogy" 522 supports only the narrowest departure from the general duty of intracircuit acquiescence
based on post-decision developments within the same circuit or
in the Supreme Court.
A proper assessment of these considerations supports rejection of any free-standing "questionable decision" exception to
5 23
the general prohibition against intracircuit nonacquiescence.
Instead, agency non-adherence to a past circuit court decision
should be permitted only if it has become so patently derelict
that it no longer qualifies as a surviving "precedent" at all.-5
C.

CORRECTION OF PRECEDENT

The basic purpose of the elaborate work of Professors Estreicher and Revesz is to advocate a major exception to the general prohibition on intracircuit nonacquiescence. They urge
that an agency may engage in such nonacquiescence whenever:
(1)

the agency has responsibility for securing a nationally uniform
policy with respect to the question that was the subject of the adverse
judicial decision; (2) there is a justifiable basis for belief that the
agency's position falls within the scope of its delegated discretion; and
acquiescence in circuit court precedent. Continuing to acquiesce in a circuit
court decision that it already is honoring, however, is far less onerous for an
agency than initiatingacquiescence on the heels of a new decision. See supra
notes 449, 505-06 and accompanying text.
521. See, eg., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 109 S. Ct.
1917, 1921-22 (1989) (noting that lower courts must follow a precedent of the
Court even if it "appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions . . . leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own
decisions").
522. See supra notes 299-307 and accompanying text.
523. For an analysis proposing a somewhat similar result, see Schwartz,
supra note 4, at 1860. Professor Schwartz, however, sees "little need to define
nonacquiescence to include dubious efforts to distinguish precedent." IH at
1861 n.174. This view is too lenient in light of both the reasons set forth above
and the need for definitional integrity set forth below. See infra note 524.
524. Some may contend that this "no exception" approach involves only semantic quibbling and ultimately requires (like the alternatives it seeks to displace) manipulable subjective judgments about whether a circuit court
decision does or does not "survive" as a "precedent." The crucible of law is
language, however, and the choice of linguistic symbols inevitably has effect in
conveying meaning. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 67-68 (1961)
(Black, J., dissenting) (advocating "absolutist" view of First Amendment freespeech clause). Given the discussion in Parts HI-VI, supra, and the obvious
existence of opportunities for evasion, see supra notes 519-20 and accompanying text, the proper message to convey is that intracircuit nonacquiescence is
unacceptable without exception.
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(3) the agency is reasonably seeking the vindication of its position
25
both in the courts of appeals and before the Supreme Court.5

The basic premises underlying this approach have been challenged elsewhere in this Article. 52 The central difficulty with
this formula, however, lies in its "practical consequences." 5
Indeed, the "exception" proposed by Professors Estreicher and
Revesz is so broad that it would all but swallow the no-nonac-

quiescence rule.528
This is the case because none of the three parts of their
test imposes any significant restriction on agencies. The first
prong is essentially meaningless, because each agency has a
mandate for "securing a nationally uniform policy with respect
to its own rules and procedures." 529 The second prong - requiring-a "justifiable basis" for the agency rule - also imposes
no serious restriction; agencies, after all, seldom will adopt policies that courts can reject out of hand even in the face of Chevron's principle of substantial deference to the agency's
judgment.5 30 The third prong requires that the agency be "reasonably" seeking to vindicate its position "in the courts of appeals." That standard also should routinely be met, because an
agency can be expected to defend the very policy the claimant
is challenging on appeal as invalid under circuit court
53
precedent. '
525. Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 753.
526. In particular, Part VI critiques each of the rationales from which this
standard is derived.
527. See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
528. See Kubitschek, supra note 4, at 453 (concluding that result of Estreicher and Revesz rule would be to "continue . . . widespread

nonacquiescence").
529. See Conference Transcript, supra note 4, at 48 (remarks of Professor
Estreicher) (describing agency-mandate prong of test as "not a terribly demanding requirement").
530. Moreover, Professors Estreicher and Revesz define their "justifiable
basis" requirement so broadly and vaguely that it almost certainly imposes no
meaningful restriction on agencies. See Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at
754-55 (requiring that the agency's position be "so bereft of support in available legal materials that it is unlikely to be accepted by any other court of appeals"); see also Conference Transcript, supra note 4, at 49 (remarks of
Professor Estreicher) (justifiable basis test is not "terribly demanding").
531. Notably, some observers believe that the SSA has consciously declined
to appeal adverse district court decisions to the courts of appeals out of fear of
establishing adverse circuit court precedent. The agency may be expected,
however, to defend its challenged policy at the initial stage of review in the
district court and if it succeeds, again to defend its position in the court of appeals when the claimant seeks circuit court review. In addition, the decisions
of many agencies are appealable directly to the court of appeals without a stop
in the district court. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)-(f) (1990) (review of orders of
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The Estreicher and Revesz "test" thus boils down to the
other component of its third requirement: that the agency
"reasonably" be seeking "the vindication of its position ...
before the Supreme Court."0 2 This putative limitation, however, also leaves open the door for virtually limitless intracircult nonacquiescence. For example, Professors Estreicher and
Revesz acknowledge that "it might be reasonable for the
agency not to seek [Supreme Court] review in advance of an intercircuit conflict." 3 In the real world, however, it may take
years for an intercircuit conflict to arise. In addition, Professors Estreicher and Revesz emphasize the value of seeking to
resolve intercircuit conflicts without Supreme Court intervention.514 Thus, it would seem "reasonable" for an agency that is
"seeking... Supreme Court" vindication to continue to nonacquiesce while awaiting the chance to cure any conflict that has
emerged through circuit court reconsideration prior to petitioning for Supreme Court review. The key point is evident.
Under the Estreicher and Revesz formulation, an agency might
nonacquiesce in almost any circuit court decision stating almost
any sub-constitutional rule for many years prior to seeking
Supreme Court review.
Such a result is irreconcilable with
any meaningful prohibition on intracircuit nonacquiescence.
Three additional considerations remove all doubt on this
score. First, in the real world of constant legislative tinkering,
"[m]any statutory issues are... shortlived." 536 This fact creates
the unsettling result that, under the Estreicher and Revesz
NLRB). In any event, private litigants, as a practical matter, would have difficulty showing that an agency is seeking consciously to avoid vindication of its
own rules in the courts of appeals.
532. Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 753.
533. Id. at 756; see also id. at 746 (rejecting the position limiting permissible
nonacquiescence to situations in which at least one circuit court has upheld
the agency's policy). See generally Diller & Morawetz, supra note 4, at 802 n.6
(model permits nonacquiescence even "in the face of repetitive rulings" because it "only asks whether there is a chance of convincing another circuit of
the agency's position, and whether the agency is pursuing a reasonably vigorous litigation strategy"); Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1833 (reading Estreicher
and Revesz as contending that "[ain agency would be permitted to maintain its
position in the face of adverse circuit precedent as long as there is a reasonable
prospect that the agency's position will ultimately be accepted by at least one
court of appeals, and as long as the agency is engaged in a reasonable litigation
program designed to achieve that end").
534. See supra notes 468-70, 478 and accompanying text.
535. Accord DiUller & Morawetz, supra note 4, at 803, 811 (concluding that
Estreicher and Revesz proposal authorizes nonacquiescence "for long periods
- of time" that are "often measured in years").
536. Id. at 809.
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wait-and-see approach, even rock-solid circuit court interpretations of statutes might never be honored as precedents by agencies. Second, Professors Estreicher and Revesz in effect justify
intracircuit nonacquiescence on the basis of contingencies that
often will not occur. For example, an intercircuit conflict may
never arise, and even if one does, "the Supreme Court may sustain the courts of appeals that ruled against the agency." 537 Finally, however tight or loose one intends the "reasonably
seeking" requirement to be, it is in the end indeterminate.m
Considerations of certainty and judicial manageability thus
539
press hard against its adoption.
D.

NONACQUIESCENCE PENDING SUPREME COURT REVIEw

Must an agency acquiesce in a circuit court decision while
time remains to seek direct Supreme Court review of that decision? And even if the agency generally must acquiesce during
the certiorari-petitioning period, must it acquiesce pending disposition of the case after the agency in fact has petitioned for
Supreme Court review? Courts might hold that the general
prohibition on nonacquiescence should give way. in these circumstances.54 ° For example, a court may plausibly decide that
Id.at 811.
538. See id at 803 & 820 n.76 (criticizing Estreicher and Revesz standard as
unduly "tentative and malleable"); Kubitschek, supra note 4, at 456 (complaining that Estreicher and Revesz rule is "vague"); Conference Transcript,
supra note 4, at 63 (remarks of Professor Morawetz) (noting that Estreicher
and Revesz proposal is "not based on objective standards such as has the
agency sought certiorari, but based on much looser, subjective standards," and
that "this proposal sets up a very vague set of standards which is likely to create enormous problems in practice").
539. See Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315, 1373 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(challenging SSA policy embodied in Interim Circular 185 because it "admits
of no objectively ascertainable limitation on non-acquiescence"), vacated sub
nom Stieberger v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986); Schwartz, supra note 4,
at 1866 (citing need for highly objectifiable rule to "ensure that intracircuit
nonacquiescence is not simply the expression of agency resistance to correction"). See generally G. GUNTHER, supra note 219, at 1001 (quoting letter from
Learned Hand to Zechariah Chafee, Jr.: "Once you admit the matter is one of
degree, while you may put it where it genuinely belongs, [you] so obviously
make it a matter of administration. [I] should prefer a qualitative formula,
hard, conventional, difficult to evade.").
540. See, e.g., COLUM. Note, supra note 4, at 606-07 (advocating open-ended
approach that generally, but not always, warrants intracircuit nonacquiescence
pending Supreme Court action). Indeed the nonacquiescence bill enacted by
the House in 1984 permitted nonacquiescence during the time allowed for filing a certiorari petition. H.R. 3755, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 302(b) (1984); see Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 4, at 703; WAsH. Note, supra note 4, at 750
(describing House Bill).
537.
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agencies must acquiesce only in final circuit court decisions,
and that decisions still subject to Supreme Court review are not
final.5 41 Moreover, in the case of the agency that actually petitions for certiorari, that agency can argue that it should be rewarded for moving in the most diligent manner to secure a
nationwide clarification of governing law.-' 2 These arguments
have force, but on balance they should be rejected.
The doctrinal reason supporting this conclusion is that a
circuit court decision has precedential significance as the law of
the circuit from the date of issuance.m Given this principle,
the conclusion that acquiescence is required following issuance
of the circuit court opinion seems logical, regardless of the postissuance possibility of Supreme Court review and reversal.4
Functional considerations support this result. In particular, authorizing intracircuit nonacquiescence during the time available
to file for certiorari makes little sense if the government does
not in fact intend to seek the writ. On the other hand, if the
agency does intend to file a petition (or at least wishes to consider the possibility of filing), an adequate procedure - short of
nonacquiescence - is available to protect its interests: it may
apply for a stay pending disposition of its petition, thus removing any duty to adhere to the circuit court ruling.54 5 The government, it bears emphasis, is required to secure a stay when
seeking interim relief from other consequences of a circuit
court judgment.546 No clear reason suggests why it should not
be bound in similar fashion to secure a stay from the obligation
541. Cf Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989) (judgment becomes "final" for purposes of habeas corpus retroactivity purposes when certiorari denied by Supreme Court).

542. See supra note 418 and accompanying text.
543. See, eg., Jones v. Superintendent, Va. State Farm, 465 F.2d 1091, 1094
(4th Cir. 1972) ("any decision is... a precedent"), cert denied, 410 U.S. 944
(1973); see also cases cited supra note 518 (agencies bound by circuit court
precedent).
544. See Anderson v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 1011, 1013 (4th Cir. 1985) (precedents binding "until they are displaced by higher authority or are overruled by
this court"); Beverly Enters. v. NLRB, 727 F.2d 591, 593 (6th Cir. 1984) (citing
"basic doctrine that, until reversed, the dictates of a Court of Appeals must be

adhered to" (emphasis added)); Ithaca College v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 224, 228 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 975 (1980).
545. See 28 U.S.C. § 2101(f) (1988); FED. R. APP. P. 41(b). One might argue
that the "stay" order described here is not a stay order at all, because it envisions blocking the effect of a precedent - not of a judgment. Regardless of
whether that is technically accurate, courts clearly should have the power to
issue such an order pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1988).
546. See Diller & Morawetz, supra note 4, at 824 n.88.
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to respect such a decision's precedential force.5 7
Finally, a nonfinality exemption to the rule of required acquiescence could raise troublesome problems of application.
For example, what if a court of appeals strikes down an agency
rule and then remands the case for district court reconsideration? May the agency persist in applying its invalidated rule on
the theory that it might seek certiorari years later following
district court action on remand and the predictable return trip
to the court of appeals?- 48 An elegant rule banning flatly all
intracircuit disregard of all circuit court precedents would do
more than remove such practical difficulties; it would send the
strongest signal of the potency with which the Constitution
condemns intracircuit nonacquiescence. 549
CONCLUSION
The structure of American government rests in the end on
"postulates which limit and control. '550 One such postulate
holds that the core authority of each branch of our government
must be vigilantly protected in order to maintain a workable
separation of powers. Another postulate holds that a special
task of the judicial branch is to ensure that the other branches
conform their actions to the rule of law. This Article shows
that a proper elaboration of these two presuppositions condemns intracircuit nonacquiescence to the constitutional dustheap. Many subtleties lurk in the truism that it is "the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is."' 1 In the end, however, there is no subtlety in applying
this principle to intracircuit nonacquiescence; a practice so disruptive of judicial authority and so lacking in persuasive justifications plainly violates the Constitution's separation of powers.

547. See Conference Transcript, supra note 4, at 81 (remarks of Judge
Sofaer) (questioning Estreicher and Revesz proposal because it removes nonacquiescence issue from "a traditional remedial context such as a stay or something of that kind"); see also Ithaca College, 623 F.2d at 228 (suggesting that
agency can "stay its proceedings" in other like cases pending Supreme Court
disposition of challenged decision).
548. See, e.g., Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Bangor
& Aroostook R.R., 389 U.S. 327, 328 (1967) (indicating that Supreme Court is
unlikely to grant certiorari in interlocutory matters, as when the court of appeals remands to the district court).
549. See supra note 524.
550. Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934) (Hughes,

C.J.).
551.

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803).

